Introduction

With Africa's largest economy, extensive oil and gas reserves, and a population on pace to exceed 375 million by mid-century, Nigeria's economic and demographic heft position it to play a major role on the global stage. Stark governance and security challenges cloud this outlook, however, amid immense development gaps: according to the World Bank, roughly one in five poor people in sub-Saharan Africa live in Nigeria.¹ By virtue of Nigeria's demographic size and influence beyond its borders, the attainment of major global development aims, such as the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals, arguably hinges to a large extent on developments in Nigeria.

President Bola Tinubu took office in May 2023, following a hotly contested election marred by extensive administrative problems and alleged vote rigging. His government inherited a mounting fiscal crisis, an underperforming economy, unprecedented security and humanitarian challenges, and a polity that is distrustful of government and divided along ethnic, religious, and regional lines.² President Tinubu has announced a series of pro-market reforms that have won praise from investors and U.S. officials, but public discontent has mounted over rising costs and declining purchasing power, and prospects for his economic agenda are uncertain.³ Likewise, it remains to be seen if Tinubu will make progress toward reining in security force abuses and religious freedom violations, which have strained relations with the United States and are highly charged political issues within Nigeria. As Congress debates policy and budgetary priorities in Nigeria, it may weigh Nigeria's geostrategic importance and the promise of Tinubu's early reform efforts against human rights issues, widespread insecurity, and scarce resources and divergent aims on the part of Nigerian authorities, all of which may constrain progress toward U.S. objectives.

Demography

With approximately 225 million people, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and sixth most populous globally; by 2050, it is poised to overtake the United States as the world's third most populous country, behind India and China ⁴ Around three in five Nigerians are below the age of 25, raising the possibility of a "demographic dividend" in the coming decades—contingent upon whether Nigeria's government and economy proves capable of providing a rapidly growing populace with quality services and livelihoods.⁵

Nigeria's population is highly diverse, comprising hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups. There are no official statistics on ethnic or religious affiliation; efforts to collect such data have been highly controversial.⁶ Nigeria's largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, made up of two groups (the Hausa and Fulani) concentrated in the north whose mutual assimilation has led them to be often, but not always, considered as a bloc in the context of Nigerian politics;⁷ the Yoruba, a majority in the southwest; and the Igbo, who predominate in the southeast. Observers describe this population as roughly evenly balanced between a mainly Muslim north and a predominately Christian south, though some demographic researchers assert that higher fertility rates in the north are likely to place Muslims in the majority in the coming decades.⁸

Figure 1. Nigeria

Source: CRS graphic, using data from the State Department and Esri, a GIS mapping software company.

Politics and Governance

Nigeria has been a multiparty republic since 1999, after three decades of military rule punctuated by recurrent coups and intermittent attempts to restore civilian authority. A federal republic with 36 states, its political structure resembles that of the United States, with a bicameral National Assembly comprising a 109-member Senate and 360-member House of Representatives.

Since a 1967-1970 civil war pitting an Igbo-led separatist insurgency in the southeast against the federal government, Nigeria's political leaders have adopted a number of formal and informal institutions to distribute political power and public resources along ethno-regional lines and stave off a return to mass ethnic violence. Electoral rules effectively require the formation of cross-ethnic political parties to win office;⁹ appointments to the civil service and other state posts are constitutionally required to ensure "no predominance" by a single ethnic or regional group;¹⁰ and political parties have tended to rotate candidates for office and split tickets (at all levels of government) along ethno-regional or religious lines.¹¹ A defining feature of Nigeria's governance system is the monthly allocation of many federally collected revenues—notably including oil and gas receipts—to state and local governments, which rely heavily on these transfers for financing and informal patronage resources. According to one observer, such power-sharing arrangements "have had a major impact on how Nigerians talk about fairness in political life and on how they demand services and benefits from the federal government."¹²

The 2023 General Elections

Nigeria held general elections in February and March 2023. With incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC) facing term limits, the APC selected Tinubu, a former governor of Lagos State—which includes the megacity of Lagos—as its flagbearer. Tinubu narrowly won with a 37% plurality. His closest challengers were former vice president Atiku Abubakar of the People's Democratic Party (PDP, 29%) and former governor Peter Obi of the Labor Party (25%), whose populist campaign had won the support of many young Nigerians, especially among fellow ethnic Igbo in the southeast. In National Assembly polls, the APC retained a majority in the Senate and remained the largest party in the House. The APC also controls 20 of 36 governorships, followed by 13 for the PDP.

The 2023 elections featured record-low turnout, widespread delays and other logistical issues, and claims of extensive rigging—though Yiaga Africa, a domestic observer group that administered a U.S.-funded parallel vote tabulation, assessed that fraud did not affect the overall outcome of the presidential election.¹³ Attacks on electoral personnel and facilities surged in the months prior to the polls, notably in the southeast; European Union (EU) observers recorded 74 deaths from electoral violence.¹⁴ Some Members of Congress expressed concerns over the conduct of the polls.¹⁵ Observers from the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute assessed that they "fell well short of Nigerian citizens' legitimate and reasonable expectations."¹⁶

Following Tinubu's declared victory, second- and third-place finishers Atiku and Obi filed petitions claiming to have won the election and seeking to nullify the result. In September 2023, a tribunal dismissed the petitions. Atiku and Obi are appealing the decision before the Supreme Court, though many analysts doubt the case will result in an invalidation of Tinubu's victory.¹⁷

The Tinubu Administration (May 2023 – Present)

President Tinubu has rolled out a series of far-reaching economic reforms since his inauguration in May 2023. In his inaugural address, he announced the termination of Nigeria's decades-old fuel subsidy, which had kept local gas prices low but drained state finances (the subsidy cost $10 billion in 2022), enabled extensive corruption, and incentivized cross-border smuggling.¹⁸ His government also has moved to dismantle a multiple exchange rate regime that had resulted in persistent foreign exchange shortages and other distortions and discouraged foreign investors.¹⁹ Tinubu has fired his predecessor's central bank governor, who spearheaded that exchange-rate system and other controversial policies, and replaced the country's top anti-corruption official.

Foreign investors and credit rating agencies have broadly welcomed Tinubu's reforms.²⁰ Market adjustments have depleted local purchasing power, however: local gas prices have spiked since the fuel subsidy removal, and the value of Nigeria's currency, the naira, has been on a sustained decline since the announced currency float. The country's main labor federation has repeatedly threatened to strike over rising prices; the Tinubu administration has agreed to a minimum wage increase and other demands, though their implementation remains to be seen.²¹ President Tinubu has suspended other initiatives, such as an excise tax on telecommunications services, in response to public discontent. Whether, and with what further concessions, the Tinubu administration can shore up support for its market-oriented economic reforms are major questions in the near term.

Civic Space and Elections

Nigeria's civic space has expanded since the return of civilian authority in 1999. Today, Nigeria's civil society comprises a broad range of advocacy groups, labor unions, and ethnic, cultural, and religious associations. Nonetheless, successive Nigerian governments have curtailed freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press. Activists and journalists have faced terrorism or other charges for commenting on sensitive issues, and the State Department has accused successive Nigerian governments of using excessive force against protesters.²² A crackdown on protests against police brutality in 2020 drew condemnation, including from some Members of Congress (see Text Box).

Corruption and U.S. Kleptocracy Recovery Efforts

Corruption in Nigeria is reportedly pervasive, and it has been the focus of extensive research, commentary, and civic activism.²⁸ Surveys indicate widespread suspicion of public office-holders and other government officials.²⁹ Several state agencies work to combat corruption, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which has received U.S. assistance and collaborated with U.S. agencies in law enforcement actions (see "Cybercrime, Financial Crime, and U.S. Responses"). These agencies have seized billions of dollars' worth of ill-gotten assets and prosecuted a number of current and former officials. Nigeria's government also has worked with foreign partners, including the United States, to repatriate the proceeds of past corruption.

Interfaith Relations and Religious Freedom Concerns³⁵

According to Pew Research Center, 93% of Nigerians surveyed in 2019 stated that religion was very important in their lives, among the highest rates globally.³⁶ As noted above, Muslims and Christians constitute majorities in the north and south, respectively, though there are significant populations of Muslims in the south, and of Christians in the north. There is extensive intra-religious diversity, such as between and within Sufi, Salafi, Shia, and heterodox Muslims, and Catholics and Protestants of various denominations. According to the State Department, many Nigerians "syncretize indigenous animism or traditional practices with Islam or Christianity."³⁷

While Nigeria has a long history of religious tolerance and nonviolent conflict resolution between faith groups, the country has experienced extensive interreligious violence, notably in religiously mixed areas of the north.³⁸ Religious discrimination also has been an enduring problem at the state level, amid accusations that the federal government has taken limited action to address religious freedom concerns (see Text Box). In 2019, the Trump Administration placed Nigeria on the "Special Watch List" for religious freedom issues under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA, P.L. 105-292, as amended), and in 2020, it named Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) for "having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom." Designation as a CPC can result in punitive measures, subject to a waiver; President Trump waived any such measures for Nigeria, citing national interest.³⁹ The Biden Administration did not designate Nigeria as a CPC in 2021 or 2022. Several Members of Congress and the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom have criticized Nigeria's delisting.⁴⁰ H.Res. 82, introduced in early 2023, would call for Nigeria's designation as a CPC, among other provisions.

Foreign Affairs

Niger. In July 2023, military officers overthrew the elected president in neighboring Niger, which became the sixth country in Africa where a military has seized power since 2020. In response, President Tinubu—who had been elected as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) two weeks prior—closed land borders with Niger, cut off electricity exports (Nigeria supplies most of Niger's electricity), and announced sanctions on the coup leaders. Other ECOWAS heads of state joined Tinubu in instituting border closures and economic sanctions. In August, after ECOWAS threatened the use of force to restore constitutional order in Niger, Tinubu wrote to Nigeria's Senate seeking support for, among other things, a "military build-up and deployment of personnel for military intervention... should [the junta] remain recalcitrant."⁵²

The move spurred blowback across Nigeria's political class, particularly in the north, which is connected to Niger through commercial and demographic ties.⁵³ The ECOWAS sanctions and proposed use of military force have also been widely criticized by politicians and civil society groups within Niger. Mali and Burkina Faso, which are suspended from ECOWAS after their own coups, have pledged to defend Niger's junta in the event of an intervention.⁵⁴ In mid-August, ECOWAS activated its "standby force," a nascent arrangement for joint member state military deployments. ECOWAS negotiations with the Nigerien junta were ongoing as of November 2023.

The People's Republic of China (PRC, or China). China is Nigeria's top source of imports, and one of its top export destinations. Chinese construction firms have undertaken a number of public works and infrastructure projects in the country, many financed wholly or partly by China's Ex-Im Bank.⁵⁵ Recently finished or ongoing projects include a deep-water port that opened in early 2023; the 700-megawatt Zungeru Hydroelectric Power Project, now in development; and several new railways and highways.⁵⁶ Nigeria has been a leading regional recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) and hosts two special economic zones partly financed by Chinese authorities or state enterprises that offer incentives to Chinese manufacturing firms.⁵⁷ China also has provided financing to support expansions of Nigeria's information and communication technology infrastructure; Chinese technology firm Huawei has been involved in these efforts.⁵⁸ In the past two decades, China has become a top supplier of military equipment to Nigeria; recent Nigerian acquisitions include tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, drone systems, and artillery.

Some commentators have criticized the alleged opacity of Chinese loans to Nigeria, and raised concerns over potential threats to Nigeria's sovereignty arising from indebtedness to China.⁵⁹ Researchers also have raised concerns related to illicit activity by Chinese commercial actors in Nigeria, such as bribery, illegal logging, and illicit fishing.⁶⁰ Preliminary polling results from Afrobarometer, a regional survey group, suggest that China's influence is viewed as mostly positive by nearly half of Nigerians, against roughly 40% for the United States, though Nigerians' positive perceptions of both China and the United States have declined considerably since 2019.⁶¹

Russia. Russia has been a major supplier of military equipment, including attack helicopters, to Nigeria; Nigeria also operates Soviet-made military equipment acquired from the Soviet Union or third countries. Nigeria and Russia signed a military cooperation agreement in 2021. Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine has been a point of friction in bilateral ties. The war has roiled global food, fuel, and fertilizer markets, harming Nigeria's economy, and former President Buhari alleged that weapons from the Russia-Ukraine war had been diverted into Nigeria and the wider region.⁶² Nigeria has voted with the United States on 4 of 6 U.N. General Assembly resolutions on the Russia-Ukraine war, but (alongside many other African countries) abstained from two, to suspend Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council, and to call for Russia to pay reparations to Ukraine.⁶³ In April 2023, Russia stated that it would send a shipment of potash (used in fertilizer production) to Nigeria free of charge, though the delivery has faced delays.⁶⁴ In July 2023, Vice President Kashim Shettima led Nigeria's delegation to the Russia-Africa Summit in Moscow.

Israel-Hamas Conflict. President Tinubu has called for a ceasefire in the conflict between Israel and Hamas, and urged a "peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue."⁶⁵ Public opinion concerning the conflict appears somewhat divided: some Muslim organizations have protested in solidarity with the Palestinian people and called for a review of bilateral relations with Israel, while the country's main Christian association issued a statement recognizing Israel's right to self-defense, while "emphasiz[ing] the importance of proportionality and the avoidance of harm to innocent civilians." ⁶⁶ In early November, Nigeria's Senate passed a resolution calling on the Tinubu administration to support an end to the conflict and to press for a two-state solution.

Security Challenges

The sections below provide overviews of select security issues in Nigeria that have attracted attention from some Members of Congress and other U.S. policymakers. Some general trends may be observed across patterns of insecurity and government responses:

Security forces are under strain. Nigerian military personnel are deployed to all 36 of Nigeria's states on internal security operations, stretching thin a force estimated to comprise 143,000 active-duty personnel.⁶⁷ Defense spending has risen over the past decade, and the government has expanded its military capabilities with the acquisition of new ground and air assets, but the military often has struggled to restore stability and state authority in zones cleared during periodic offensives or bombing raids. Surveys indicate low troop morale and discontent with poor equipment and living conditions, infrequent rotation, and other issues.⁶⁸ Nigeria's national police force also is under-resourced, and many officers are hired as private security for wealthy and middle-class Nigerians, foreigners, and businesses. Vigilante groups have emerged in some areas, varying in size and state backing, with uncertain prospects for future demobilization.

Security forces have committed extensive abuses. Observers have accused Nigerian security forces of extrajudicial killings, torture, and other human rights violations.⁶⁹ Human rights groups estimate that thousands have died in Nigerian military custody since 2011.⁷⁰ As discussed below ("Security Assistance and Cooperation"), reported security force abuses have raised concerns in Congress and complicated U.S. security cooperation.

Impunity is widespread. Perpetrators of violence often have eluded prosecution, as authorities have in many cases proved unable or unwilling to hold instigators to account. Where authorities have intervened, human rights groups have repeatedly accused security forces of conducting arbitrary mass arrests following episodes of violence.⁷¹ In some cases, authorities have released suspects without charge once tensions cooled.⁷² In others, detainees—including thousands arrested for alleged ties to Boko Haram—have remained in pre-trial detention for years, often in conditions that Amnesty International and other human rights groups describe as inhumane.⁷³ Several thousand Boko Haram suspects faced prosecution in three mass trials held in 2017-2018 that resulted in hundreds of convictions; some observers raised concerns with those trials and assessed that prosecutions primarily targeted civilians or low-level offenders.⁷⁴

Corruption is a key challenge. Procurement fraud, embezzlement, and other forms of corruption have reportedly drained defense sector resources.⁷⁵ By many accounts, there is little transparency into defense budgeting and procurement; several military officers have been convicted of self-enrichment. Off-budget expenditures are common. Transparency International has described Nigeria's legislature as "largely passive and compliant" in its oversight of defense issues.⁷⁶

Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (IS-WA)

Founded in the early 2000s as a Salafist Sunni Muslim reform movement, Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad (JAS)—more commonly known as Boko Haram, which roughly translates to "Western culture is forbidden"—evolved beginning in 2009 into one of the world's deadliest extremist groups. It gained global notoriety for its brutal tactics, including its use of women and children as suicide bombers. IS-WA, an Islamic State affiliate that splintered from Boko Haram in 2016, has eclipsed its parent organization and established itself as the leading Islamist extremist group in the Lake Chad Basin region, comprising border regions of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.⁷⁷ In 2021, Boko Haram's longtime leader committed suicide after coming under siege by IS-WA militants, prompting thousands of Boko Haram fighters and non-combatants living in the group's strongholds to surrender to Nigerian authorities.

IS-WA has sought to consolidate its control in the northeast, warring with remnant Boko Haram cells while sustaining attacks on military personnel and other targets in Nigeria and neighboring states.⁷⁸ Some former Boko Haram fighters, meanwhile, reportedly have relocated to join criminal gangs or emergent extremist cells based in northwest and north-central Nigeria (see below). While the Nigerian government regularly claims to have killed numerous militants in airstrikes, ground forces have struggled to restore stability in cleared zones. Analysts debate the extent of IS-WA's ties with core IS and with other IS affiliates (notably IS-Sahel), but by some accounts collaboration with IS-Sahel may be growing.⁷⁹ IS-WA appears to act independently, however, funding itself through "war spoils, extortion of the local population," and taxation of local commerce.⁸⁰ In 2021, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)'s then-Commander assessed that "neither Boko Haram nor ISIS-WA today pose a significant threat to U.S. interests."⁸¹ Both groups are U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).

In 2016, the Nigerian government launched Safe Corridor, a de-radicalization and reintegration program for ex-combatants. Hundreds of men and boys have participated. Analysts have raised a number of concerns related to the program, including with poor screening that has resulted in misclassification of civilians as militants, abuses against participants, and opposition by some officials and communities to the reintegration of ex-militants into society.⁸² Observers contend that regional military coordination has moderately improved since the 2014 activation of the African Union-authorized Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF)—comprising troops from Nigeria, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—though low interoperability and inconsistent funding, among other challenges, have reportedly limited its effectiveness.⁸³

As of August 2023, according to U.N. data, an estimated 11.1 million people in the Lake Chad Basin were in need of humanitarian assistance.⁸⁴ Approximately 2.4 million people are displaced in Nigeria; another 355,000 are refugees in neighboring countries, most in Niger and Cameroon.⁸⁵ Humanitarian groups have faced severe access constraints and other operational challenges. Boko Haram and IS-WA have kidnapped and killed humanitarian workers and destroyed aid facilities. Nigeria's military has restricted humanitarian access beyond urban areas and repeatedly accused international humanitarian agencies of supporting terrorists, at times suspending their operations.

Rural Insecurity: Herder-Farmer Conflict and Banditry

Rural violence has surged in Nigeria over the past decade, especially in the northwest and central "Middle Belt" regions (see map).⁸⁶ Some observers attribute the increase to a rise in conflicts between farmers and herders over access to land and resources and related issues. Such violence has intensified as socioeconomic, political, and ecological trends have reduced the compatibility of pastoral and farming livelihoods and raised the stakes of competition for resource access and control.⁸⁷ In the northwest, clashes typically pit ethnic Fulani herders against ethnic Hausa farmers, two predominately Muslim groups. In the Middle Belt, as noted above, most violence has involved Fulani herders and Christian farmers of various ethnic groups. Hate speech has proliferated, with some analysts expressing particular concern over rhetoric that attributes unified, nefarious aims to the Fulani—an expansive ethnic group that spans much of West Africa.⁸⁸

Mounting herder-farmer violence has provided a pretext for a broader escalation of insecurity; ethnic militias have mobilized, and lines between conflict drivers have blurred as violence has grown to encompass resource disputes, reprisal killings, and criminality. Media often refer to Fulani armed groups as "bandit" gangs. Among other incidents, bandits have abducted hundreds of children in mass kidnappings, collecting millions of dollars in ransom; intercepted a commuter train, taking dozens hostage; downed a military jet; and killed hundreds in a series of massacres. In some areas, bandits exert territorial control, extorting local communities and providing basic services, such as settling local disputes.⁸⁹ In turn, vigilante groups have formed to oppose the bandits, and have reportedly indiscriminately targeted Fulani communities in some areas.⁹⁰

In this context, some analysts and U.S. officials have expressed concern over the prospects for Islamist extremists to gain a foothold beyond the northeast.⁹¹ Among other trends, Ansaru—an Al Qaeda-affiliated Boko Haram splinter faction and U.S.-designated FTO that appeared dormant as of 2015—has reactivated in the northwest and Middle Belt, reportedly led by former Boko Haram fighters.⁹² Some analysts assert that bandits and extremists have collaborated in some cases, but have also clashed over control of territory.⁹³ Most bandit gangs appear not to espouse a political or religious ideology, though some have mobilized under the banner of protecting Fulani.⁹⁴

Separatism in the Southeast

Since 2020, the emergence of a separatist movement in southeast Nigeria has triggered a wave of violence and sparked fears of a return to large scale ethnic conflict. Known as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), the separatists profess an aim to restore the would-be breakaway state of Biafra, which attempted to split from Nigeria in 1967, precipitating the devastating 1967-1970 Nigerian Civil War.⁹⁵ IPOB messaging has sought to leverage historic perceptions of marginalization among the Igbo—Nigeria's third-largest ethnic group, which led the original push for an independent Biafra—as well as newer grievances, such as disputes between Muslim herders and Christian farmers. (The Igbo are predominately Christian, and Igbo activists have long protested their perceived domination by the northern Hausa-Fulani and other ethnic groups.)

Violence escalated in mid-2020, as government forces conducted raids on IPOB meetings and arrested alleged IPOB sympathizers. IPOB later launched an armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN). Unidentified gunmen have since killed dozens of state security personnel; human rights groups have accused security forces of killing over a hundred people in response, and of mass arrests and torture.⁹⁶ Violence surged around the 2023 general elections. In May 2023, gunmen attacked a U.S. government convoy as it traveled through Anambra State en route to a USAID project site, killing multiple locally employed staff as well as police.⁹⁷ IPOB denied that attack and has disavowed violence generally, though splits in the group—and the fact that authorities have rarely arrested assailants—make it difficult to assess culpability.

Insecurity in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea

Nigeria's Niger Delta, an oil-rich region in southern Nigeria that borders the Gulf of Guinea, has long been a site of political unrest, criminality, and intermittent armed militancy linked to local grievances over perceived neglect, exploitation, and oil-related environmental devastation.⁹⁸ Militant violence peaked in the 2000s, with regular attacks on oil facilities and personnel. In 2009, the government announced an amnesty and introduced a monthly stipend for former Niger Delta militants. The program largely halted attacks on oil facilities, but some analysts contend it has failed to address root causes of insecurity—in particular, the perceived exploitation of local resources without adequate compensation. Attacks on oil facilities periodically resurge.⁹⁹

The Niger Delta faces an array of additional security challenges. These include gang violence by secretive syndicates commonly known as "cults" or "confraternities,"¹⁰⁰ intercommunal clashes, and political violence. The Gulf of Guinea is among the world's most dangerous bodies of water for attacks on vessels. Oil theft, known as "bunkering," from oil pipelines for artisanal refinement and black-market sale is another key challenge that reportedly involves criminal networks, politicians, security personnel, and oil workers.¹⁰¹ As discussed below (see "The Economy"), foreign oil firms have increasingly sought to divest from Nigeria's onshore oil and gas industry, amid risks of insecurity, oil theft, and litigation from oil-producing communities due to oil spills.

Trafficking in Persons and Narcotics Trafficking

Trafficking in Persons. Nigeria is a source, transit point, and destination for human trafficking. In its Trafficking in Persons report for 2023, the State Department ranked Nigeria on Tier 2, meaning it does not fully meet standards for eliminating trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so.¹⁰² Edo State, in southwest Nigeria, is a hub for international sex and labor trafficking to Europe, particularly Italy, typically via Libya.¹⁰³

Narcotics Trafficking. Narcotics trafficking is another key challenge and a long-standing focus of U.S. law enforcement assistance. Nigeria is a source, transit point, and destination market for drug trafficking, including of illicit recreational drugs (e.g., cocaine and heroin) as well as real and counterfeit opioids and other pharmaceuticals (e.g., tramadol, codeine, and anti-malarials).¹⁰⁴

Cybercrime, Financial Crime, and U.S. Responses

Cybercrime in Nigeria has been a focus of U.S. law enforcement assistance and justice sector actions. Nigeria is a global hub for cybercriminal activity, including "419 scams"—advance-fee fraud nicknamed for the article in Nigeria's penal code that outlaws fraud—as well as business email compromise attacks and identity theft. Nigerians also are prominent in "romance scams," in which conspirators defraud victims via fake online romantic relationships. Nigerian fraudsters reportedly stole millions of dollars in U.S. COVID-19 relief payments.¹⁰⁵

U.S. and Nigerian authorities have collaborated to crack down on cybercrime, and coordinated U.S.-Nigerian law enforcement operations have led to hundreds of arrests. U.S. authorities have charged a number of Nigerian nationals with internet fraud and money laundering.¹⁰⁶ In 2020, the Treasury Department imposed sanctions on six Nigerian nationals for email and romance scams under Executive Order 13694 (as amended), pertaining to cybercrime.¹⁰⁷

The Economy

Nigeria's economy is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa. Its oil sector, discussed below, has been a critical source of government revenues since large-scale production began in the 1970s, and oil dependence has significantly shaped Nigeria's politics and economy. The non-oil economy is large and dynamic, driven by a rapidly growing population and burgeoning services sector. Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, is among the world's largest cities and is a technology and financial services hub in Africa; its population and annual gross domestic product (GDP) are larger than those of many African countries. Nigerian artists and musicians are prominent in global media, and the country's film industry, "Nollywood," is second to India's Bollywood in annual output.¹⁰⁸ Investors have increasingly viewed Nigeria as a potentially lucrative consumer market for telecommunications, financial services, retail trade, and other industries.¹⁰⁹

Nonetheless, Nigeria faces stark economic and development challenges, and a wide gap between rich and poor. According to a 2022 Nigerian government survey, 63% of Nigerians—roughly 133 million people—are multidimensionally poor, facing deprivations in education, health, and/or standard of living.¹¹⁰ Service provision is limited in densely populated urban zones and in rural areas; according to the World Bank in 2021, approximately 60 million Nigerians do not have access to basic drinking water, and 80 million lack access to improved sanitation facilities.¹¹¹ Nigeria tops the World Bank's list of countries with the largest populations lacking access to electricity, with an estimated 90 million people as of 2019.¹¹² Despite notable advancements in public health care provision, immense challenges remain: Nigeria accounts for over a quarter of annual malaria deaths and one of the top tuberculosis disease burdens globally, and is home to the world's third-largest population living with HIV. According to UNAIDS, "one in seven babies born with HIV in the world is Nigerian."¹¹³ Numerous analyses have sought to identify barriers to the realization of Nigeria's economic potential and explain the apparent contradiction between the country's vast human and natural resources and its poor development indicators (see Text Box).

The agriculture sector is central to Nigeria's economy, and has been a focus of U.S. development assistance. It is the country's leading employer and contributes roughly one-quarter of annual GDP.¹¹⁹ Top export crops include sesame seeds, cashew nuts, and cocoa beans. Nigeria's livestock industry is one of the largest in Africa and is expected to grow as rising incomes, population growth, and urbanization drive up demand for animal products.¹²⁰ Some analysts contend Nigeria's agriculture sector operates below potential, due to such issues as low fertilizer use (Nigeria has one of the world's lowest fertilizer usage rates), limited uptake of improved seeds, irrigation, and other technologies, poor access to credit, and high market access costs.¹²¹

Several analyses have assessed Nigeria to be particularly vulnerable to negative effects of climate change.¹²² Northern Nigeria is chronically arid, and susceptible to highly variable rainfall, leading to drought and riverine flooding; the Middle Belt also faces exposure to aridity and flooding, with implications for herder-farmer violence and other land-use conflicts in the region.¹²³ Storm surges and riverine flooding pose key risks in southern Nigeria, particularly in densely populated coastal cities, including Lagos, that generally lack adequate drainage systems and other infrastructure. The burning of natural gas associated with oil drilling, known as gas flaring, has historically accounted for a considerable share of Nigeria's contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions.

The Oil and Gas Sector

As of 2022, Nigeria was the world's 15^th largest oil producer and 16^th largest producer of natural gas liquids.¹²⁴ Oil and gas receipts remain the single most important contributor to government revenues, though they have accounted for a declining share of state earnings since the 2000s: in 2022, oil and gas accounted for around 40% of federal revenues.¹²⁵ Efforts are underway to expand domestic refining capacity, but Nigeria continues to import nearly all its fuel.¹²⁶

Nigeria's crude oil production declined beginning in 2020, as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to which Nigeria belongs, responded to the global oil price crash by imposing quotas on members' output. Nigeria's output has yet to recover to pre-pandemic levels, as maintenance issues linked to past underinvestment and a strike by Exxon employees in 2023 have limited Nigeria's output to below its OPEC quota.¹²⁷ Decades of pipeline spills have ravaged the environment and devastated local livelihoods and health conditions. Local communities often blame the spills on equipment failure, while oil operators attribute them to pipeline sabotage.¹²⁸

U.S. firms Chevron and ExxonMobil are among the largest international oil companies (IOCs) active in Nigeria's oil and gas sector. Others include Anglo-Dutch firm Shell (the leading IOC in Nigeria), French firm Total, and Italian firm Eni. Some IOCs have sought to sell their onshore and shallow-water assets in Nigeria, a trend analysts attribute to high costs associated with aging pipelines, insecurity, risks of litigation from local communities seeking reparations for oil spills, and IOC efforts to reduce emissions.¹²⁹ Nigerian authorities have contested some divestments, including a pending sale of Exxon's shallow-water holdings to a Nigerian firm.¹³⁰ Advocates have raised concerns that divestments could effectively exonerate IOCs from redressing oil pollution, and that environmental conditions could worsen with a transfer of assets to domestic firms.¹³¹

U.S.-Nigeria Trade and Investment

Nigeria is the United States' second-largest trade partner and the third-largest destination of U.S. FDI in sub-Saharan Africa. Crude oil and other mineral fuels have historically accounted for the lion's share of Nigeria's exports to the United States, making up 90% of such exports, by value, in 2022.¹³² Nigeria often ranks as a top exporter to the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended) trade preference program; crude oil makes up nearly all of Nigeria's AGOA exports. The top categories of U.S. exports to Nigeria in 2022, by value, were automobiles, mineral fuels, cereals, machinery, and aircraft and related parts.

According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. direct investment position in Nigeria was $5.6 billion in 2022, down 6.4% from 2021.¹³³ U.S. investment in Nigeria has historically been concentrated in the oil and gas sector, though the share of extractives in the U.S. FDI position in Nigeria has declined amid U.S. investment in other sectors, such as services.¹³⁴

Economic Trends and Outlook

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects Nigeria's GDP growth at 2.9% in 2023, down from 3.3% last year.¹³⁵ Fuel price increases spurred by President Tinubu's subsidy removal appear to have propelled inflation, which exceeded 25% in September 2023, the highest rate in decades. The naira currency fell to a record low in October 2023. The Central Bank of Nigeria has removed restrictions on the use of foreign exchange for imports of dozens of items, a protectionist policy introduced by the previous administration. It remains to be seen whether the Tinubu government can sustain support for its pro-market agenda, or whether it may backtrack on certain measures in the face of public discontent or further inflationary or currency pressures.

Fiscal conditions have come under increasing strain, amid new borrowing and a surge in fuel subsidy payments in 2021-2022 linked to elevated global gas prices. Interest payments are high as a share of government revenues: Nigeria has struggled to collect taxes outside of the oil and gas sector, and has one of the world's lowest government revenue-to-GDP ratios.¹³⁶ The government's debt office estimates the debt service-to-revenue ratio at 74% in 2023, and projects a rise to 105% in 2025.¹³⁷ Boosting tax generation is a stated aim of the Tinubu administration. As of 2022, around 48% of Nigeria's external debt was owed to multilateral lenders, led by the World Bank; roughly 37% to commercial lenders; and 12% to bilateral lenders, led by China's Ex-Im Bank.¹³⁸

U.S. Relations and Assistance

Successive U.S. Administrations have described the U.S.-Nigeria relationship as among the most important U.S. partnerships in Africa. Nigerian presidents are often among the first African heads of state to receive calls from new U.S. presidents. Secretaries of State under each Administration since President Clinton have visited Nigeria. Amid travel disruptions linked to COVID-19, Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Nigeria virtually in his first official "trip" to Africa in early 2021, and in late 2021 visited the country in his first in-person trip to the region. During the latter visit, Blinken met with then-President Buhari to discuss cooperation in public health, economic growth, climate change, and security, among other issues, and signed a five-year aid agreement entailing U.S. development assistance commitments worth $2.1 billion.¹³⁹

Bilateral relations include the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), a forum inaugurated in 2010 that features regular high-level diplomatic visits and discussion of a range of interests. The last BNC, held in 2020, focused on trade and investment, governance, security cooperation, and development. A U.S.-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID), launched in 2017, convenes U.S. and Nigerian officials and private sector actors to foster commercial ties, initially focused on "infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, investment, and regulatory reform."¹⁴⁰ The State Department maintains an embassy in Abuja and consulate in Lagos, and supports "American Corners" in libraries throughout Nigeria to share information on U.S. culture. People-to-people ties are extensive, underpinned by a large U.S.-based Nigerian diaspora (see Text Box).

Niger. The Biden Administration has expressed support for President Tinubu's efforts, via ECOWAS, to support a restoration of constitutional order in Niger, while stopping short of backing Tinubu's call for a military option, instead emphasizing "a diplomatic path."¹⁴² In July 2023, Vice President Harris and Secretary Blinken each called President Tinubu to discuss Niger; in September 2023, President Biden met with Tinubu on the sidelines of the G20 Summit to discuss Tinubu's domestic economic reforms and ECOWAS efforts related to Niger.¹⁴³

U.S. Assistance

Nigeria often ranks among the top annual recipients of U.S. foreign aid globally. According to public budget materials, bilateral State Department- and USAID-administered nonemergency aid for Nigeria totaled $627.7 million in allocations of FY2022 appropriations (see Table 1).

Health assistance has regularly comprised roughly 90% of annual State Department and USAID-administered aid for Nigeria. HIV/AIDS assistance under the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has long constituted the largest share of annual health assistance for Nigeria (see Text Box). Other health funding supports efforts to counter malaria—Nigeria is a President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) focus country—support maternal and child health, control tuberculosis, enhance water and sanitation services, and promote nutrition, among other aims.

Support for agriculture-led economic growth has typically comprised the second-largest category of U.S. assistance for Nigeria, which is one of 20 focus countries under Feed the Future (FTF), an agricultural development initiative. U.S. democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) aid for Nigeria has included funding to help strengthen political competition and democratic institutions (e.g., electoral bodies), support conflict prevention and resolution, and build the capacity of civil society. DRG programs also have helped strengthen local law enforcement and the justice sector. Nigeria receives additional assistance through regionally and centrally managed programs, which public budget materials do not disaggregate by country.

Humanitarian Assistance

The United States is the largest donor to the humanitarian response in Nigeria, having provided over $2.6 billion in bilateral food and non-food assistance since FY2015 (see Table 2). The majority of these funds have supported the humanitarian response in the northeast, though U.S. humanitarian assistance also has targeted other regions, including the northwest and Middle Belt.

Security Assistance and Cooperation

In 2021, the State Department reported that security cooperation with Nigeria funded through the Departments of State and Defense had totaled roughly $650 million since 2017.¹⁴⁸ Nigerian purchases of U.S. defense articles and services through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program account for roughly $500 million of this total (see below). Otherwise, State Department-managed security assistance for Nigeria has aimed to build counterterrorism capacity, enhance maritime security, and professionalize Nigeria's military, among other efforts. Law enforcement capacity building has been another focus of State Department programming, which has helped to establish a specialized police unit to assume law enforcement duties in the northeast, and to improve responses to drug trafficking.¹⁴⁹ Nigeria is a partner under the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a regional counterterrorism program, and also has benefitted from U.S. support to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin. The Department of Defense (DOD) also has administered security assistance for Nigeria under its "global train and equip" authority (10 U.S.C. 333).

The maintenance of U.S. defense articles provided to Nigeria has been a concern. For instance, a 2021 DOD evaluation of maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea between 2007 and 2018 identified "a strong reliance on the United States to provide parts and maintenance services" on the part of Nigeria's navy.¹⁵⁰ The study found that Nigerian authorities often failed to provide support infrastructure and supplies, such as fuel and internet, to sustain U.S.-provided materiel.

U.S. Military Sales and Transfers

Nigeria has made two major purchases under FMS: 12 A-29 "Super Tucano" light attack aircraft and associated weapons and training (notified in 2017 at an initial value of $593 million) and 12 AH-1Z Cobra attack helicopters and accompanying systems (notified in 2022 at a value of $997 million).¹⁵¹ The A-29 sale was the largest FMS sale in Africa to date, until the AH-1Z sale. As discussed below, both sales were initially held up due to U.S. human rights concerns. The A-29s were inducted into Nigeria's Air Force in 2021; the AH-1Zs have not yet been delivered.

Other Nigerian FMS purchases have supported the refurbishment of Kainji Air Base to house the A-29s, as well as the acquisition of munitions and rocket propellants, unmanned aircraft, targeting systems, bomb equipment, and surveillance systems.¹⁵² The United States has provided materiel to Nigeria under other programs, including two Coast Guard cutters and 24 armor-protected vehicles under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) programs.¹⁵³

Human Rights Concerns

Abuses by Nigerian security forces have spurred concern among some Members of Congress, complicated U.S. security cooperation, and impeded sales of U.S. defense articles and services.¹⁵⁴ In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked the transfer of U.S.-origin attack helicopters from Israel to Nigeria amid "concerns about Nigeria's ability to use and maintain this type of helicopter [ ... and] the Nigerian military's protection of civilians when conducting military operations."¹⁵⁵ In response, Nigeria's ambassador to the United States criticized the United States' alleged refusal to sell "lethal equipment" to Nigeria, and Nigeria's military cancelled a planned U.S. training.¹⁵⁶

As noted above, both the A-29 and AH-1Z acquisitions were temporarily held up due to human rights concerns. In 2017, the Obama Administration suspended consideration of the A-29 sale after a Nigerian jet bombed a displaced persons camp; the sale was later revived by the Trump Administration.¹⁵⁷ Some Members of Congress expressed opposition to the sale; none introduced or moved to force consideration of a joint resolution of disapproval.¹⁵⁸ In 2021, according to press accounts, Senate Foreign Relations Committee leadership reportedly placed an informal, pre-notification hold on the proposed AH-1Z sale.¹⁵⁹ The sale went forward in 2022.

More recently, in December 2022, Reuters alleged that Nigeria's military had conducted a secret mass abortion program in the northeast that had terminated the pregnancies of at least 10,000 women and girls since 2013, many of whom had been raped by extremists.¹⁶⁰ Some Members expressed alarm at the allegations; State Department and DOD spokespersons separately called for an investigation.¹⁶¹ Nigerian military authorities initially refused to investigate, but later agreed to comply with a Nigerian government inquiry into abuses in the northeast, including the Reuters allegations. The status of that investigation is unclear. In the 118^th Congress, a proposed amendment to a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024 (H.R. 2670) would have required the Secretary of State to report to Congress on efforts to urge accountability for civilian casualties and human rights abuses by Nigeria's armed forces. The amendment was not adopted for debate on the House floor.

U.S. "Leahy laws," which prohibit the provision of U.S. security assistance to security force units implicated in gross violations of human rights, have precluded some Nigerian military personnel from receiving certain types of U.S. security assistance.¹⁶² Between 2015 and 2018, and again in 2020 and 2021, the State Department designated Nigeria under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA, Title IV of P.L. 110-457) in connection with the use of child soldiers by state-backed militias battling Boko Haram and/or the use of children, generally in support roles, by Nigeria's military.¹⁶³ That designation can carry restrictions on U.S. security assistance, subject to a waiver; successive Administrations have fully waived the restrictions for Nigeria, citing the U.S. interest. In October 2021, President Biden waived all CSPA aid restrictions on Nigeria for FY2022.

Outlook and Issues for Congress

President Tinubu has received praise from some foreign audiences for his aggressive economic reforms and strong stance on the coup in neighboring Niger, but both efforts have been widely unpopular domestically. Having entered office with less than 40% of the popular vote, Tinubu's political capital may be limited, according to some analysts.¹⁶⁴ Whether, and with what concessions, he can marshal political buy-in for his agenda are key questions.

The Nigerian government's poor governance and human rights record has driven growing U.S. criticism and threatened to strain bilateral ties, notably with respect to security cooperation. At the same time, the U.S.-Nigerian defense partnership has deepened through continued military sales and U.S. training and equipment activities, and bilateral engagement has increased amid military takeovers elsewhere in West Africa. As Congress considers engagement with Nigeria, Members may possibly draw lessons from U.S. approaches to other countries where U.S. governance and human rights concerns have arguably conflicted with U.S. security interests.¹⁶⁵

Nigeria's size, economic weight, and regional influence position it to play an important role in the context of U.S.-Africa policy, as the attainment of various U.S. security, development, and global health objectives in the region arguably hinges on the advancement of such goals in Nigeria. As it considers budgetary, policy, and oversight priorities, Members may assess U.S. priorities in Nigeria in the context of various regional objectives. These might include

Development and global health promotion, in view of Nigeria's high poverty rate and disease burden—which, by virtue of the country's demographic size, weigh heavily on broader poverty and health trends in Africa. Members may review past U.S. development and health investments in Nigeria, and assess whether U.S. assistance is sufficient and properly targeted to help address its needs.

Expanding U.S.-Africa trade and investment, in light of Nigeria's arguably immense economic potential. Congress may review current U.S.-Nigeria commercial relations, and assess the barriers to greater cooperation. Among other dynamics, Members may examine the ongoing divestment from Nigeria's oil industry by U.S. firms, and debate how (if at all) to spur greater U.S. commercial interest in Nigeria.

Strengthening democracy and promoting human rights, amid extensive governance challenges in Nigeria and democratic backsliding in the broader sub-region. Congress may debate what mix of tools might best help promote good governance in Nigeria and weigh the merits of increased engagement (e.g., expanding democracy, human rights, and governance assistance and anti-kleptocracy efforts) against signals of U.S. concern and punitive measures (e.g., aid restrictions, sanctions, and public criticism); and

Global power competition in Africa, in the context of Nigeria's robust commercial and military relationship with China. Congress may weigh various approaches for advancing U.S. influence, such as by expanding bilateral cooperation (through increased diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, or military sales), promoting U.S. commercial competitiveness, and drawing attention to malign practices by foreign actors.

How Congress balances these priorities, as well as other U.S. interests—such as enhancing peace and security, responding to humanitarian crises, and maintaining and advancing U.S. strategic access and influence—is likely to continue to shape U.S. engagement in Nigeria. Congress may continue to influence bilateral relations through its appropriation and oversight of U.S. assistance, consideration of U.S. military sales, and engagement (e.g., through hearings, statements, travel, and correspondence) on issues related to Nigeria and U.S.-Nigeria policy.