Overview

In the wake of a 2016 leadership transition, Uzbekistan's government embarked on a wide-ranging reform program. Uzbekistan has since reengaged with the international community following years of relative isolationism, leading to significantly improved relations with the United States. U.S. officials have praised Uzbekistan's ongoing reform efforts, but continue to raise concerns about human rights and political freedoms.¹ Constitutional changes introduced following an April 2023 referendum and a subsequent July 2023 snap election raise the prospect of the country's current leader remaining in office until 2037. The United States and Uzbekistan cooperate on political and civil society issues, in developing economic relations, and in addressing regional threats such as illegal narcotics, trafficking in persons, terrorism, and violent extremism.² Some analysts describe Uzbekistan as a potential regional leader in Central Asia.³ Uzbekistan has the largest population in the region and is the only country that borders all four other Central Asian states (see Figure 1). The country also shares a border with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is slightly larger than California, and the majority of the country's population of approximately 36.2 million is Uzbek (83.8%), with Tajik (4.8%), Kazakh (2.5%), Russian (2.3%), Karakalpak (2.2%), and Tatar (1.5%) minorities, among others.⁴ Most of Uzbekistan's inhabitants are Muslim (88% according to U.S. government estimates, and 96% according to the government of Uzbekistan), almost exclusively Sunni; about 2.2% of the population is Russian Orthodox.⁵

Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan

Source: Graphic created by CRS. Notes: "Karakalpakstan," an alternate form of "Qoraqalpog'iston," is used in the text of this report.

Domestic Political Background

From 1991 to 2016, Uzbekistan, formerly a constituent republic of the Soviet Union, was led by President Islam Karimov, a former high-level Soviet official. International observers considered his rule authoritarian and highly repressive.⁶ Karimov's economic policies emphasized national self-sufficiency, and his government pursued a largely isolationist foreign policy. After his death, Karimov was succeeded by Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who had served as prime minister under Karimov for 13 years and won a December 2016 presidential election that international observers criticized as "devoid of genuine competition."⁷ Mirziyoyev subsequently embarked on an ambitious reform program, aiming to transform Uzbekistan by modernizing and liberalizing the economy, addressing human rights concerns, and reengaging with the international community. He won reelection to a second five-year term in October 2021. The Election Observation Mission from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) noted "significant procedural irregularities" in that election and concluded "that recent reforms, which have gradually introduced welcome improvements, have not yet resulted in a genuinely pluralistic environment."⁸

U.S. officials and other international observers have noted continuing positive reforms in Uzbekistan since 2016.⁹ One longtime observer describes the overall changes in Uzbekistan as "remarkable," particularly with regard to increased openness, improved governance, and decreased repression.¹⁰ U.S. officials have voiced support for these ongoing reforms.¹¹ Reform remains a top-down, centralized process, however, leading to skepticism among some analysts as to the extent to which the government is willing to democratize.¹² Analysts also note less progress in areas such as the privatization of state assets, the decentralization of political power, and combatting corruption.¹³ Following a meeting with Mirziyoyev in Tashkent in March, 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, "We applauded the [reform] steps that had been taken. I noted as well the importance of not only having a strong vision but of fully implementing it. And of course, that remains an important work in progress."¹⁴ U.S. government officials and other observers continue to express concerns about human rights and political freedoms.¹⁵ Freedom House classifies Uzbekistan as "not free," assessing that the country "remains an authoritarian state with few signs of democratization."¹⁶

Uzbekistan's centralized government structure grants the executive branch extensive powers, with the President exercising significant control over the legislature and the judiciary. The bicameral legislature (Oliy Majlis) has historically provided neither an effective check on the executive nor a venue for genuine political debate. Its role has expanded somewhat under Mirziyoyev, who, upon assuming the presidency, urged more oversight over the executive and greater initiative from parliament.¹⁷ The country held its first post-Karimov parliamentary elections in December 2019 under the slogan "New Uzbekistan—New Elections." According to international observers, the elections took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented openness and engagement with voters but did not demonstrate genuine competitiveness.¹⁸ The composition of parliament remained largely unchanged, and the five parties that hold seats are generally pro-government. Although no party has an outright majority, Mirziyoyev's Liberal Democratic Party won a plurality of seats (53 of 150). In 2020, legislative amendments expanded the oversight powers of the Oliy Majlis, and the new parliament has engaged in some increased debate on policy issues.¹⁹ Freedom House assesses, however, that the parliament has "remained quiescent and failed to raise serious objections to any initiatives raised by the president."²⁰

Following his 2021 reelection, Mirziyoyev raised the possibility of constitutional changes, in a move some analysts saw as intended to evade the two-term limit on the presidency.²¹ When a new draft constitution was published for public comment in June 2022, officials presented the proposed changes as intended to strengthen Uzbekistan's institutions and expand social welfare programs.²² Some of the proposed provisions would have changed the political status of Karakalpakstan, a sparsely populated region in western Uzbekistan that accounts for about 40% of Uzbekistan's territory and about 5% of the population, by weakening its nominal autonomy. This spurred large-scale protests that turned violent in July 2022, leaving at least 21 people killed and a further 243 injured.²³ In the wake of this unrest, President Mirziyoyev announced that the articles of the extant constitution concerning Karakalpakstan would remain unchanged.²⁴

A new constitution approved in an April 30, 2023, referendum extended the presidential term from five years to seven, potentially allowing Mirziyoyev to stay in power until 2037.²⁵ The new constitution also introduced changes that address some popular grievances, including by bolstering property rights, and criminal justice reforms such as banning the death penalty.²⁶ Uzbek officials state that the constitutional changes will serve to strengthen human rights protections, improve social services, and make the government more accountable to its citizens.²⁷ Critics argue, however, that the new constitution does not bolster the rule of law and serves primarily to strengthen Mirziyoyev.²⁸ One scholar contends that, "the referendum was conducted by the regime for the regime" as a form of "authoritarian modernization."²⁹ After the new constitution went into force on May 1, Mirziyoyev secured 87% of the vote in a snap presidential election held on July 9. OSCE observers determined that the election "took place in a constrained political environment that was lacking genuine political alternatives" and noted "serious irregularities."³⁰ In light of the constitutional referendum and snap election, one expert concluded, "any hope of political reforms, especially allowing genuine opposition parties or independent candidates to participate, seems dead, for now."³¹

Human Rights

International organizations have lauded Uzbekistan's progress on human rights since 2016, but some observers continue to raise concerns. The International Labour Organization determined in 2021 that reforms had eradicated systemic forced and child labor in the harvesting of cotton, previously a major human rights concern in Uzbekistan.³² In 2022, the Cotton Campaign ended its call for a global boycott of cotton from Uzbekistan, citing Uzbekistan's "historic achievement" in ending systemic, state-sponsored forced labor in the cotton sector.³³ Some analysts assess that Uzbekistan's media and civil society operate more freely now than under Karimov, but still face constraints.³⁴ Some outside observers and journalists within Uzbekistan argue that the space for free expression has constricted after an initial period of opening following Mirziyoyev's accension to the presidency.³⁵ The Mirziyoyev government has eased barriers to registration for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), but both local and international organizations face bureaucratic obstacles.³⁶ No new political parties have been allowed to register, and all existing parties support the government.³⁷ The Uzbek state strictly controls and monitors religious practices, and unregistered religious activity is criminalized.³⁸ An amended law on religion signed by President Mirziyoyev in July 2021 eased some restrictions, but drew criticism from religious freedom advocates for maintaining registration requirements and other elements of government control over religious life.³⁹

In December 2020, the State Department removed Uzbekistan from its Special Watch List of countries that engage in severe violations of religious freedom. The Department had previously designated Uzbekistan as a Country of Particular Concern from 2006 to 2017, and placed it on the Special Watch List in 2018 and 2019.⁴⁰ In its 2023 Annual Report, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom noted that religious freedom conditions in Uzbekistan "trended slightly positively" in 2022 but recommended that the State Department return Uzbekistan to the Special Watch List in light of continuing violations of religious freedom.⁴¹

Economy

Uzbekistan is a lower-middle-income country with significant natural resources and relatively well-developed infrastructure. Major exports include cotton, natural gas, uranium, and gold. The country is the world's seventh-largest producer of cotton, and the Uzbek government is moving to transition from raw cotton exports to textile production. Uzbekistan has sizeable natural gas reserves; the primary destination for its natural gas exports is China, although the majority of production is consumed domestically. Uzbekistan has experienced domestic energy crises in recent winters due to increased domestic demand combined with infrastructural deficiencies, prompting the government to consider importing gas from Russia.⁴² Uzbekistan is the world's seventh-largest uranium supplier and has concluded long-term supply agreements with various countries, including the United States, China, India, and Japan. According to Russian government figures, there were more than 4.5 million Uzbek labor migrants in Russia in 2021; the actual number may be higher.⁴³ Remittances, which come primarily from Russia, were equivalent to about 21% of GDP in 2022 according to World Bank estimates, up from 13% in 2021.⁴⁴

The COVID-19 pandemic had a negative impact on Uzbekistan's economy, which faced pressure due to lower exports, lower natural gas prices and export volumes, decreased remittances, and domestic economic disruption. The World Bank estimates that Uzbekistan's GDP expansion slowed to 2.0% in 2020 (down from 5.7% growth in 2019), and rebounded to 7.4% growth in 2021, slowing—partly due to the war in Ukraine—to 5.7% in 2022 and a projected 5.5% in 2023.⁴⁵

Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy

Bilateral Relations with the United States

After experiencing a sharp decline in 2005 (see "Security Cooperation" below), U.S. relations with Uzbekistan have improved markedly since 2016, reflecting the country's broader pursuit of international ties. President Mirziyoyev traveled to Washington, DC, in 2018, the first official visit by an Uzbek president to the United States since 2002; he lauded the "new era of the strategic partnership" between the two countries.⁴⁶ During a March 2023 trip to Tashkent, Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that U.S.-Uzbekistan relations have "grown much closer in recent years," adding, "across all of my engagements here, what I come away with is a mutual and enthusiastic commitment to strengthening that partnership even further."⁴⁷ The Biden Administration's strategy for Uzbekistan states, "U.S. strategic priorities in the region and our interest in a broader and deeper bilateral relationship with Uzbekistan are stronger than ever."⁴⁸

In the assessment of the Biden Administration, "Uzbekistan over the past five years has become a catalyst for dialogue and economic integration, both among the five Central Asian states and between Central Asia and South Asia," whereas the country had previously represented "the main obstacle to regional cooperation during its first 25 years of independence."⁴⁹ According to Trump Administration officials in speaking 2019, Uzbekistan's reengagement with its neighbors invigorated the U.S.-led C5+1 framework, which was established in 2015 and which provides a high-level forum for the United States and the five Central Asian countries to discuss regional issues.⁵⁰ The most recent C5+1 Ministerial took place in February, 2023, in Astana, Kazakhstan.⁵¹ In September 2023, President Biden met with his five Central Asian counterparts in New York on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, marking the first-ever C5+1 presidential summit.⁵²

Security Cooperation

From 2001 to 2005, relations between the United States and Uzbekistan were relatively robust, and focused heavily on security cooperation related to U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan. In 2002, during a visit by then-President Karimov to Washington, DC, the two countries signed a Declaration of Strategic Partnership and Cooperation. U.S.-Uzbekistan relations experienced a severe downturn in 2005, after government forces killed over 100 unarmed civilians during unrest in the eastern city of Andijon. The government responded to foreign criticism by expelling numerous international NGOs and media organizations, ending the Peace Corps program, and demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in support of military operations in Afghanistan.⁵³ Uzbekistan continued to provide logistical support for NATO forces in Afghanistan by allowing the transit of non-lethal shipments through its territory as part of the Northern Distribution Network, established in 2009. From 2013 to 2017, the NATO Liaison Officer for Central Asia was based in Uzbekistan.⁵⁴ Since 2012, Uzbekistan has partnered with Mississippi through the National Guard's State Partnership Program, developing military-to-military contacts and participating in training in areas such as counterterrorism and disaster preparedness.

In advance of the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from Afghanistan in 2021, the Biden Administration reportedly considered whether the United States should seek to reestablish basing arrangements with Uzbekistan or other Central Asian countries.⁵⁵ Some analysts dismissed prospects for such agreements as "doubtful" given likely opposition from China and Russia, and the unpopularity of hosting foreign military facilities among the Uzbek public.⁵⁶ Other analysts argued that technical assistance, border security, information sharing, and training would be more effective avenues for expanding U.S. security engagement with Central Asian countries.⁵⁷ In a June 2022 press interview, Uzbekistan's Special Representative for Afghanistan stated, "In regard to the question of fighting international terrorism, we are partners of the United States," but noted, "our military doctrine is that Uzbekistan cannot be part of any military-political blocs. […] We cannot accept that any military bases or military infrastructure be located on our territory."⁵⁸

U.S.-Uzbekistan Trade

The value of bilateral trade between the United States and Uzbekistan more than doubled from 2017 to 2018, from approximately $150 million to $315 million, and reached $540 million in 2019.⁵⁹ After falling to $277 million in 2020 because of trade disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between the United States and Uzbekistan grew to $424.6 million in 2021.⁶⁰ Trade relations between the United States and Uzbekistan are governed by Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment, which denies normal trade relations (NTR) status to some current and former nonmarket economy countries unless they adhere to certain freedom-of-emigration requirements (see "Issues for Congress" below).

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Uzbekistan

U.S. foreign assistance to Uzbekistan currently aims to support the country's reform efforts while addressing the ongoing consequences in Uzbekistan of sanctions imposed on Russia (see "Relations with Russia and Implications of the War in Ukraine" below) and the expanding influence of China by reducing Uzbekistan's reliance on Russian and Chinese markets. Assistance to Uzbekistan also includes support for nonproliferation activities and public health programs aimed at combatting global infectious disease threats, as well as support for efforts to expand civil society, strengthen journalistic professionalism, increase judicial independence and professionalism, and develop governance capacity. Aid also is intended to bolster Uzbekistan's border security and counterterrorism capabilities. The State Department requested $49 million in assistance to Uzbekistan in FY2024, roughly level with the FY2023 request ($48.9 million) and the FY2022 allocation ($47.2 million).⁶¹

Regional Relations

Upon assuming power, President Mirziyoyev embarked on a "good neighbor" policy, reengaging with the region and declaring Central Asia to be Uzbekistan's main foreign policy priority.⁶² This is a significant shift, as Uzbekistan under Karimov represented "an obstacle to regional integration" and "a knot at the heart of the region," in the assessment of one longtime observer, due to tense relations with neighboring countries.⁶³ Mirziyoyev has emphasized "good-neighborliness" as a guiding principle of his government's approach to regional issues.⁶⁴ According to the U.S. State Department, this change in Uzbekistan's foreign policy after the country's 2016 leadership transition encouraged regional connectivity.⁶⁵ Uzbekistan has moved to normalize and improve previously strained relations with its Central Asian neighbors, resolving border disputes with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and engaging in increased regional outreach. Uzbekistan's government eased visa restrictions and opened border crossings. In 2018, a meeting between Central Asia's heads of state took place for the first time in nine years. The summit, held in Kazakhstan, was initiated by Mirziyoyev. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Daniel Rosenblum was later quoted in the press as crediting President Mirziyoyev with "dramatically changing the tenor of relations in the region from mutual suspicion to mutual cooperation."⁶⁶

Relations with Afghanistan

Under President Mirziyoyev, the government of Uzbekistan sought to position itself as an intermediary between the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan's then-President Ashraf Ghani, in line with Uzbekistan's stated aim of facilitating intra-Afghan peace talks.⁶⁷ Since the August 2021 collapse of Afghanistan's government, Uzbekistan has pursued high-level engagement with the Taliban, while maintaining that Uzbekistan will not extend recognition to the Taliban government before the international community does.⁶⁸ Some analysts describe Uzbekistan's stance toward the Taliban as pragmatic, with the priority of ensuring Uzbekistan's security.⁶⁹ Uzbek officials describe the Taliban as "a reality that must be accepted."⁷⁰ Although the Taliban have stated that they will not allow the territory of Afghanistan to be used to launch attacks on Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan has faced multiple missile strikes from the territory of Afghanistan since August 2021, at least some of which have been claimed by extremists affiliated with the Islamic State (IS).⁷¹

Uzbekistan has become a hub for the delivery of international humanitarian aid to Afghanistan thanks to its overland transportation links.⁷² Afghanistan imports the majority of its electricity, and Uzbekistan is its main supplier. Due at least in part to international sanctions on the Taliban, Uzbekistan has had difficulty collecting payment for electricity exports.⁷³ In August 2022, Uzbekistan's Ministry of Energy announced that Afghanistan's national power utility had paid its approximately $70 million debt for 2021 and was paying current bills on time.⁷⁴ Uzbekistan reduced supplies of electricity to Afghanistan in December 2022 in light of its domestic energy crisis. Uzbekistan and Taliban authorities concluded a new agreement on electricity exports to Afghanistan in January 2023.⁷⁵ Taliban plans to complete the Qosh Tepa canal, a project that would divert as much as a third of the water from the Amu Darya River—which runs along Afghanistan's border with Uzbekistan and on which the latter depends for agricultural irrigation—may threaten regional water security and strain relations in coming years.⁷⁶

As the Afghan government fell in August 2021, a reported 46 aircraft from the Afghan Air Force crossed into Uzbekistan, carrying some 500 people.⁷⁷ The government of Uzbekistan, reportedly facing pressure from the Taliban to return the personnel and their aircraft to Afghanistan, requested that the United States relocate them.⁷⁸ In September 2021, those Afghan personnel were transferred from Uzbekistan to a U.S. base in the United Arab Emirates.⁷⁹ Uzbek officials have since stated that they consider the aircraft to be U.S. property and have no intention of transferring them to the Taliban.⁸⁰ The United States is reportedly considering transferring the aircraft to Uzbekistan in return for counterterrorism assistance.⁸¹

Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Terrorist attacks within Uzbekistan are rare, but Uzbek nationals have been involved in international terrorist activity. Government crackdowns drove domestic Islamist extremist groups out of the country in the 1990s, and some Uzbek militants allied themselves with the Taliban, Al Qaeda, or IS in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although other Uzbek nationals have been involved in terrorist attacks abroad, analysts assess that the radicalization of these individuals occurred primarily abroad, often linked to their experiences of discrimination and marginalization as labor migrants in Russia.⁸² In 2017, a U.S. permanent resident from Uzbekistan who pledged allegiance to IS killed eight people in a vehicular attack in New York. About 1,500 Uzbek nationals travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for IS; including women and children, the total estimated number of Uzbek citizens associated with IS is 3,000.⁸³ Uzbekistan was among the first countries to undertake a large-scale repatriation and rehabilitation effort for its IS-affiliated nationals, bringing back over 500 women and children between 2019 and 2021. The United States provided logistical support for some of Uzbekistan's repatriation operations, and the U.S.-funded United States Institute of Peace is supporting rehabilitation programs for repatriated individuals throughout Central Asia. Uzbek foreign fighters remain an international concern due to their ongoing participation in armed groups active in Afghanistan, particularly the IS-affiliated Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).⁸⁴ In the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, ISKP has reportedly increased the production and dissemination of propaganda and recruitment materials targeting Uzbekistan.⁸⁵

Relations with Russia and Implications of the War in Ukraine

Since Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, the government of Uzbekistan has avoided endorsing Russian aggression and has expressed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity.⁸⁶ On February 26, 2022, following a phone call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and President Mirziyoyev, the latter's spokesman emphasized Uzbekistan's "balanced, neutral position," adding, "Our country traditionally has close, friendly relations with both Russia and Ukraine. We are interested in ensuring peace, stability and sustainable development in our vast region."⁸⁷ In a March 17, 2022, speech to Uzbekistan's parliament, then-Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated, "The Republic of Uzbekistan recognizes Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. We do not recognize the Luhansk and Donetsk republics," adding that, "taking into account its national interests," Uzbekistan would continue mutual cooperation with both Russia and Ukraine.⁸⁸ At the United Nations, Uzbekistan did not cast a vote on the March 2, 2022, resolution condemning Russia's invasion and abstained on subsequent resolutions related to the war.⁸⁹ Some analysts see the fact that Uzbekistan and its Central Asian neighbors did not side with Russia as signaling disapproval of Russia's actions, even if these countries did not vote for the resolutions.⁹⁰ Uzbekistan has sent multiple shipments of humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In advance of a March 9, 2022, meeting with Kamilov, Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted that the United States "very much welcome[s] the strong humanitarian support that you've been providing to the Afghans on one hand and now Ukrainians on the other."⁹¹

Uzbekistan is less economically dependent on Russia than are some of its Central Asian neighbors, but it still has significant ties to Russia, rendering it vulnerable to economic fallout from the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions. Russia was Uzbekistan's top trading partner in 2021, and has historically served as the primary route for Uzbek exports to reach global markets (a legacy of imperial Russian and Soviet-era railroad networks). As a result, international sanctions on Russia "nearly paralyzed" Uzbek trade in the early days of the conflict.⁹² According to Russian government figures, there were more than 4.5 million labor migrants from Uzbekistan registered in Russia in 2021.⁹³ The World Bank initially projected that remittances to Central Asia would decline sharply in 2022 as a result of the war; it now estimates that remittances from Russia reached record highs in that year, due in part to increased demand for labor and to the Russian ruble's appreciation against the U.S. dollar.⁹⁴ At the same time, the cost of sending remittances from Russia has increased significantly due to international sanctions.⁹⁵ Labor migrants from Uzbekistan are increasingly seeking alternative destinations, such as Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom.⁹⁶

In June 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce included Uzbekistan on a list of countries that serve as "common transshipment points through which restricted or controlled exports have been known to pass before reaching destinations in Russia or Belarus."⁹⁷ The State Department concurrently designated an Uzbekistan-based company for "actively support[ing]" efforts by a Russian entity specializing in procuring foreign items for Russia's defense industry to evade U.S. sanctions.⁹⁸ Alisher Usmanov, an Uzbekistan-born Russian billionaire, was designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in March 2022 for his involvement in the technology sector of the Russian economy.⁹⁹ Usmanov reportedly maintains close ties with Uzbekistan's government.¹⁰⁰ In April 2023, Treasury revoked the general license that had authorized transactions involving entities in which Usmanov holds at least a 50% stake and that are not included on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List; Treasury also designated a number of entities and individuals tied to Usmanov.¹⁰¹ The State Department concurrently designated a number of companies tied to Usmanov, including an Uzbekistan-based cement producer.¹⁰² Also in April 2023, the Department of Commerce added two Uzbekistan-based companies to the Entity List, imposing export restrictions on transactions involving those companies.¹⁰³

Relations with China

While Russia has traditionally been Uzbekistan's main trade partner, China has expanded its economic presence in recent years and took the top spot from 2015 to 2020. In 2021, Uzbekistan's bilateral trade with Russia and China equaled $7.5 billion and $7.4 billion, respectively.¹⁰⁴ Some analysts have speculated that China's economic engagement with Uzbekistan will increase in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia's aggression in Ukraine, particularly as landlocked Uzbekistan seeks to expand its access to global trade routes.¹⁰⁵ China's President Xi Jinping traveled to Uzbekistan in September 2022 as part of his first foreign trip since January 2020. During the trip, Xi indicated China's willingness to strengthen cooperation within the "China+Central Asia" ("C+C5") mechanism. In May 2023, China held the first in-person C+C5 Summit in Xi'an, China, bringing together Xi and the five Central Asian Presidents.¹⁰⁶ Some observers see the summit as evidence that China is increasingly challenging Russia's influence in Central Asia in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.¹⁰⁷

Issues for Congress

Trade

U.S. trade with Uzbekistan is governed by Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618), the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. This section denies normal trade relations (NTR) status to some current and former nonmarket economy countries unless they adhere to certain freedom-of-emigration requirements. These requirements were initially aimed at promoting free emigration from the Soviet Union and were prompted by Soviet restrictions on Jewish emigration. Since 1992, Uzbekistan has received temporary NTR status under a provision of the amendment that allows the President to extend NTR status to a country affected by the amendment by determining that the country is not in violation of the amendment's provisions, subject to annual review. A complete lifting of the Jackson-Vanik requirements would require Congress to pass relevant legislation.¹⁰⁸ Legislation that would have exempted Uzbekistan was introduced in previous Congresses but did not make it out of committee.¹⁰⁹ The Biden Administration supports lifting Jackson-Vanik for Uzbekistan.¹¹⁰ H.R. 1755, introduced in the 118^th Congress, would authorize the President to determine that Jackson-Vanik should no longer apply to Uzbekistan and to extend permanent normal trade relations to that country.

The Biden Administration seeks to address the economic impacts in Central Asia of the war in Ukraine through the Economic Resilience in Central Asia Initiative (ERICEN), launched in September 2022. Using $50 million in FY2022 and FY2023 funding, ERICEN aims to diversify trade routes, increase shipping capacity, and enhance trans-Caspian infrastructure, in addition to bolstering the private sector (including by facilitating the movement of Western multinational companies to Central Asia) and providing training and education opportunities.¹¹¹ In the assessment of one analyst, despite its small scale, "ERICEN lays the groundwork for prosperous trade relations and business partnerships" and "can emphasize U.S. comparative advantages in terms of international standards that bring greater long-term benefits" as compared to Chinese investment.¹¹² Others have criticized ERICEN as too modest in size, with one scholar terming it "not a very serious gesture" due to the fact that "$50 million is insignificant compared to what other powers are bringing in."¹¹³ Congress could consider whether to appropriate additional funding for the initiative. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in expanding U.S. economic engagement with Uzbekistan, and assisting Uzbekistan in diversifying its trade relationships away from Russia.¹¹⁴

Human Rights

Some Members of Congress have noted Uzbekistan's progress on human rights since 2016. For example, Senator Bob Menendez named Uzbekistan's successful efforts to eradicate forced labor in the cotton industry as an example illustrating that "respect for human rights is not only a moral imperative but will create an environment more conducive to economic investment and prosperity."¹¹⁵ At the same time, some Members of Congress have drawn attention to ongoing human rights concerns in Uzbekistan, including the criminalization of homosexuality, violence against protestors in Karakalpakstan, limits on free speech and media freedoms, and the lack of substantial progress toward political liberalization.¹¹⁶

Security Cooperation

In March 2023 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Donald Lu stated that the war in Ukraine has created new opportunities for security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia, noting Central Asian countries' desires to diversify the sourcing of their defense equipment away from Russia as well as the success of the National Guard's State Partnership Program in the region.¹¹⁷ Some scholars and U.S. officials have identified training and professional military education as areas of opportunity for expanding security cooperation between the United States and Central Asian countries.¹¹⁸

Proposed versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, S. 2226 and H.R. 2670, passed in the Senate and the House, respectively, would authorize support to the government of Uzbekistan "for purposes of supporting and enhancing efforts of the armed forces of Uzbekistan to increase security and sustain increased security along the border of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan."

Energy

Promoting energy security within Central Asia, including by supporting a transition to renewable energy sources, is a stated goal of U.S. policy in the region.¹¹⁹ Congress could consider whether existing programs are effective, and whether and how they should potentially be expanded. Although it is a gas producer, Uzbekistan has experienced domestic energy crises in recent winters due to increased domestic demand combined with infrastructural deficiencies. In May 2023, a Pennsylvania-based company signed a $1 billion investment agreement with Uzbekistan to acquire and operate a natural gas processing facility in the country.¹²⁰ In October 2023, Uzbekistan began importing natural gas from Russia for the first time, a measure geared toward alleviating winter energy shortages.¹²¹

The U.S. Department of Commerce describes renewable technologies and grid modernization projects as areas of opportunity for U.S. companies in Uzbekistan.¹²² In the assessment of the International Energy Agency, "Uzbekistan's considerable [renewable energy source] potential could spur significant development of a green, environmentally friendly economy."¹²³ Uzbekistan's solar energy potential is estimated at almost four times the country's primary energy consumption.¹²⁴ In 2021, the government of Uzbekistan declared its commitment to reaching a renewable energy target of 25% by 2030, and Uzbekistan has initiated solar energy projects with Chinese, European, and Gulf investors.¹²⁵

Regional Connectivity

Promoting regional connectivity has long been a U.S. policy priority in Central Asia, and the United States has funded projects promoting regional cooperation in a range of areas. Since 2015, U.S. bilateral relationships in the region have been complemented by the C5+1 diplomatic platform, which provides a forum for the United States and the five Central Asian countries to address common challenges they face in areas such as security, economic connectivity, and environmental vulnerabilities. Uzbekistan's Ambassador in Washington stated, "the U.S. has played a significant role in promoting dialogue and cooperation among the Central Asian nations through initiatives such as the C5+1," adding, "we encourage the U.S. to bolster this mechanism."¹²⁶

Some analysts suggest that regional connectivity in Central Asia has taken on added significance in light of the war in Ukraine. In his March 2023 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Donald Lu stated that furthering regional connectivity would grant Central Asian countries "options that enable them to stand firm in the face of malign influence."¹²⁷ For instance, in this view, greater regional connectivity could bolster Central Asia's energy security and decrease its dependence on Russian natural gas, as well as facilitate trade via routes that bypass Russia. Congress could consider how Central Asian regional connectivity aligns with broader U.S. interests in light of the war, and how U.S. programs could support connectivity within Central Asia in a new geopolitical context. Congress could consider, for instance, whether or not to appropriate additional funding for the Biden Administration's ERICEN initiative in order to bolster connectivity within Central Asia.