Background

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "to raise and support Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," and "to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." It also provides the Senate with the authority to provide "Advice and Consent" on presidential nominations of "all other Officers of the United States," including military officers.¹ On the basis of its constitutional authority, Congress has passed laws that govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations.

The most senior officers in the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force are known as general officers. The most senior officers in the Navy² are known as flag officers. The phrase "general and flag officers," or "GFOs," refers to all officers in paygrades O-7 through O-10, thereby including one-star, two-star, three-star, and four-star officers. At the highest level, O-10, GFOs hold the most visible and important military positions in the Department of Defense (DOD), including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the five military services, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and the combatant commanders. At the lowest level, O-7, they hold positions that span an array of roles, including commanders, deputy commanders, and key staff roles in large organizations.

This report provides an overview of active-duty GFOs in the U.S. Armed Forces—including duties, statutory controls, authorizations, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, and issues for Congress including criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions and recurring GFO oversight questions. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active-duty caps on GFOs.

Given the authority granted to GFOs, Congress has developed a statutory framework applicable to this group and considers changes to these laws as it deems appropriate. Congress also periodically reviews the number, duties, and compensation of GFOs. A frequent tension during these reviews has been DOD requests for additional GFOs versus congressional concerns that there are too many GFOs. As one senior DOD official noted during a 1997 congressional hearing,

throughout our history there has been a dialogue, just as is going on now, that has ebbed and flowed between the Congress and the military on the number of general and flag officers we need.... I think it is fair to say that over the years, the Congress has consistently taken the view that we have needed fewer general and flag officers, and that we have taken the opposite view, that we needed more than the Congress would allow. These debates tended to intensify during periods of major downsizing and restructuring of our forces, such as after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and now after the cold war.³

References in this report to specific grades (ranks) within the GFO corps use the appropriate capitalized title, insignia, or paygrade as indicated in Table 1.

Responsibilities of GFO Positions

While Congress has specified functions or duties for some key positions—such as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,⁴ the top two officers of each service (i.e., service chiefs and vice chiefs),⁵ the combatant commanders,⁶ the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command,⁷ the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command,⁸ and the Chief and Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau⁹—the majority of GFO positions are not defined in statute. In these instances, DOD uses the following criteria for determining whether a position should be filled by a general or flag officer:

• nature, characteristics, and function of the position;
• grade and position of superior, principal subordinates, and lateral points of coordination;
• degree of independence of operation;
• official relations with other U.S. and foreign governmental positions;
• magnitude of responsibilities;
• mission and special requirements;
• number, type, and value of resources managed and employed;
• forces, personnel, value of equipment, total obligation authority;
• geographic area of responsibility;
• authority to make decisions and commit resources;
• development of policy;
• national commitment to international agreements;
• impact on national security and other national interests; and
• effect on the prestige of the nation or the armed force.¹⁰

Statutory Controls on GFO Authorizations

Congress has established a statutory framework for GFOs, which limits their numbers by grade, requires presidential determination of many three-star and four-star positions, and specifies the grade and/or duties of certain key positions. This framework provides for greater congressional control over the most senior GFO positions, while providing substantial latitude to the executive branch in the management of the remaining GFOs.

Positions to which DOD is required or may choose to assign a GFO may be designated as joint duty assignments. Such positions may reside in joint activities (e.g., the Joint Staff, combatant command staffs).¹¹ All other positions normally reside in the respective services (e.g., the Army Staff, division, wing, or higher commands).¹²

The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (FY2017 NDAA; P.L. 114-328) included a provision, codified at 10 U.S.C. §526, to reduce the number of GFOs authorized to be on active duty for more than one year, effective as of January 1, 2023. The conference report that accompanied the bill highlighted congressional concerns that the military departments had not demonstrated a willingness to implement GFO reductions directed by then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in 2011 and noted the context of significant reductions in personnel strength that occurred in the calendar year 2011-2016 time frame. ¹³

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024 NDAA; P.L. 118-31) concludes a series of legislative actions begun in the FY2017 NDAA, to lower congressionally mandated limits on the number of GFOs on active duty.

Table 2 summarizes the statutory limitations by grade for GFOs for service-specific positions.

Per the Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2670 (H.Rept. 118-301), the conferees "authorized the permanent increase in general and flag officer authorized strengths [in Section 501, by one per service] to accommodate the congressional requirement for a general or flag officer to serve as the lead special trial counsel, and [added] an increase of an additional Marine Corps general officer to address safety needs in the Marine Corps."¹⁴ There are certain circumstances under which a general or flag officer does not "count" against these caps.¹⁵ Additionally, the President has authority under Title 10, Section 527, of the U.S. Code to suspend the operation of the caps in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or the President.

Section 526(b) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code further authorizes exemption of up to 232 GFOs from the limitations of Section 526(a). Unless the Secretary of Defense determines that a lower number is in the best interest of the department, the GFOs serving in the 232 authorized joint positions shall be at least 75 Army officers, 53 Navy officers, 17 Marine Corps Officers, 68 Air Force Officers, and 6 Space Force Officers.¹⁶ Section 512 of the FY2024 NDAA amends 10 U.S.C. §10505 to require that the Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau be appointed to serve in the grade of general and that the Secretary of Defense designate this position as one of the general officer positions to be excluded from the limitations of Section 526(a) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. This position would count among those listed in Table 3.

Figure 1. Minimum Number of GFOs for Joint Positions As provided by 10 U.S.C. §526

Source: 10 U.S.C. §526. Note: 10 U.S.C. §526 does not fully allocate the joint authorizations to the Services; it allocates minimums per service.

Combining the maximum number of service and joint GFO authorizations, the maximum number of GFO positions authorized is currently 857.

Figure 2. GFO Authorizations, by Service Percentage

Source: 10 U.S.C. §§525 and 526. Note: 10 U.S.C. §526 does not fully allocate the joint authorizations to the Services; it allocates minimums per service.

Current Number of GFOs

Table 3 lists the number and flag officers on active duty, whether in service-assignment and joint assignment.

Presidential Determination for Three-Star and Four-Star Positions

Section 601 of Title 10 provides that "[t]he President may designate positions of importance and responsibility to carry the grade of general or admiral or lieutenant general or vice admiral.... An officer assigned to any such position has the grade specified for that position if he is appointed to that grade by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Thus, with the exception of those so designated in statute, all three-star and four-star positions must be designated as such by the President. Congress can review the rationale for this designation as part of its oversight function and the Senate retains the power to confirm or reject the nomination of an individual to fill such a position. The authority of the President to designate such positions is also limited by the strength caps on GFOs found in 10 U.S.C. §§525 and 526.

Statutorily Defined Positions

Congress has established in law certain GFO positions with specified grades, designated duties, or both. Those GFOs named in 10 U.S.C. §151, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands comprise most of these positions.

Statutory Grades

Congress has specified the grade for certain positions. For example, 10 U.S.C. §152 specifies that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff holds the rank of General or Admiral. Similar language also exists for the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the top two officers of each service, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, the Commander of U.S. Cyber Command, and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. The Appendix highlights some positions with statutorily required grades. Congress may change these statutory grades. For example, in 2008, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau from Lieutenant General to General.¹⁷ Additionally, Section 502 of the FY2017 NDAA amended various statutory provisions to eliminate the statutory grade for 54 positions.¹⁸ As explained in the report that accompanied the Senate version of the FY2017 NDAA, where the provision originated,

[t]he Committee determined that in order to effectively manage the reduction in the number of general and flag officers prescribed elsewhere in this Act, that the Secretary of Defense must be given the flexibility to assign appropriate officer grades to positions. The provision would not prohibit the position from being filled by an officer with the same, or a higher, or lower grade than the law currently requires.¹⁹

Statutory Duties

Positions with statutorily required grades typically have statutorily required duties as well. The Appendix provides excerpts of the statutorily required responsibilities, duties, or functions of certain GFO positions. Congress may change these duties. For example, in 2011, Congress changed the law to specify that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included "the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions."²⁰

Regular Military Compensation for GFOs

Military personnel, including GFOs, are compensated in three main ways: cash compensation (pay and allowances), noncash compensation (benefits), and deferred compensation (retired pay and benefits). This report discusses only the compensation elements that make up regular military compensation (RMC).

An Overview of Regular Military Compensation

RMC is a statutorily defined measure of the major compensation elements that every servicemember receives. It is widely used as a basic measure of military cash compensation levels and for comparisons with civilian salary levels. RMC, as defined in law, is "the total of the following elements that a member of the uniformed services accrues or receives, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind every payday: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and Federal tax advantage accruing to the aforementioned allowances because they are not subject to Federal income tax."²¹ Certain GFOs receive a "personal money allowance" as well. This is not part of RMC.

RMC for GFOs

Table 4 provides the average RMC that GFOs received in 2023. It assumes that all GFOs receive a basic allowance for housing (BAH) rather than living in government provided housing.²²

Considerations for Congress

Proportion of GFOs in the Force

Historical Perspective

A summary of the number of active-duty GFOs and the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force over the past five decades is provided in Table 5. A review of GFO levels indicates a 2.8% increase in the number of four-star officers (36 on September 30, 1965, versus 37 on September 30, 2023) and an 11% increase in the number of three-star officers (119 versus 132), with variations over time related to current events. At the same time, the number of one-star and two-star officers has decreased by about 43.3% (1,129 versus 640).

During this time, the size of the total force dropped by approximately 51.5%, from 2.66 million on September 30, 1965, to 1.29 million on September 30, 2023. Thus, a more salient measure may be the proportion of GFOs to the total force.

Looking at the data from this perspective, it is clear that although GFOs have always made up a very small percentage of the total force, the GFO corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, whereas they made up about one-sixteenth of one percent (0.063%) of the total force in 2023, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs has increased by 31%. This historical trend is more pronounced with respect to four-star officers (which grew from 0.0014% of the total force to 0.0029%, a 107% increase) and three-star officers (which grew from 0.0045% of the total force to 0.0103%, a 129% increase). One- and two-star officers as a percentage of the total force increased less demonstrably (from 0.0425% of the total force to 0.0500%, a 17.6% increase).

These increases occurred at the same time that the size of the officer corps in general was increasing as a percentage of the total force. As indicated in the last column of Table 5, between 1965 and 2023, the officer corps increased from 12.76% of the total force in 1965 to 18.22% in 2023, indicating that the share of the total force made up of officers increased by 42.8%.

Overview of Effects of Legislative Action from 2017 Through 2023

The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) was enacted on December 23, 2016. Section 501 stipulates the purpose was to "reduce the number of general and flag officers on active duty by 110 from the aggregate authorized number of general and flag officers authorized by sections 525 and 526 of title 10, United States Code, as of December 31, 2015." The FY2024 NDAA, in Section 501, codified and generally affirmed this purpose.

Overall, the reduction is for 100 GFOs, or 11% of the GFO population. With respect to the total force, GFOs made up about one-fourteenth of one percent (0.069%) of the total force in 2015, whereas they made up about one-sixteenth of one percent (0.063%) of the total force in 2023, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs has decreased by 8.7%. Four-star officers dropped by one, from 38 to 37, remaining at 0.0029% of the force. Three-star officers dropped from 141 to 132, a 6.4% population drop that reduced them from 0.0107% to 0.0103% of the force. One- and two-star officers dropped from 730 to 640, a 12.33% population drop that reduced them from 0.0556% to 0.0500% of the force.

Criticisms of Increasing the Proportion of GFOs

There have been two principal criticisms raised against increasing the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force. The first criticism revolves around the increased cost of employing a GFO compared with employing a lower-ranking officer. The second relates to the belief that too many GFOs slow down decisionmaking processes. Each point is explained in more detail below.

• Cost. GFOs cost more to employ than officers of a lower rank. In part, this is due to the higher compensation they receive. For example, the average GFO in paygrade O-7 receives $251,058 in RMC²³ in 2024, while the average officer in paygrade O-6 receives $220,275. Additionally, there can be other costs associated with GFOs, particularly at higher grades, such as the costs of larger staffs, official travel, security details, and aides.²⁴ An example of this perspective was provided by a witness at a 2011 congressional hearing, who stated, "The progression towards a more top-heavy force is not without its consequences.... The cost of officers increases markedly with their rank, so taxpayers are overpaying whenever a GFO is in a position that could be filled by a lower ranking officer."²⁵
• Decisionmaking. Another criticism is that an increasing proportion of GFOs slows decisionmaking by adding additional layers of management between the highest echelons of command and the lowest. In a 2010 speech, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates criticized the impact of an increase in GFOs and senior civilians in making the DOD a top-heavy and overly bureaucratic organization:

During the 1990s, the military saw deep cuts in overall force structure—the Army by nearly 40 percent. But the reduction in flag officers—generals and admirals—was about half that. The Department's management layers—civilian and military—and numbers of senior executives outside the services grew during that same period. Almost a decade ago, Secretary Rumsfeld lamented that there were 17 levels of staff between him and a line officer. The Defense Business Board recently estimated that in some cases the gap between me and an action officer may be as high as 30 layers.... Consider that a request for a dog-handling team in Afghanistan—or for any other unit—has to go through no fewer than five four-star headquarters in order to be processed, validated, and eventually dealt with. This during an era when more and more responsibility—including decisions with strategic consequences—is being exercised by young captains and colonels on the battlefield.²⁶

Justifications for Increasing the Proportion of GFOs

The increasing proportion of GFOs in comparison to the total force has been a topic of particular interest during past congressional hearings.²⁷ During these hearings, and particularly during a 1997 congressional review of GFO authorizations, witnesses from the DOD put forth a number of rationales for this growth, including the following:

• Coalition operations. A rationale used to explain the increased proportion of GFOs has been an increased emphasis by the United States on forging coalitions with other nations to achieve common security objectives. This has, in turn, generated a demand for senior military leaders to conduct coordinated planning, training, and operations with their peers from foreign nations. The argument is also linked to the number of contingency operations the U.S. military has conducted since the end of the Cold War, which have often involved forces from dozens of countries, including the forces of the nation in which the operations take place. Examples of these coalition operations include Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as smaller-scale contingencies such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo (ongoing), Somalia (ongoing), and Syria (ongoing). Contingency operations such as these are often commanded by a GFO, who usually has additional GFOs as subordinate commanders and senior staff officers. Both their experience and the authority inherent in their grade can be considered important elements to the success of complex operations. Political and diplomatic considerations can also be a factor, as the officers leading these operations are normally expected to interact with the senior military and civilian leadership of the foreign nation where the operations are occurring.
• Organizational structure. As noted previously, the increase in the proportion of GFOs over the past 50 years has not been due to an increase in the number of GFOs, but to the much larger decrease in the size of the Armed Forces in general. In part, this slower reduction of GFOs is due to the organizational structure of the Armed Forces, which includes certain GFO positions whether the Armed Forces are comparatively large or small. For example, there was a Chief of Staff of the Air Force at the peak of the Vietnam War, when the Air Force had about 900,000 airmen, and there is one today, when the Air Force has approximately 315,000 airmen. A similar case can be made for many of the GFOs who serve on the Joint Staff, the Service Staffs, the combatant commands, and certain defense agencies. Given the organizational structure and "posture" of the Armed Forces—some of which is required by law—the amount of management "overhead" does not necessarily change in direct proportion to the size of the force. Another way of illustrating this is to consider what would happen if an Army division were disestablished: doing so would eliminate about 15,000 soldiers, but only three of them would be general officers.
• Technological changes. A fourth justification for increased GFO ratios is that technological advances have changed the way the United States fights its wars. Modern weapons systems, much more powerful and accurate than their predecessors, require fewer personnel to deliver greater firepower. Thus, while the number of personnel a GFO commands may decline as more sophisticated equipment is substituted for manpower, the lethality of those forces may increase. From this perspective, the lethality of the weapons systems, rather than the number of people, provides the justification for an organization to be led by a very senior military officer. Additionally, the advent and development of new domains of warfare—such as space and cyber—has led to the creation of new organizations (e.g., U.S. Space Force) to exploit advantages and defend against vulnerabilities in those environments.
• Budget changes. The budgets appropriated for defense have increased, as have expectations of their management. (DOD outlays are depicted in Figure 3.) As with the increased sophistication of operations and weaponry, increased budgets over time and responsibility for budgets that amount to over one half of federal discretionary spending may require more senior-level management.

Figure 3. National Defense Outlays, FY1940-FY2028 (Projected)

Sources: CRS Report R47582, FY2024 Defense Budget Request: Context and Selected Issues for Congress, by Cameron M. Keys and Brendan W. McGarry. Figure created by CRS using data from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Budget of the United States Government, FY2024, Historical Tables, Table 3.1 and Table 10.1, March 2023, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Budget and Economic Data, Spending Projections, by Budget Account, February 2023. Notes: Figures adjusted to estimated constant FY2024 dollars using "Total Defense" deflator in OMB Table 10.1. FY2021-FY2022 amounts from OMB; FY2023-FY2028 projections from CBO.

Recurring Questions for Congress in Managing GFO Authorizations

Congress has a long-standing interest in the military officer corps in general, and it has periodically focused additional attention on its most senior officers. Should Congress elect to address GFO authorizations, duties, compensation, or other related topics in more detail, it may consider the following:

• What about a task or role requires a senior military officer, especially in terms of advanced managerial skills, versus a senior civilian?
• How do advances in information technology and decisionmaking tools affect the need for GFOs? Could use of these technologies result in flattened management structures and decrease the need for GFOs? Or do they require additional GFOs with specialized expertise?
• What is the most appropriate way to determine how many GFOs the DOD should have? How closely should this be linked to total force size? What other factors would be useful in determining the optimal number of GFOs?
• To what extent do statutory requirements, such as the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), drive GFO requirements? Should GNA be revised to alter this effect?
• Could organizational restructuring of the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, and combatant command staffs decrease the need for GFOs or allow positions to be held by lower pay-grade officers? Could selected organizations be merged to reduce the requirements for GFOs?
• Could military relations with international partners be restructured so as to reduce the need for GFO representation? How important is rank equivalence when senior U.S. military personnel work with their allied peers?
• Could National Guard and Reserve GFOs be used to reduce the need for active-duty GFOs?
• Are there GFO positions that could be eliminated or "downgraded" to a lower rank? Are there GFO positions that could be replaced by civilian employees? What are the costs and benefits associated with these actions? How might this affect military effectiveness?
• Can the direct and indirect costs associated with GFOs be reduced? For example, could staff overhead costs be reduced without significantly affecting the ability of GFOs to carry out their duties?

Appendix. Selected Positions with Statutorily Specified Grades and/or Responsibilities