Overview

India is characterized by U.S. officials as an emerging great power, strategic partner of the United States, and key potential counterweight to the People's Republic of China (PRC or China)'s growing international clout.¹ The country is South Asia's dominant actor with 1.4 billion citizens and the world's fifth-largest economy, recently surpassing that of the United Kingdom. New Delhi has long pursued "strategic autonomy" in foreign affairs; it welcomes a multipolar world and aspires to be "a leading power, rather than just a balancing power."² Since 2005, the United States and India have pursued a strategic partnership, and bilateral security cooperation has expanded, including through defense trade and combined military exercises. Bilateral trade and investment also have generally grown in that timeframe, although India accounts for a relatively small share of U.S. total trade.³ The Administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump sought to strengthen the U.S.-India partnership, and the Trump Administration identified India as a leading player in the U.S. efforts to secure the vision of a "free and open Indo-Pacific."⁴ The Indian-American community—more than 4 million strong and relatively wealthy and well-educated—is increasingly influential in American politics.⁵

The Administration of President Joe Biden has continued to expand and deepen U.S.-India ties, working with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in office since 2014.⁶ In 2022, much U.S. foreign policy attention focused on the U.S.-China rivalry and on the Indian government's neutral posture toward Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Despite divergences on the latter issue, U.S. and Indian leaders continue to issue strongly positive remarks on the state of the partnership. This was demonstrated most recently following the January 2023 launch of a sweeping bilateral initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), as well as with a May 2023 Leaders' Summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or "Quad"—which also includes Japan and Australia.⁷

The U.S. Congress remains broadly positive in its posture toward the U.S.-India strategic partnership, despite some areas of friction that attract congressional attention.⁸ U.S.-India cooperation on defense, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although progressing rapidly on several fronts and improved relative to that of only a decade ago, still faces institutional and political obstacles. U.S. officials have taken issue with India's cooperative relations with Russia, where Indian officials see vital interests. U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress also raise concerns about human rights in India, including 2019 changes to the status of India's Jammu and Kashmir region, proposed changes to India's citizenship laws, religious persecution, and signs of democratic backsliding, among others.⁹

India's economy, while slowly changing, continues to be a relatively closed one, with barriers to trade and investment deterring foreign business engagement. According to the State Department's 2022 Investment Climate Statements, "India remains a challenging place to do business."¹⁰ U.S. officials and firms regularly criticize India's intellectual property (IP) protection regime. The Trump Administration took some significant trade actions, including terminating India's eligibility for the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) over market access concerns.¹¹ Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved. During the Biden Administration, the United States and India have revived ministerial-level meetings of their bilateral Trade Policy Forum (TPF) to engage on trade and investment issues.

India's government calls the United States "a crucial strategic partner of India in the Indo-Pacific and in the Quad framework."¹² In 2022, India arguably emerged as "the world's ultimate swing state."¹³ While enthusiasm for the U.S.-India partnership is palpable in both capitals, historical complications presenting sometimes mismatched objectives persist. As articulated by one longtime U.S. observer, the United States and India have "divergent ambitions for their security partnership": "New Delhi will never involve itself in any U.S. confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security."¹⁴ Another U.S.-based analyst argues that, because "India is willing and potentially able to assist it in constraining Beijing's expansive regional ambitions," the United States should continue to support India's efforts to expand its military capabilities and diplomatic influence.¹⁵

Prime Minister Modi is set to be in Washington, DC, in late June for the third state visit of the Biden Administration (after the presidents of France and South Korea). The White House announcement states the visit "will affirm the deep and close partnership between the United States and India and the warm bonds of family and friendship that link Americans and Indians together."¹⁶ U.S. congressional leadership, noting the two countries' "shared values and commitment to global peace and prosperity," invited Modi to address a Joint Meeting of Congress during his visit.¹⁷ U.S. business interests view the visit as an opportunity to increase bilateral trade, perhaps especially in the private and defense sectors.¹⁸ The Indian leader has planned several events with a largely welcoming Indian-American diaspora community, although some among them are more critical.¹⁹ Indian political opposition figures also offer criticisms.²⁰ Among potential "deliverables" during the state visit is an unprecedented deal that would allow General Electric to manufacture its advanced F414 jet engines in India (subject to congressional approval). India's defense ministry also reportedly has approved the purchase of 31 armed MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones from the United States in a landmark deal worth more than $3 billion.²¹

Considerations for Congress

As India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi is welcomed for a state visit to the U.S. capital, Members may consider what legislative and oversight roles Congress can play in key issue areas likely to arise during his visit, including

• The Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, including how the strategy conceives and approaches India's role; the resourcing required to meet stated U.S. goals; the ways in which India's rivalry and border conflict with the PRC affects New Delhi's policy preferences in its engagements with both the United States and the Quad; and how to facilitate India's navigation of its newly articulated pursuit of "multi-alignment" while keeping India as an effective U.S. partner.
• The optimal balancing of U.S. democratic values and respect for human rights with the pursuit of other U.S. interests in relations with India; the potential implications for the United States of further democratic backsliding in India; and how Congress may wish to conduct oversight of the Administration's handling of democracy and human rights concerns with respect to India.
• What issues, if any, to direct the Administration to prioritize in U.S. trade policy on India; the adequacy of current mechanisms to engage on bilateral trade issues as well as on regional and global economic issues of shared concern; any opportunities, if desired, for expanded cooperation on trade issues.
• If and how Congress may wish to adjust existing U.S. laws and regulations that may hinder the kind of defense trade and defense industrial cooperation with India that is sought by the Administration, as well as the means by which the aspirations of the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) can be best and most efficiently realized, should some Members support that initiative.
• The potential implications of a prolonged war in Ukraine if India continues its large-scale purchases of Russian energy supplies and other commodities, thus indirectly aiding Moscow's ability to continue prosecuting that war, as well as the pace at which India reduces its dependence on Russian defense equipment. Congress may consider whether to conduct oversight of the Administration's handling of CAATSA sanctions provisions with respect to India.

U.S.-India Strategic and Security Relations

The Biden Administration calls U.S. relations with India among the most consequential of the 21^st century. Its February 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy presents 10 "core lines of action" to pursue, among them support for "India's continued rise and regional leadership," with India called "a like-minded partner" in the region.²² The Administration's National Security Strategy (NSS, issued in October 2022)—which prioritizes "maintaining an enduring competitive edge" over China—counts the Quad among "a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world." The NSS also includes the "I2U2"—a new minilateral grouping of the United States, India, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates—in this latticework.²³

Reflecting the priority placed on expanding cooperation with key regional partners, President Biden initiated the Quad's first-ever summit-level meeting (held virtually) less than two months after taking office. The March 2021 meeting produced the forum's first Joint Statement, noting a collective striving for an Indo-Pacific region "that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion."²⁴ The March 2023 Quad Ministerial statement notably included language opposing "any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo or increase tensions" in the South and East China Seas (India had previously resisted signing on to implicit criticisms of PRC actions so as not to antagonize Beijing).²⁵ All four Quad leaders met again in Japan in May 2023 and identified 10 key areas for Quad cooperation.²⁶ They also issued a "Vision Statement" outlining four Quad principals focused on prosperity and stability in the Indo-Pacific in accordance with international law, respect for the centrality of regional institutions, and a practical Quad agenda to deliver economic and social value.²⁷ New Delhi is concurrently deepening and expanding its security and other ties with Japan and Australia.

India is the only Quad member to share a land border with China and the only one to operate outside of the U.S.-led alliance system. Its leaders typically emphasize "inclusiveness" in the Indo-Pacific. Until 2020, India had taken a cautious approach to Quad engagement, possibly due to uncertainty about U.S. strategic intent and to avoid antagonizing China. Since India's border disputes with China led to violent and lethal clashes in mid-2020, New Delhi has engaged the Quad mechanism more enthusiastically. While Quad leaders emphasize the group is not and does not seek to become a formal military alliance, some analysts see potential for fruitful security cooperation that could advance the Biden Administration's objective of building "integrated deterrence" in the Indo-Pacific region.²⁸ India's myriad internal challenges may also constrain the country's ability to influence global affairs.²⁹

In January 2023, the United States and India formally launched a wide-ranging new bilateral initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) to foster increased bilateral cooperation on defense production, quantum computing, semiconductor supply chains, space, and other high-tech fields. iCET is distinctive in being overseen by the two countries' respective National Security Councils. Mutually-held concerns about China's growing clout and aggressive actions are widely seen to provide the context, and the two parties say the initiative is rooted in "shared democratic values and respect for universal human rights."³⁰ Enhanced collaboration on semiconductor production and supply chains could facilitate efforts in both capitals to shift away from any reliance on China for such critical technologies—the Biden Administration has said it will work to remove existing obstacles to trade with India on these and other high-technology items.³¹

The U.S. Congress formally named India as a "Major Defense Partner" (MDP) in 2016, a bespoke designation. Military exercises across all services are now routine and defense trade has emerged as a leading facet of the security partnership.³² The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY2023 (P.L. 117-263, §1260) includes provisions to further enhance defense ties. In 2020, India signed the final of four "foundational" defense cooperation accords that facilitate and, in many cases, provide the legal framework for intensified U.S.-India defense engagement.³³ President Biden has "reaffirmed the strength of the defense relationship" and the "unwavering commitment to India" as an MDP.³⁴ Bilateral cooperation also continues on counterterrorism and intelligence sharing, in particular through a long-standing Counterterrorism Joint Working Group and a Homeland Security Dialogue that was reinvigorated in 2022.³⁵ Other bilateral security fora include a Maritime Security Dialogue, a Defense Space Dialogue, a Cyber Dialogue, a Counternarcotics Working Group, and, most recently, an Advanced Domains Defense Dialogue and the Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, or "INDUS-X."³⁶

iCET's Defense Innovation and Technology Cooperation mechanism is aimed at fostering long-term research and development cooperation, and includes a Defense Industrial Cooperation Roadmap component that is expected to lead to joint production of advanced weaponry—including the potential GE jet engine deal noted above—and may accelerate progress in Washington's efforts to wean New Delhi away from its reliance on Russian-supplied defense wares. The two countries have also launched a new "Innovation Bridge" that will connect U.S. and Indian defense startups. The GE engine deal and other potential co-production projects will require adjustments to U.S. technology transfer policies, as well as reforms of Indian laws.³⁷

India's Economy and U.S.-India Trade Relations³⁸

Trade and investment ties are a key aspect of U.S.-India relations. The 118^th Congress may oversee U.S.-India trade relations and seek to shape U.S. trade policy on India. Congress may monitor whether Prime Minister's Modi upcoming state visit yields any outcomes on efforts to resolve current bilateral trade frictions such as over tariffs; or new or enhanced engagement on specific trade matters (e.g., supply chains and new technologies).

Economic Conditions

In 2022, India overtook the United Kingdom (UK) to become the world's fifth-largest economy.³⁹ India also is among the fastest-growing major economies—it grew by 6.8% in 2022 and is projected to grow by 5.9% in 2023.⁴⁰ Services, especially information technology and communications (ITC) and the digital economy, are a key part of the economy. Agriculture remains India's top jobs provider in India, but its share of India's GDP has declined, as the country's economy has diversified. India's government seeks to boost its manufacturing sector to create jobs and support self-reliance. India's 2023/2024 budget has a major focus on investing in physical and digital infrastructure.

India was projected to overtake China as the world's most populous country at the end of April 2023, with a population of more than 1.4 billion.⁴¹ India's economy features a large middle class that has driven its domestic consumption-led economic growth, but also was hard-hit by COVID-19.⁴² The country also faces challenges related to unemployment and poverty.⁴³ Other issues include inflationary pressures and weak infrastructure. India's currency, the rupee, depreciated to record lows against the U.S. dollar in 2022.

Prime Minister Modi's government has enacted some market-opening reforms and sought to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In particular, India's government aims to position the country as a viable alternative destination for companies seeking to diversify their supply chains beyond China.⁴⁴ Yet under Modi, India has raised tariffs and adopted other trade-restrictive measures—some in a declared bid to promote "self-reliance" and boost manufacturing. Some Members of Congress and other observers have responded to these restrictive measures by questioning the pace and direction of reform.⁴⁵

Trade and Investment Trends

U.S.-India bilateral trade and investment ties have generally grown over the past decade (see Figure 1). Their trade still accounts for a small share of global U.S. trade and it is more consequential for India. For example, in 2022, India was the United States' 10^th-largest goods export market by country (2.3% share of total U.S. goods exports). In comparison, the United States was India's largest market (a share of nearly one-fifth).⁴⁶ In 2022, top U.S. goods exports to India were in oil and gas, miscellaneous manufactured commodities, coal and petroleum gases, basic chemicals, waste and scrap, and aerospace products and parts. Top U.S. goods imports from India in 2022 were in miscellaneous manufactured commodities, pharmaceuticals and medicines, apparel, basic chemicals, textiles and furnishing, and petroleum and coal products.⁴⁷ In 2021, top U.S. services exports to India were travel and charges for intellectual property; the top U.S. services imports from India were various business services and telecommunications, computer, and information services.⁴⁸ Defense sales also are significant. A range of U.S. firms operate in India, across sectors. FDI from India in the United States is concentrated in information technology (IT) services, software, business services, pharmaceuticals, and industrial equipment sectors.

Select Trade Issues

India's economy presents opportunities for U.S. commercial interests.⁴⁹ At the same time, U.S.-India trade ties are characterized by a history of bilateral trade frictions over tariffs, other trade restrictions, and differences in approaches in the World Trade Organization (WTO) (discussed further below). Both sides "recogniz[e] that for economies of their size, significant potential remains unfulfilled," and aim to continue to "increase and diversify" bilateral trade.⁵⁰

Figure 1. U.S. International Trade and Investment with India

Source: CRS, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).

During the Trump Administration, bilateral tensions grew over tariffs and other policies. A trade deal to address some market access issues reportedly neared conclusion in 2020, but did not materialize. During the Biden Administration, the two nations have agreed to resolve certain bilateral trade issues and explore ways to expand trade ties.⁵¹ Persistent U.S. government concerns include India's high tariffs, unpredictable tariff regime, agricultural trade barriers, weak intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, and restrictive data policies.⁵² The concerns India's leaders have raised include U.S. temporary visa and Social Security tax policies that affect Indian nationals working in the United States. Further, U.S. Section 232 tariffs on certain U.S. imports of steel and aluminum from India, and India's retaliatory tariffs, remain unresolved.⁵³ The partners have made progress on some issues, including certain agricultural market-openings.⁵⁴ New issues of U.S. concern include India's energy trade with Russia and potential U.S. sanctions evasion (see below).⁵⁵

Notably, the partners revived their bilateral Trade Policy Forum (TPF)—the 2021 TPF ministerial was the first held in four years, and since then, the partners have continued to convene the TPF. At the January 2023 TPF ministerial, the partners discussed issues such as tariff reductions, agricultural market access, and IPR. India's representatives also expressed their government's desire for reinstatement of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); the U.S. side said that this "could be considered, as warranted, in relation to the eligibility criteria determined by" Congress.⁵⁶ Among other things, the partners agreed to establish a TPF working group on "resilient trade," focusing initially on issues such as trade facilitation, worker rights, regulatory cooperation, and environmental protection.⁵⁷

The United States and India are pursuing other economic cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor supply chains, and telecommunications (see iCET discussion above).⁵⁸ Some commentators view these moves as part of the Biden Administration's efforts to shift critical supply chains away from China.⁵⁹ India also is a focus of a Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), launched by the Group of Seven (G7) to make "strategic investments" to support infrastructure needs of low- and middle-income countries. Some commentators describe PGII as an effort to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative.⁶⁰

India is among 14 countries involved in the U.S.-led, four-pillar Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the Biden Administration's first major trade and economic initiative in the Indo-Pacific.⁶¹ India was the only country to opt out of IPEF's trade pillar, questioning the pillar's commitments on environment, labor, and other areas, while joining IPEF's three other pillars (supply chains, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anti-corruption).⁶² The trade pillar's scope and effectiveness is a point of debate among some stakeholders in the United States and abroad, given its current exclusion of tariffs.⁶³ India is negotiating trade deals with other countries, including with the European Union (EU) and the UK, and, in 2022, reached deals with Australia and the United Arab Emirates.

U.S. and Indian views diverge at times in the WTO, with some WTO members seeing India as blocking multilateral progress in negotiations on some issues over its developing country-oriented concerns.⁶⁴ At the January 2023 TPF ministerial, both sides expressed their shared intent "to work constructively at the WTO," but differences remain over some seemingly intractable issues (e.g., agricultural subsidies and market access) and other newer issues (e.g., e-commerce).

India, which holds the Group of Twenty (G-20) presidency for 2023, has indicated that it seeks to prioritize climate and the environment, "accelerated, inclusive, and resilient growth," sustainable development goals, technology and digital public infrastructure, multilateral institutions, and women-led development.⁶⁵ India is touting its G-20 presidency as an opportunity to strengthen its role in the global economic order and to shape global economic priorities.⁶⁶

Energy and Climate

India is the world's third-largest energy consumer after China and the United States. Due to its large population and use of high-emitting fuels for electricity, India is the third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO₂), despite low per capita CO₂ emissions. Reliance on coal is persistent, and the carbon intensity of India's power sector is well above the global average. Indian leaders vow to reduce carbon emissions even as energy demand grows, and they view Washington as a key partner in this effort.⁶⁷ The United States and India established a Strategic Energy Partnership in 2018 (later redubbed as the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership by the Biden Administration) and in 2021 launched a new high-level "U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership," envisaging cooperation to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement with a focus on collaboration in cleaner energy sectors. A 2022 Ministerial Joint Statement reviewed an array of "enhanced bilateral efforts."⁶⁸ Of the Administration's requested $82.5 million in FY2024 Development Assistance for India, more than three-quarters is to go toward climate adaptation, clean energy, and sustainable landscape programs.⁶⁹

Scientific assessments find India acutely vulnerable to and poorly prepared for the effects of climate change. For example, Yale University's 2022 Environmental Performance Index, which ranks countries on climate change performance, environmental health, and ecosystem vitality, placed India 180^th of 180 countries, finding especially poor performance in the categories of biodiversity and air quality. Also, as of late 2022, the independent Climate Action Tracker gives India an overall rating of "highly insufficient" (the United States is rated "insufficient"), "indicating that India's climate policies and commitments are not consistent with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C temperature limit."⁷⁰

India has taken some steps toward meeting its vows to reduce carbon emissions, including Parliament's December 2022 passage of an Energy Conservation (Amendment) Bill and the more recent launch of a $2.3 billion plan to incentivize development of a green hydrogen industry.⁷¹ At the November 2022 Climate Change Conference in Egypt (COP27), India released its national report on plans to decarbonize and reach its goal of net-zero by 2070. A senior Indian official reportedly has said India will need up to $100 billion in annual investment to reach this goal.⁷² A year earlier Prime Minister Modi had announced ambitious new national targets to address climate change, even as his government faces criticism for its refusal to "phase out" coal.⁷³ Many observers agree that Indian energy and climate policies will be crucial to global efforts to slow climate change, yet as the New Delhi government seeks to balance its decarbonization goals with efforts to forward economic development, it often favors the latter. India's projected reliance on coal beyond 2040, its continued large-scale subsidization of fossil fuel industries, and its significant perceived shortfall in "green transition" investment may combine to limit progress.⁷⁴

Space Issues and Cooperation

A U.S.-India Space Security Dialogue first met in 2015 after nearly 15 years of less formalized bilateral civil space cooperation. At the April 2022 bilateral 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, U.S. and Indian officials pledged to expand bilateral space cooperation, concluded a Memorandum of Understanding on Space Situational Awareness, and lauded ongoing collaboration between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), including on the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) satellite now scheduled for launch in 2024.⁷⁵ The iCET forum includes efforts to further foster NASA-ISRO collaboration, including expanding the agenda of the U.S.-India Civil Space Joint Working Group to include planetary defense.⁷⁶ New Delhi established a new Indian Space Association in 2021 to provide an apex body for developing India's private space and satellite industries, and ISRO reports having successfully deployed 385 foreign satellites since 1999, with 5 launch missions in 2022 alone. As India further develops its commercial space launch sector, reports suggest that U.S. companies have found India's space launch services effective and affordable.⁷⁷ India is also increasing space-related cooperation with its two other Quad partners, Japan and Australia.⁷⁸

India successfully tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in 2019, becoming the fourth country to demonstrate this capability. In 2022, the U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution for a nonbinding moratorium on ASAT tests, despite India's abstention.⁷⁹

Health Cooperation and the COVID-19 Pandemic

The U.S. government has long supported India's health sector with assistance on infectious diseases, maternal and child health care, and HIV/AIDS, among others areas. The Biden Administration has requested $48.5 million for such aid for both FY2023 and FY2024 to support the goals of preventing child and maternal death and combating infectious disease threats. The United States and India expanded cooperation to address the COVID-19 pandemic in India, and the Quad countries collaborated to accelerate vaccine production.⁸⁰ The United States allocated more than $226 million in COVID-19 relief to India, including $55 million in emergency supplies.⁸¹ India's official COVID-19 death toll (about 531,000) may grossly underreport the actual toll—the World Health Organization estimates more than 4.7 million "excess deaths" in India for 2020-2021, which would give India the world's highest mortality rate.⁸²

Immigration⁸³

India closely watches U.S. immigration policy, especially as related to the H-1B nonimmigrant visa (for temporary workers in specialty occupations). Indians account for at least two-thirds of annual H-1B visa issuances. Reforming the H-1B program has been of interest to Congress, where there is debate between Members concerned that hiring through the program displaces U.S. workers, and others who argue that U.S. employer demand for H-1B nonimmigrant workers reflects a lack of qualified U.S. workers to fill open positions, and is thus a problem for U.S. competitiveness.⁸⁴ Some U.S. officials have also raised concerns over delays in processing work authorization and status renewals for H-1B spouses living in the United States, as well as long wait times for Indians applying for visas abroad. The United States has taken steps to address processing delays related to renewals⁸⁵ and, in January 2023, the U.S. Mission in India announced a multi-pronged approach to address visa backlogs.⁸⁶ In February 2023, the State Department announced that it would pilot a program to allow temporary workers in H-1B (and L-1 status) to renew their visas without having to leave the United States.⁸⁷

Leaders in New Delhi express particular concern about Indian nationals who have been approved for employment-based Legal Permanent Resident status, but who face long wait times for a numerically limited employment-based visa to become available. U.S. immigration law prevents any one country from receiving more than 7% of such visas in a given year.⁸⁸

Human Rights⁸⁹

The U.S. government and many independent assessments identify India as the site of widespread human rights abuses, some of them perpetrated by agents of the state. By many accounts, the scale of such abuses has increased significantly under Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The State Department's 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights reviews evidence of "significant human rights issues in India." Its 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom lists extensive ongoing problems, and its 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report finds that India's anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts "inadequate compared to the scale of the problem."⁹⁰ Press freedoms, and restrictions on nongovernmental organization operations and social media companies, are further areas of concern.⁹¹ India reportedly has led the world in internet shutdowns for five consecutive years and accounts for more than half of all shutdowns worldwide since 2016.⁹² Some Members of Congress have publicly expressed concerns about religious freedom and the plight of Muslims and other religious minorities in India.⁹³ Numerous independent assessments warn that, under the Modi/BJP government, India's democratic institutions are eroding, its syncretic traditions are under threat, and its citizens' freedoms of expression and religion increasingly are being constrained by government actions.⁹⁴

In April 2022, while standing next to his Indian counterpart following a "2+2 Ministerial Meeting," Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a rare public—and apparently scripted—rebuke, saying, "[We]'re monitoring some recent concerning developments in India, including a rise in human rights abuses by some government, police, and prison officials."⁹⁵ His remarks were in response to violent, large-scale clashes between Hindus and Muslims that took place in several Indian states in 2022, as well as Hindu leaders issuing hate speech and even calls for genocide of Muslims. In June 2022, two BJP officials sparked controversy by making remarks about the Prophet Mohammed that were seen as offensive to Muslims (several Muslim countries formally condemned the remarks). More recently, the New Delhi government responded angrily to a BBC News documentary on mass-scale anti-Muslim pogroms in the state of Gujarat in 2002, during Modi's tenure as the state's chief minister. Tax officials subsequently raided BBC offices in two Indian cities.⁹⁶

Biden Administration officials insist that they raise human rights concerns with India consistently, but in private. In New Delhi in March 2023, Secretary Blinken told reporters "[We] regularly engage with our Indian counterparts to encourage the Indian government to uphold its own commitments to protect human rights, just as we look to ourselves to do the same thing." Yet some reporting suggests that inside the State Department there is frustration with "the kid-glove treatment" India receives, even in internal U.S. government documents.⁹⁷

India-Russia Relations and the War in Ukraine

Indian officials describe their "Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with Russia" as "exceptionally steady and time-tested."⁹⁸ India's five decades of close and friendly relations with the former Soviet Union and Russia may complicate the Biden Administration's pursuit of stated goals in the Indo-Pacific region, including in the context of Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Moscow's recent diplomatic outreach to key Indian rivals China and Pakistan reportedly has led to disquiet in New Delhi, with the Indian government seeking in turn to forestall any deepened Russia-China alignment by reaffirming its ties with Moscow.⁹⁹ Meanwhile, Russia remains India's top arms supplier and, although Indian officials have blamed the war in Ukraine for Russia's inability to deliver vital defense equipment, the two countries are moving forward to strengthen their defense cooperation.¹⁰⁰ U.S. officials regularly encourage India leaders to reduce their reliance on imported Russian arms.¹⁰¹ India's ongoing purchases of Russian-made weapons systems have the potential to trigger U.S. sanctions on India under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44).¹⁰²

In early 2022, New Delhi's neutrality on Russia's aggression against Ukraine—and India's abstention on all U.N. votes condemning or criticizing that invasion—met with dismay among some Members of Congress, as well as many Western analysts, who had hoped for a stronger stance from the world's most populous democracy.¹⁰³ Russia's war on Ukraine has elevated India's influence and importance on the world stage, but also has disrupted India's current presidencies of both the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.¹⁰⁴ For some observers, India's unwillingness to openly criticize Russia belies its purported commitment to "shared values" with the United States, and may squander a portion of the good will India has built in recent decades, both globally and in Washington, DC.¹⁰⁵ According to its foreign minister, India "strongly advocates a return to dialogue and diplomacy" on Russia and Ukraine, and is "clearly on the side of peace, respect for international law and support for the U.N. Charter."¹⁰⁶

Energy trade is another central feature of the India-Russia relationship and, in late 2022, Russia emerged as India's leading source of imported oil.¹⁰⁷ U.S. officials stated earlier in the year that Washington would not set "red lines" for Indian purchases of Russian oil, but did not want to see "rapid acceleration" of such imports.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, Indian purchases of Russian oil reportedly have increased 16-fold following the invasion to some 1.6 million barrels per day in December 2022, providing revenue that, by some accounts, contributes to sustaining Moscow's war effort.¹⁰⁹ In a decision welcomed by Russian leaders, India does not honor price caps on Russian petroleum products imposed by G7, European Union, and other nations as a further means of reducing revenue flows to Moscow, and India has (along with China), made purchases above the cap.¹¹⁰ The overall value of Indian imports from Russia has more than quadrupled since the February 2022 invasion as compared to earlier years.¹¹¹

To date, Biden Administration officials acknowledge the strategic and economic motivations for India's neutrality policy and appear willing to abide ongoing India-Russia ties in the pursuit of what the Administration deems to be broader U.S. interests.¹¹² Yet one former U.S. official noted the Administration's "tremendous forbearance toward India's very disappointing response" and warned that Washington's frustration may increase over time, potentially hampering relations.¹¹³

India-China Relations

India's relations with China have been fraught for decades, with significantly increased enmity in recent years. In 2020, relations saw the worst bilateral border conflict since the Sino-Indian War of 1962, significantly reducing trust and confidence in both capitals. Impasses persist over disputed frontiers, as well as China's support for Pakistan, India's key rival, and China's growing influence in India's periphery, including in the Indian Ocean. Indian officials likely are rankled by Beijing's repeated moves to obstruct imposition of U.N. sanctions on Pakistan-based terrorists. Leaders in Beijing, meanwhile, take issue with the presence of the Dalai Lama and a self-described "Central Tibetan Administration" and "Tibetan Parliament in Exile" on Indian soil.

Indian and U.S. officials—including the U.S. Congress—blamed spring 2020 border clashes on PRC aggression, and that development renewed fears that India could face a two-front war, given China's potential collusion with Pakistan.¹¹⁴ According to one Indian pundit, "From New Delhi's perspective, the PRC military aggression on the disputed border is the price India is paying for joining hands with the Western alliance."¹¹⁵ India has since adjusted its economic relations with China in response to the conflict, banning more than 250 PRC mobile apps and seeking to diversify supply chains.¹¹⁶ Still, trade ties remain crucial: China was a close second to the United States among India's top trade partners during India's FY2021/22, and the value of Indian imports from China reached a record high last year, as did the trade deficit, given the modest levels of Indian exports to China.¹¹⁷

Despite ongoing negotiations, including 18 rounds of military-to-military talks, tensions at the India-China Line of Actual Control (LAC) remain high, and China newly holds a reported 580 square miles of territory previously patrolled by India. Non-lethal December 2022 clashes involving hundreds of soldiers from each side renewed fears of a wider conflict. Both parties maintain about 50,000 troops and heavy weaponry at the LAC, and both continue to improve their infrastructure and military capabilities in the region; the U.S. intelligence community assesses that "persistent low-level friction on the LAC has the potential to escalate swiftly."¹¹⁸ U.S.-supplied defense equipment has bolstered India's capabilities at the LAC, and Washington reportedly provided India with intelligence that allowed Indian forces to repel the latest PRC incursion.¹¹⁹ The United States is "strongly opposed to any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by incursions, military or civilian, across the border," and it encourages India and China "to utilize existing bilateral channels to discuss disputed boundaries."¹²⁰ India remains firm in its position that PRC "transgressions" at the LAC preclude restoration of "normalized relations." New Delhi boosted the country's latest defense budget by more 10% with an emphasis on improving border security.¹²¹

India-Pakistan Relations and Kashmir

India and Pakistan have fought four wars since 1948, three of them over the disputed former princely region of Kashmir, the most recent in 1999. India largely cut off bilateral engagement following an early 2019 terrorist attack in Pulwama, in Indian-held Kashmir, and a subsequent Indian airstrike on a suspected militant camp inside Pakistan. India's government continues to hold Pakistan responsible for supporting cross-border anti-India militancy, while Islamabad highlights India's alleged repression of the Kashmir Valley's overwhelmingly Muslim populace. Later in 2019, the Indian government took a series of controversial actions that significantly eroded the (largely nominal) constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir—until then the country's only Muslim-majority state—and cracked down on protesters, suspended internet and cell service, and took thousands of people, including prominent local politicians, into "preventive detention." Pakistan, which also claims the region, strongly objected. Some Members of Congress criticized India's actions, mainly on human rights grounds.¹²² Although New Delhi lifted remaining internet lockdowns in 2021—and tourist visits have since reached record levels beyond pre-pandemic levels—reports indicate that tensions and disaffection remain in the Kashmir Valley, with the central government's credibility harmed by ineffective governance, a depressed economy, and continued militant recruitment.¹²³

Developments in Afghanistan since mid-2021 further complicated India-Pakistan relations, and the potential for further conflict remains high, according to U.S. intelligence assessments.¹²⁴ In March 2022, what New Delhi called a "technical malfunction" led to the "accidental firing" of a missile that landed (without detonation) on Pakistani territory. Islamabad decried "technical lapses of serious nature in Indian handling of strategic weapons."¹²⁵ India's government also continues to look warily upon U.S.-Pakistani security ties; New Delhi formally protested the Biden Administration's recent plans to provide sustainment for Pakistan's F-16 combat aircraft fleet at a potential cost of up to $450 million.¹²⁶ Hopes for restored India-Pakistan diplomatic ties persist, but recent animus over water sharing issues appears to have added to ongoing mutual circumspection.¹²⁷

Figure 2. Map of Indian States

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Map information generated by using data from http://www.mapsofindia.com, Department of State international boundary files (2015); Esri (2014); and DeLorme (2014).