Defense Primer: Army Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

As an operational concept, Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) influence what types of weapon systems and equipment the Army procures, what types and numbers of soldiers are needed, the organizational structure of the Army, and what type of training is required—all significant congressional oversight concerns.

What Are Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)?

According to the Army's Field Manual (FM) Operations dated October 1, 2022,

Multi-Domain Operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost.

Multi-Domain Operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum. Below the threshold of armed conflict, multi-domain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.

Why Did the Army Adopt MDO?

MDO is described in a December 2018 Army publication, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028. The Army developed MDO in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy which shifted the previous focus of U.S. national security from countering violent extremists worldwide to confronting revisionist powers—primarily Russia and China—that are said to "want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions." According to The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,

China and Russia exploit the conditions of the operational environment to achieve their objectives without resorting to armed conflict by fracturing the U.S.'s alliances, partnerships, and resolve. They attempt to create stand-off through the integration of diplomatic and economic actions, unconventional and information warfare (social media, false narratives, cyber-attacks), and the actual or threatened employment of conventional forces. By creating instability within countries and alliances, China and Russia create political separation that results in strategic ambiguity reducing the speed of friendly recognition, decision, and reaction. Through these competitive actions, China and Russia believe they can achieve objectives below the threshold of armed conflict.

How the Army Intends to Compete

Arguably, competition is a critical aspect of MDO because if conducted successfully, conflict might be avoided. According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Paper #2, The Army in Military Competition, dated March 1, 2021, the Army competes in three ways:

Narrative competition is reflected in the rise and fall of a country's reputation based on general perceptions of its strength, reliability, and resolve. The Army contributes by being a lethal, competent, credible force and being recognized as such by allies, partners, and adversaries.

Direct competition encompasses the full range of competitive activities, from the lowest intensity competition below armed conflict through general state conflict. In direct competition, the objective is to create leverage for the United States and to deny leverage to adversaries.

Indirect competition's objective is to gain advantage (or deny it to the adversary). This objective is in contrast to the more forceful concept of leverage in direct competition. The Army contributes by offering a range of credible options for policymakers.

Some of these options include overseas exercises, security cooperation, security force assistance, military-to-military exchanges, overseas basing, intelligence sharing, and disaster relief. In this regard, indirect competition is not a "new" operational concept but instead a "re-designation" of traditional activities short of armed conflict. Army leadership believes if the Army and the other Services prevail in these "competitions," U.S. national security objectives should be achieved.

How MDO Is Intended to Work

The Army's central idea is to prevail by competing successfully in all domains short of conflict, thereby deterring a potential enemy. If deterrence fails, Army and Joint forces are to

• Penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems (layered and integrated long-range precision-strike systems, littoral anti-ship capabilities, air defenses, and long-range artillery and rocket systems) to enable strategic and operational maneuver of U.S. forces.
• Dis-integrate—disrupt, degrade, or destroy A2/AD systems to enable operational and tactical maneuver of U.S. forces.
• Exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to achieve operational and strategic objectives by defeating enemy forces in all domains.
• Re-compete—consolidate gains across domains and force a return to competition on favorable terms to the United States and allies.

How Will MDO Change the Organization of the Army?

As part of the release of The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, an Army official explained specific Army echelons are to be given different "problems" to address under MDO. Existing Divisions and Corps are to be tasked with fighting and defeating specific components of the enemy's system. As such, the Army will no longer organize or center itself on Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as it did under previous National Defense Strategies. Under the previous BCT-centered organizational construct, Divisions and Corps had a limited warfighting role, but under MDO, Divisions and Corps headquarters are to return to their historic warfighting roles, in which they employed subordinate units and allocated Corps and Division-level assets to support subordinate units.

Under MDO, the Army plans to field five different types of divisions across the Active and Reserve Components:

• The Armored Division is to be optimized with armored breaching and bridging assets to conduct the military's most difficult mission: defeating an adversary's deliberate defenses (penetration).
• Airborne and Air Assault Divisions are to be capable of joint forcible entry with strategic and operational mobility and vertical envelopment to defeat an adversaries' defense.
• The Standard (Heavy) and Standard (Light) Divisions are to be organized with mixes of brigade combat team types and task-organized to conduct a broad scope of missions worldwide.

The Army is also creating five Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs). MDTFs are to be theater-level units to coordinate effects and fires in all domains against A2/AD networks.

How Will MDO Affect Army Modernization?

According to an August 2022 Army report to Congress in response to S.Rept. 117-39 to accompany S. 2792, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, MDO-specific modernization is to be

focused signature modernization to provide a specific portion of the force with doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policies that enable MDO.

The portion of the Total Force that will undergo focused signature-modernization includes three theater headquarters, four corps, six divisions (including one Army National Guard [ARNG]), and 25 BCTs (including five in the ARNG). The balance of the Army's combat forces—five Regular [Active] Army and seven ARNG Divisions—are to be modernized after 2030, depending on the progress of the Army's focused modernization effort and fiscal considerations.

As of 2024, it remains unclear how much of this MDO-focused modernization has been accomplished in both the Active Army and Army National Guard.

Concerns with the Army's MDO Doctrine

While the Army continues to emphasize the importance and necessity of MDO in supporting the national security strategy, some have expressed concern. One commentary notes,

Despite its faddishness, or perhaps because of it, the multi-domain operations concept is now guiding the transformation and modernization of Western armed forces and of their peers. Yet, there are real concerns about whether multi-domain operations will mature into a fully functional warfighting concept or whether it will go by the wayside like effect-based operations in the past.

The authors further suggest the following:

• New concepts are often highly optimistic, uncoordinated with other services and allies, and lack any clear theory of success.
• Most concepts fall prey to technological overconfidence, particularly in the field of communications. Assured connectivity in combat is central to nearly all multi-domain operations.
• The effective implementation of MDO depends on the availability of mature technologies, in sufficient numbers, deployed by trained and ready forces.
• Experiences in Ukraine and the Middle East do not necessarily conform the how MDO postulates future conflict and that "claims to be able to see all, move quickly, and strike anywhere in order to rapidly resolve a conflict with minimum civilian impact are once again being challenged."
• MDO "does not sit well within existing political and military structures. This is particularly the case when a new concept seems to put the military or defense in a leading or coordinating role for other [governmental] ministries or departments."