Overview
The Biden Administration has boosted the profile of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aka "the Quad," as a centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy aimed at strengthening the United States' commitment to the region. The four-country coalition, comprised of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, claims a common platform of standing for a rules-based order, protecting freedom of navigation, and promoting democratic values in the region. The leaders have held three summits, with plans for a fourth in Sydney in 2023. The activities of the Quad may be of interest to Congress given its oversight responsibilities, attention to security alliances, and concern about China's power and influence in the region.
Since President Biden took office, the Quad has focused on areas beyond traditional security, but concerns about China's growing influence and military assertiveness appear to undergird the group's motives. Without explicitly referencing China, the most recent (May 2022) joint statement reiterates the Quad's commitment "to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion." When the partners first held a series of Quad meetings in 2007, China denounced them as an attempt to encircle it. The effort dissipated amid member leadership transitions, concerns about economic repercussions from China, and attention to other national interests. Revitalization of the group began in 2017 and has accelerated since 2020, bringing similar accusations from Beijing, and crystallizing the geopolitical and economic risks for Quad members. China is among the top three trading partners for all four Quad countries, and each is reliant on China for stable supply chains.
Questions remain about how the Quad defines itself and its goals. Critics point to the Quad's inability to speak with one voice on regional issues, the absence of collaborative democracy promotion efforts, a dearth of joint military operations, and a lack of institutional structure as limits on its effectiveness. Does it compete with or complement other regional groupings? Will it remain limited to the four founders or open its membership to others? Is it durable in the face of leadership changes in member countries? Can it be effective without a strong economic pillar to counter China's dominance in regional trade arrangements? In many observers' view, India's participation in the group is particularly precarious given its traditional reluctance to join regional or ideological blocs.
Quad Activities
A September 2021 Quad Leaders' Summit produced a statement outlining four broad areas of cooperation: vaccine production and distribution; climate change mitigation efforts and clean energy development; the promotion of transparency and high-standard governance in the field of critical and emerging technologies; and the development of a regional infrastructure partnership.
With several other mechanisms available to distribute vaccine doses, the Quad has re-oriented itself to other priorities. Climate change mitigation remains a focus, with the four countries announcing a Quad Climate Change and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP) to address mitigation and resilience in the Indo-Pacific region. One area of cooperation is green shipping and clean energy supply chains. Although the Quad has working groups on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and infrastructure, no specific efforts have been announced.
At the May 2022 summit, the leaders announced the establishment of a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, with an emphasis on tracking vessels involved in illegal fishing. Some advocates point to this initiative as a strong example of how the Quad can deliver public goods to the region, particularly if the program expanded to include training of regional forces to enhance enforcement. Further global health cooperation, building on the initial effort to distribute vaccine doses, could also burnish the reputation of the Quad among Indo-Pacific countries.
Growing Security Cooperation
Although the Quad has emphasized non-security areas in joint statements, military cooperation has expanded among the four countries. Annual Malabar joint naval exercises, originally bilateral between the United States and India, later added Japan as a permanent member in 2015, and since 2020 have included Australia. U.S. Defense officials say Malabar could be a potent war-fighting exercise that deepens trust and interoperability among the four militaries in the air and sea domains. All four militaries operate compatible anti-submarine warfare systems, making this a particularly promising area of cooperation.
In addition to Malabar, Quad countries are increasing bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises with one another that may accelerate the building of integrated capabilities. Examples of these exercises include the India-Australia biennial AUSINDEX naval exercise, the Japan-India JIMEX exercise in the North Arabian Sea, and the large multilateral biennial Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise, which includes all four countries. In 2023, Japan and India held their first-ever joint fighter air drills. As U.S. treaty allies, Australia and Japan regularly hold large-scale exercises with the U.S. military.
Japan's Role
Japan led efforts to invigorate the Quad; former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated in July 2022, was a leading champion of the concept. Japan's eagerness to pursue the Quad appears driven above all by its concern over China's increasing power, influence, and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as its own territorial disputes and history of conflict with China. Japan is anxious to establish a regional order that is not defined by China's economic, geographic, and strategic dominance.
While the U.S. alliance remains fundamental to its security, Japan has worked steadily to build closer security ties with both Australia and India. For the past decade Japan has deepened defense relations with Australia, and the two concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement (similar to a Status of Forces Agreement) to define rules and procedures for visiting troops. Australia uses practices and equipment similar to those of Japan, which may make cooperation relatively more accessible. Japan has inked an Acquisition and Cross-servicing Agreement with India, along with agreements concerning the protection of classified military information and transfer of defense equipment and technology. Bilateral exercises with both countries have grown in number and sophistication.
In late 2022, Japan released updated security documents that could transform its approach to security and significantly enhance its deterrent capabilities. In addition to advancing its own capabilities, Japan is deepening its defense relationships with other like-minded countries in the region, particularly those in the Quad.
Australia's Evolving Strategic Posture
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese demonstrated the importance of the Quad to Australia by attending the May 2022 meeting in Tokyo only hours after being sworn in. The Australian government describes the Quad as a pillar of its Indo-Pacific agenda supporting a free and open region free from coercion. The Quad is also a key diplomatic network that complements Australia's other bilateral, regional, and multilateral relationships. Australia is updating its national security posture, including its relations with allies and partners, in large part because of rising concerns with China's increasing power and influence.
The United States and Australia are allies under the 1951 ANZUS alliance. Since September 2021, Australia's effort to promote military capability development collaboration has increasingly focused on the AUKUS agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The AUKUS pact will give Australia access to U.S. and U.K. nuclear propulsion technology for its new fleet of submarines, as well as access to other weapons systems and military capabilities. Decisions about Australia's future submarine program and a new Defence Strategic Review are due to be released in March 2023.
Australia is concerned about China's recent security pact with the Solomon Islands, which largely focuses on domestic security threats, and which some fear will open the way for a PRC military presence in the South Pacific. Australia has responded to growing geopolitical uncertainty by passing foreign interference legislation, expanding diplomatic ties, and increasing its defense budget, with plans to expand the size of its military.
Australia and Japan have solidified security and economic ties with a series of bilateral agreements. In June 2020, Australia and India signed a Mutual Logistics Sharing Agreement and announced the elevation of their bilateral ties to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Australia is scheduled to host the next Quad meeting in mid-2023.
India's Motivations
Delhi's pursuit of "strategic autonomy" in foreign affairs has led to an aversion to international alliances and wariness toward formalized multilateral engagements. India is the only Quad member that is not a U.S. alliance partner and the only to share a land border (and conflict) with China. Beijing has no maritime disputes in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). Delhi's skepticism about U.S. strategic intent in Asia lingers, and some analysts doubt that India can be a net-provider of security in the Indo-Pacific. India's neutrality on the war in Ukraine—Russia is a decades-old "strategic partner" to India—makes it an outlier among Quad members, leading to questions about Delhi's commitment to core Quad values. These factors lead some observers call India the "weak link" of the Quad.
2020 was a watershed year in the hardening of India's posture toward China, which Delhi's leaders identify as their primary security challenge. Relations became more acrimonious after Indian and Chinese troops clashed along their disputed frontier in spring 2020 and the military standoff continues today. Delhi has become more welcoming of ties with external actors—Quad members, France, the United Kingdom, and others—that may help to balance against Chinese "transgressions." Chinese economic and military support for India's traditional rival, Pakistan, increased Chinese naval deployments to India's region, and major Chinese infrastructure investments along India's periphery undergird Delhi's concerns. India has rejected participation in both Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in apparent resistance to a China-led Asia order.
However, many Indians remain uncertain about how the Quad mechanism fits into India's longer-term regional strategy. India has extensive interests in the Persian Gulf and the western Indian Ocean, regions beyond the defined purview of both the Quad and of the Pentagon's Indo-Pacific Command. Delhi is likely to continue moderating the pace at which the grouping operationalizes its initiatives, particularly in security goals.