Regardless of one’s beliefs on the wisdom and outcomes of fighting in space, it is clear that space is now a contested domain.
..
Office of the Director of National Intelligence | March 2025
[ 2 ]
ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
March 2025
INTRODUCTION
This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to
Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116 -260). This report reflects the
collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed to providing the nuanced,
independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law
enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.
This assessment focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the United States primarily during the
next year. All these threats require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near -term
focus may help head off greater threats in t he future.
Information available as of 18 March was used in the preparation of this assessment.
[ 3 ] CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 2
FOREWORD ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 4
NONSTATE TRANSNATION AL CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS ................................ ....... 5
Foreign Illicit Drug Actors ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 5
Transnational Islamic Extremists ................................ ................................ ............................ 6
Other Transnational Criminals ................................ ................................ ............................... 7
MAJOR STATE ACTORS ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 9
China ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9
Russia ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 16
Iran ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 22
North Korea ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 26
Adversarial Cooperation ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 29
[ 4 ] FOR EWORD
The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) is the Intelligence Community ’s (IC) official,
coordinated evaluation of a n array of threats to U.S. citizens, the Homeland, and U.S. interests in
the world. A diverse set of foreign actors are targeting U.S. health and safety, critical infrastructure,
industries, wealth, and government. State adversaries and their proxies are als o trying to weaken and
displace U.S. economic and military power in their region s and across the globe .
Both state and nonstate actors pose multiple immediate threats to the Homeland and U.S. national
interests . Terrorist and transnational criminal organizations are directly threatening our citizens .
Cartels are largely responsible for the more than 52,000 U.S. deaths from synthetic op ioids in the 12
months ending in Octo ber 2024 and helped facilitate the nearly three million illegal migrant arrivals
in 2024 , strain ing resources and put ting U.S. communities at risk. A range of cyber and intelligence
actors are targeting our wealth, critical infrastructure, telecom, and media . Nonstate groups are often
enabled , both directly and indirectly, by state actors , such as China , as source s of precursors and
equipment for drug traffickers. State adversaries have weapons that can strike U.S. territory, or
disabl e vital U.S. systems in space , for coerci ve aims or actual war. These threats reinforc e each
other, creating a vastly more complex and dangerous security environment .
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea —individually and collectively —are challenging U.S. interests
in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and
conventional hard power t actics , and promot ing alternative systems to compete with the United
States, primarily in trade, finance, and security. They seek to challenge the United States and other
countries through deliberate campaigns to gain an advantage, while also trying to avoid direct war .
Growing cooperation between and among these adversaries is increasing their fortitude against the
United States, the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another , and pressure on
other global actors to choose side s.
This 2025 ATA report supports the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s commitment to
keeping the U.S. Congress and American people informed of threats to the nation’s security,
representing the IC’s dedication to monitoring, evaluating, and warning of threats of all types . In
preparing this assessment, the National Intelligence Council worked closely with all IC components,
the wider U.S. Government, and foreign and external partners and experts to provide the most
timely, objective, and useful insights for strategic warning and U.S. decision advantage.
This 2025 Annual Threat Assessment details these myria d threats by actor or perpetrator, starting with
nonstate actors and then presenting threats posed by major state actors . The National Intelligence
Council stands ready to support policymakers with additional information in a classified setting .
[ 5 ] NONSTATE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALS
AND TERRORISTS
Transnational criminals, terrorists, and other nonstate actors are threatening and impacting the lives of U.S.
citizens, the security and prosperity of the Homeland, and U.S. strength at home and abroad . Some t ransnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) are producing and trafficking large amounts of illicit drugs that are imperiling
American lives and livelihood s. They are conducting other illegal activities that challenge U.S. security, such as
human trafficking, cyber oper ations, money laundering , and inciting violence . U.S. citizens —at home and
abroad —are also facing more diverse, complex, and decentralized terrorist threats. Actors , ranging from designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations —including the Islamic State of Iraq and ash -Sham ( ISIS), al-Qa‘ida , other
Islamist terrorist groups, and some drug cartels — to terrorists acting alone or in small cells , are likely to pursue,
enable, or inspire attacks . Finally, large -scale illegal im migration has strained local and national infrastructure
and resources and enabl ed known or suspected terrorists to cross into the United States .
Foreign Illicit Drug Actors
Western Hemisphere -based TCOs and terrorists involved in illicit drug production and trafficking bound for the
United States endanger the health and safety of millions of American s and contribute to regional instability .
Fentanyl and other synthetic opioid s remain the most lethal drugs trafficked into the United States , causing
more than 52,000 U.S. deaths in a 12 -month period ending in October 2024. This represents a nearly 3 3
percent decrease in synthetic opioid -related overdose deaths compared to the sam e reporting time frame the
previous year , according to CDC provisional data , and may be because of the availability and accessibility
of naloxone .
• Mexico -based TCOs —including the Sinaloa Cartel and the New Generation Jalisco Carte l—remain
the dominant producers and suppliers of illicit drugs , including fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine,
and South American -sourced cocaine, for the U.S. market. Last year, o fficial points of entry along the
U.S. -Mexico border were the main entry point for illicit drugs, often concealed in passenger vehicles
and tractor trailers. However, some TCOs likely will at least temporarily change their smuggling
techniques and routes in response to increased U.S. security force presence at the border.
• Since at least 2020, th e growth of Mexico -based independent fentanyl producers —actors who are
autonomous or semiautonomous from Mexican cartel control —has increasingly fragmented Mexico’s
fentanyl trade. Independent fentanyl producers are attracted to the drug’s profitability and the low barriers
to market entry, including the ease of synthesizing it using basic lab equipment and few personnel.
• Colombia -based TCOs and illegal armed groups a re responsible for produ cing and exporting the vast
majority of cocaine that reaches the U nited States , some of which is transshipped through Ecuador,
contributing to an uptick in violent criminal conflicts that spurs regional migration.
• Mexico -based TCOs are ramping up lethal attacks in Mexico against rivals and Mexican security
forces using IEDs, including landmines, mortars, and grenades. In 2024, there were nearly 1,600
attacks on Mexican security forces using IEDs, surging from only three reported atta cks between 2020 -
2021. The sophistication of TCO tactics is reshaping Mexico’s security landscape and has heightened
the risk to security forces.
[ 6 ] China remains the primary source country for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing
equipment , followed by India . Mexico -based chemical brokers circumvent international controls through
mislabeled shipments and the purchase of unregulated dual -use chemicals.
Transnational Islamic Extremists
ISIS’s most aggressive branches, including ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS -K), and its entrepreneurial plotters will c
...
..
Office of the Director of National Intelligence | March 2025
[ 2 ]
ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
March 2025
INTRODUCTION
This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to
Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (Pub. L. No. 116 -260). This report reflects the
collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed to providing the nuanced,
independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law
enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world.
This assessment focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the United States primarily during the
next year. All these threats require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near -term
focus may help head off greater threats in t he future.
Information available as of 18 March was used in the preparation of this assessment.
[ 3 ] CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ...................... 2
FOREWORD ................................ ................................ ................................ .............................. 4
NONSTATE TRANSNATION AL CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS ................................ ....... 5
Foreign Illicit Drug Actors ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 5
Transnational Islamic Extremists ................................ ................................ ............................ 6
Other Transnational Criminals ................................ ................................ ............................... 7
MAJOR STATE ACTORS ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 9
China ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 9
Russia ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 16
Iran ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 22
North Korea ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 26
Adversarial Cooperation ................................ ................................ ................................ ....... 29
[ 4 ] FOR EWORD
The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) is the Intelligence Community ’s (IC) official,
coordinated evaluation of a n array of threats to U.S. citizens, the Homeland, and U.S. interests in
the world. A diverse set of foreign actors are targeting U.S. health and safety, critical infrastructure,
industries, wealth, and government. State adversaries and their proxies are als o trying to weaken and
displace U.S. economic and military power in their region s and across the globe .
Both state and nonstate actors pose multiple immediate threats to the Homeland and U.S. national
interests . Terrorist and transnational criminal organizations are directly threatening our citizens .
Cartels are largely responsible for the more than 52,000 U.S. deaths from synthetic op ioids in the 12
months ending in Octo ber 2024 and helped facilitate the nearly three million illegal migrant arrivals
in 2024 , strain ing resources and put ting U.S. communities at risk. A range of cyber and intelligence
actors are targeting our wealth, critical infrastructure, telecom, and media . Nonstate groups are often
enabled , both directly and indirectly, by state actors , such as China , as source s of precursors and
equipment for drug traffickers. State adversaries have weapons that can strike U.S. territory, or
disabl e vital U.S. systems in space , for coerci ve aims or actual war. These threats reinforc e each
other, creating a vastly more complex and dangerous security environment .
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea —individually and collectively —are challenging U.S. interests
in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and
conventional hard power t actics , and promot ing alternative systems to compete with the United
States, primarily in trade, finance, and security. They seek to challenge the United States and other
countries through deliberate campaigns to gain an advantage, while also trying to avoid direct war .
Growing cooperation between and among these adversaries is increasing their fortitude against the
United States, the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another , and pressure on
other global actors to choose side s.
This 2025 ATA report supports the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s commitment to
keeping the U.S. Congress and American people informed of threats to the nation’s security,
representing the IC’s dedication to monitoring, evaluating, and warning of threats of all types . In
preparing this assessment, the National Intelligence Council worked closely with all IC components,
the wider U.S. Government, and foreign and external partners and experts to provide the most
timely, objective, and useful insights for strategic warning and U.S. decision advantage.
This 2025 Annual Threat Assessment details these myria d threats by actor or perpetrator, starting with
nonstate actors and then presenting threats posed by major state actors . The National Intelligence
Council stands ready to support policymakers with additional information in a classified setting .
[ 5 ] NONSTATE TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINALS
AND TERRORISTS
Transnational criminals, terrorists, and other nonstate actors are threatening and impacting the lives of U.S.
citizens, the security and prosperity of the Homeland, and U.S. strength at home and abroad . Some t ransnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) are producing and trafficking large amounts of illicit drugs that are imperiling
American lives and livelihood s. They are conducting other illegal activities that challenge U.S. security, such as
human trafficking, cyber oper ations, money laundering , and inciting violence . U.S. citizens —at home and
abroad —are also facing more diverse, complex, and decentralized terrorist threats. Actors , ranging from designated
Foreign Terrorist Organizations —including the Islamic State of Iraq and ash -Sham ( ISIS), al-Qa‘ida , other
Islamist terrorist groups, and some drug cartels — to terrorists acting alone or in small cells , are likely to pursue,
enable, or inspire attacks . Finally, large -scale illegal im migration has strained local and national infrastructure
and resources and enabl ed known or suspected terrorists to cross into the United States .
Foreign Illicit Drug Actors
Western Hemisphere -based TCOs and terrorists involved in illicit drug production and trafficking bound for the
United States endanger the health and safety of millions of American s and contribute to regional instability .
Fentanyl and other synthetic opioid s remain the most lethal drugs trafficked into the United States , causing
more than 52,000 U.S. deaths in a 12 -month period ending in October 2024. This represents a nearly 3 3
percent decrease in synthetic opioid -related overdose deaths compared to the sam e reporting time frame the
previous year , according to CDC provisional data , and may be because of the availability and accessibility
of naloxone .
• Mexico -based TCOs —including the Sinaloa Cartel and the New Generation Jalisco Carte l—remain
the dominant producers and suppliers of illicit drugs , including fentanyl, heroin, methamphetamine,
and South American -sourced cocaine, for the U.S. market. Last year, o fficial points of entry along the
U.S. -Mexico border were the main entry point for illicit drugs, often concealed in passenger vehicles
and tractor trailers. However, some TCOs likely will at least temporarily change their smuggling
techniques and routes in response to increased U.S. security force presence at the border.
• Since at least 2020, th e growth of Mexico -based independent fentanyl producers —actors who are
autonomous or semiautonomous from Mexican cartel control —has increasingly fragmented Mexico’s
fentanyl trade. Independent fentanyl producers are attracted to the drug’s profitability and the low barriers
to market entry, including the ease of synthesizing it using basic lab equipment and few personnel.
• Colombia -based TCOs and illegal armed groups a re responsible for produ cing and exporting the vast
majority of cocaine that reaches the U nited States , some of which is transshipped through Ecuador,
contributing to an uptick in violent criminal conflicts that spurs regional migration.
• Mexico -based TCOs are ramping up lethal attacks in Mexico against rivals and Mexican security
forces using IEDs, including landmines, mortars, and grenades. In 2024, there were nearly 1,600
attacks on Mexican security forces using IEDs, surging from only three reported atta cks between 2020 -
2021. The sophistication of TCO tactics is reshaping Mexico’s security landscape and has heightened
the risk to security forces.
[ 6 ] China remains the primary source country for illicit fentanyl precursor chemicals and pill pressing
equipment , followed by India . Mexico -based chemical brokers circumvent international controls through
mislabeled shipments and the purchase of unregulated dual -use chemicals.
Transnational Islamic Extremists
ISIS’s most aggressive branches, including ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS -K), and its entrepreneurial plotters will continue
to seek to attack the West , including the United States , via online outreach and propaganda aimed at directing,
enabling, or inspiring a ttacks , and could exploit vulnerable travel route s. ISIS has suffered major setbacks and is
incapable of holding ground in Iraq and Syria. I n recent years, ISIS saw the U.S. defeat of its physical
caliphate in 2019, the loss of three overall leaders in 2022 , 2023 , and 2025 , and renewed counterterrorism
efforts this year removing leaders driving global operations. Nevertheless, ISIS remains the world’s largest
Islamic terrorist organization, has sought to gain momentum from high -profile attacks, and continues to rely
on its most capable branches and globally dispersed leadership to weather degradation .
The New Year’s Day attacker in New Orleans was influenced by ISIS propaganda , and separately , an
Afghan national was arrested in October for planning an election day attack in the name of ISIS,
highlighting ISIS’s ability to reach into the Homeland to both inspire and enable attacks.
• ISIS-K in South Asia is the group’s branch most capable of carrying out external terrorist attacks and
maintains the intent to conduct attacks in South and Central Asia , and globally, although its
capabilit ies vary. ISIS -K’s mass casualty attacks in Russia and Iran in 2024, as well as arrests of ISIS-K
supporters in Europe and the United States , highlight the group’s expanding capability beyond South
Asia and ability to inspire individuals to conduct attacks abroad .
• ISIS will seek to exploit the end of the Asad regime in Syria to reconstitute its attack capabilities ,
including external plotting, and to free prisoners to rebuild their rank s.
• In 2024, the ISIS spokesman publicly hailed the group’s Africa expansion , highlighting the growing
importance of the continent to the group. ISIS -Somalia has d oubled in size during the past year , ISIS-
West Africa remains the largest branch and leads in numbers of claimed attacks , and ISIS -Sahel is
expanding into coastal West Africa.
Al-Qa‘ida maintains its intent to target the United States and U.S. citizens across its global affiliates . Its leaders,
some of whom remain in Iran, have tried to exploit anti -Israeli sentiment over the war in Gaza to unite
Muslims and encourage attacks against Israel and the United States. Al -Qa‘ida’s media apparatus issu ed
statements from leaders and the group’s affiliates supporting HAMAS and encouraging attacks against
Israeli and U.S. targets .
• Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) relaunched its Inspire guide with videos and tweets that
encouraged attacks against J ewish targets, the United States, and Europe . Inspire provided instructions
for making bombs and placing explosive devices on civilian airliners and gave religious, ideological,
historical, and moral justification for such attacks. In addition to trying to inspire attacks worldwide
and in the U nited States , AQAP has the intent to conduct operations in the region and beyond.
• Al-Shabaab —al-Qa‘ida’s largest and wealthiest affiliate —remains focused on attacks in Somalia that
further its regional objectives, provides funding to al -Qa‘ida efforts outside of Somalia, and has a
[ 7 ] burgeoning relationship with the Huthis that could provide access to a ne w source of more
sophisticated weapons , increasing the threat to U.S. interests in the region.
• In West Africa, al -Qa‘ida is expanding its territorial control by gaining inroads with civilians through
the provision of services and intimidation, and is threa tening urban centers in Burkina Faso and Mali,
where U.S. personnel are located.
• Al-Qa‘ida’s affiliate in Syria, Hurras al -Din, probably is exploiting the end of the Asad regime in Syria
to strengthen its position. Despite its public announcement that the group was ordered dissolved by al -
Qa‘ida’s senior leaders in Iran, Hurras al -Din members were advised not to disarm and instead to
prepare for a future conflict , noting their continued fight against the Jews and their supporters .
Other Islamic terrorist g roups —including some with historical ties to al -Qa‘ida —continue to pose a threat to the
United States primarily in the regions where they operate. Most of these groups generally have targeted local
governments in recent years, while Lebanese Hizballah has continued to pursue limited targeting of
primarily Israeli and Jewish individuals in and outside of the Middle East. The U.S. Government works
with partners worldwide to prevent attacks against U.S. citizens, while watching for indications that these
groups may shift intent and build capabilities to pursue transnational attacks.
• In South Asia, Tehrik -e-Taliban (TTP) operations in recent years have focused exclusively on targeting
the Government of Pakistan, probably to avoid drawing more counterterrorism pressure. However,
TTP’s capabilities, historic al ties to al -Qa‘ida, and previous support to operations targeting the United
States keep us concern ed about the potential future threat. Anti -India groups, including Lashkar -e
Tayyiba , similarly concern us in part because of their historic al links with al -Qa‘ida.
Other Transnational Criminal s
Profit -motivated transnational criminals are using corruption , intimidation , and enabling technologies to expand
their illegal activities into new markets and to diversify their sources of income , which increase their resiliency to
U.S. and international law enforcement and financial regulatory efforts. TCOs are defrauding U.S. citizens ,
businesses, and government programs, while laundering billions of dollars of illicit proceeds through U.S.
and international financial institutions. TCOs sometimes outsource money laundering operations and
investments to individuals and networks with leg al and banking expertise to circumvent financial regulations .
• TCOs and their financial facilitators use a myriad of methods to launder and repatriate illicit proceeds
and to evade law enforcement and regulatory pressures. Some TCOs use digital currencies f or money
laundering and sanctions evasion activities because of its perceived anonymity and weaker
international regulations compared to fiat currencies.
Financially motivated cyber criminals continue to prey on inadequately defended U.S. targets , such as healthcare
systems and municipal governments, that could have broad impact on the U.S. populace and economy . Others have
conducted attacks on critical infrastructure , disrupting utility company business networks or manipulating poorly
secured control systems.
• Ransomware actors in mid -2024 attacked the largest payment processor for U.S. healthcare
transactions, hampering prescriptions and causing extended delays in accessing electronic health
records, patient communications, and medication order ing systems, and forcing some ambulances to
divert patients to other hospitals.
[ 8 ] • U.S. water infrastructure has become a more common target. In October 2024, criminal actors
conducted cyber attacks against both large and small water utilities in the United S tates, possibly
inspired by attacks against water infrastructure by Russian hacktivists and Iranian cyber actors in 2023
that had little effect but drew substantial publicity.
Foreign and U.S. -based h uman traffickers exploit vulnerable individuals and groups by promising well-paying jobs,
confiscating identification documents, coercing victims to engage in risky behaviors and to work in inhumane
conditions. TCOs that engage in human trafficking may also engage in other criminal activit y threatening the
United States , including fraud scams, drug trafficking, and weapons and human smuggling.
• Criminal actors , including Mexico -based TCOs, exploit migrants transiting the Western Hemisphere
to the United States through kidnapping for ransom, fo rced labor, and sex trafficking operations. For
example, some victims are forced to repay their smuggling fee s through debt bondage once they
arrive in the United States . These migrants are typically forced to become domestic servants, to work
in the fishing, agriculture, and meat processing industries for low wages, or to work in illegal
marijuana grow houses.
The total number of migrants trying to reach the United States has dropped significantly since January 2025 due to
a surge in border security e nforcement. While k ey drivers of migration in the Western Hemisphere , such as
crime, poverty, and political repression, are likely to continue, heightened border security and mass
deportation policies probably serve as a deterrent for migrants seeking to i llegally cross U.S. borders.
• Law enforcement encounters with migrants at the U.S. -Mexico border were 14 percent lower in 2024
when compared to the previous year , and U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions along the Southwest
border in January 2025 dropped 85 percent from the same period in 2024 . Guatemalan, Mexican, and
Venezuelan nationals were the most frequently encountered nationals at the U.S. -Mexico border .
• Real or perceived changes to immigration laws or travel polices in transit countries can trigger
unexpected spikes . Since 2021, for instance, Nicaragua has removed visa requirements for air
travelers from third countries, triggering a surge in U.S. -bound migrat ion from those countries
through Nicaragua.
[ 9 ] MAJOR STATE ACTORS
Several major state actors present proximate and enduring threats to the U nited States and its interests in the world ,
challenging U.S. military and economic strength , regionally and globall y. China stands out as the actor most
capable of threatening U.S. interests globally , though it is also more cautious than Russia, Iran, and North Korea
about risking its economic and diplomatic image in the world by being too aggressive and disruptive . Growing
cooperation among these actors expands the threat, increasing the risk that should hostilities with one occur,
it may draw in others .
CHINA
Strategic Overview
President Xi Jinping and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) want to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation” by 2049. The PRC will seek to increase its power and influence to shape world events to create an
environment favorable to PRC interests, obtain greater U .S. deference to China’s interests, and fend off challenges
to its reputation, legitimacy, and capabilities at home and abroad .
• Beijing is deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions and views Washington’s measures against China as part
of a concerted, whole -of-government effort , working with U.S. allies and partners, to contain China’s
development and rise, undermine CCP rule, and prevent th e PRC from achieving its a ims. PRC
leaders are most concerned about strong unified opposition from the U nited States and its allies , and
are responding , in part, by strengthening ties with partners like Russia and North Korea .
• At the same time, China’s le aders will seek opportunities to reduce tension with Washington when
they believe it benefits Beijing, protects its core interests, and buys time to strengthen its position .
The PRC will likely continue posturing to be in a position of advantage in a potential conflict with the United
State s. The PRC will continue trying to press Taiwan on unification and will continue conduct ing wide -ranging
cyber operations against U.S. targets for both espionage and strategic advantage . China will likely struggle to
sufficiently constrain the activities of PRC companies and criminal elements that enable the supply and trafficking
of fentanyl precursors and synthetic opioids to the United States , absent greater law enforcement actions .
• China’s military operations to project power over Taiwan and its efforts to assert sovereignty claims in
the South and East China Seas occur routinely with confrontations that increase concern of
miscalculations potentially leading to conflict .
• China has demonstrated the ability to compromise U.S. infrastructure through formidable cyber
capabilities that it could employ during a conflict with the United States.
Beijing will continue to strengthen its conventional military capabilities and strategic forces , intensify competition
in space, and sustain its industrial - and technology -intensive economic strategy to compete with U.S. economic
power and global leadership .
[ 10 ] Military
China presents the most comprehensive and robust military threat to U.S. national security. The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) is fielding a joint force that is capable of full-spectrum warfare to challeng e
intervention by the United States in a regional contingency, project ing power globally , and secur ing what
Beijing claims i s its sovereign territory. A major portion of China’s military modernization efforts is focused
on developing counter -intervention capabilities tailored against all aspects of U.S. and allied military
operations in the Pacific. Beijing will focus on meetin g key modernization milestones by 2027 and 2035,
aimed at making the PLA a world -class military by 2049.
• Examples of PLA advances in 2024 include the PLA Navy’s third carrier (CV -18 Fujian) beginning
sea trials and likely being ready to enter operational service in 2025 . The PLA Rocket Force probably
is fielding the DF -27 ballistic missile, w ith a hypersonic glide vehicle payload option and an estimated
range of between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometers . The PLA ground forc es are also fielding its most
advanced multiple rocket launcher, the PCH191, increasing its long-range, precision strike capability.
• The PLA has improved its force structure, readiness, and training. The PLA probably has made
particular progress in critica l areas, such as modernizing key ground forces, expanding its navy with
more modern combatants, and fielding a wide variety of new missile systems; it has also improved its
electronic warfare ( EW) capabilities.
The PLA has the capability to conduct long -range precision -strikes with conventional weapons against the
Homeland ’s periphery in the Western Pacific, including Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. China has developed a
range of ballistic and cruise missiles with conventional payloads that can be delivered from its mainland as
well as by air and sea, including by nuclear -powered submarines. China may be exploring development of
conventionally -armed intercontinental range missile systems, which, if developed and fielded, would allow
China to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States.
The PLA will continue to pursue the establishment of overseas military installations and access agreements
to project power and protect China’s interests abroad. Beijing may also pursue a mixture of military logistics
models, including preferred access to commercial infrastructure abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities
with pre -positioned supplies co-located with commercial infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, to
meet its overseas military logistics needs.
China is using complex, whole -of-government campaigns featuring coercive military, economic, and influence
operations short of war to assert its positions and strength against others , reserving more destructive tools for full-
scale conflict . Beijing will likely expand these campaigns to advance unification with Taiwan, project power
in East Asia, and reverse perceived U.S. hegemony.
• Beijing has pushed back against U.S. military operat ions, such as reconnaissance and bomber
flights, freedom of navigation operations, and exercises around PRC borders and maritime claims.
The PLA regularly intercepts and shadows U.S. forces and sometimes conducts unsafe maneuvers
in their vicinity.
[ 11 ] Cyber
The PRC remains the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. government, private -sector, and critical
infrastructure networks. The PRC’s campaign to preposition access on critical infrastructure for attacks during
crisis or conflict, tracked publicly as Volt Typhoon, and its more recently identified compromise of U.S.
telecommunications infrastructure, also referred to as Salt Typhoon, demonstrates the growing breadth and depth of
the PRC ’s capabilit ies to compromise U.S. infrastructure. Taiwan and Maritime Flashpoints
In 2025, Beijing will likely apply stronger coercive pressure against Taiwan and perceived increases in U.S.
support to the island to further its goal of eventual unification. The PRC calls for a peaceful unification with
Taiwan to resolve the Civil War that drove Taiwan’s separation , even as it threatens to use force to
compel unification if necessary and counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine
China’s rise.
A conflict between China and Taiwan would disrupt U.S. access to trade and semiconductor technology
critical to the global economy. Even without U.S. involvement in such a conflict, there would likely be
significant and costly consequences to U.S. and global economic and security interests.
Beijing is working to isolate Tai pei by pressuring states to downgrade diplomatic ties and support China ’s
unification goal. Since 2016, Taiwan’s official diplomatic relationships have dropped from 22 to only 12,
and several of the remaining ones are vulnerable to Chinese pressure.
China is advancing military capabilities for a cross -Strait campaign while also using its armed forces to exert
steady state pressure on Taiwan. The PLA probably is making steady but uneven progress on capabilities
it would use in an attempt to seize Taiwan and deter —and if necessary, defeat —U.S. military
intervention , and it is intensifying the scope, size, and pace of operations around Taiwan .
Beijing will continue to pressure Tai pei with economic coercion and probably will increase it if it sees Taiwan
taking steps toward formal independence. It could suspen d preferential tariff terms, selective ly ban Taiwan
import s to China , and arbitrar ily enforce regulat ions.
Beijing’s aggressive efforts to assert sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas are heightening
tensions that could trigger a broader conflict.
• In 2024, PRC tactics in the South China Sea led to the loss of the Philippines’ unilateral access to
some disputed areas , and forced talks between Beijing and Manila in which the Philippines agreed
to concessions in exchange for access. However, Manila is unlikely to relinquish its claims,
creating potential for escalation by either side.
• Tension between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands last flared up a decade ago. Since
then, Chinese ships have remained in proximity of the disputed islands, occasionally entering the
territorial zone, and driving responses from Japan’s Self-Defense Force to monitor the activity.
[ 12 ] • If Beijing believed that a major conflict with Washington was imminent, it could consider aggressive
cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure and military assets. Such strikes would be designed
to deter U.S. military action by impeding U.S. decision -making, inducing societal panic, and
interfering with the deployment of U .S. forces.
Economics
The PRC seeks to compete with the United States as the leading economic power in the world . To do so, the strategy
calls for a centralized, state -directed, and nationally resourced approach to dominating global markets and strategic
supply chains , limiting foreign competitors , and making other nations dependent on China. PRC leaders are applying
the same strategy to bolster China’s position and become more globally dominant in critical supply chains,
both in upstream inputs it can provide more cheaply than others and in downstream production at wider scale.
• China’s weak domestic demand, coupled with its industrial policies, such as manufacturing subsidies,
have enabled a surge in cheap Chinese exports in sectors such as steel, harming U.S. competitors and
fueling a record PRC trade surplus.
• China’s dominance in key supply chain s enables its use of ec onomic coercion against countries that
adopt policies Beijing opposes. Beijing is develop ing an institutionalized framework enabling more
assertive and centrally controlled trade retaliation. PRC leaders are using ostensibly unofficial or
technical trade a nd investment barriers, administrative regulations , logistics, and symbolic sanctions in
a targeted way against individuals, firms, and sectors, in parallel with messages to warn and deter.
• PRC leaders appear to be preparing for more economic friction with the United States, and probably
are weighing options with the new U.S. administration while looking for leverage and other ways to
prevent a major escalation and decoupling.
China’s dominan ce in the mining and processing of several critical materials is a particular threat, providing it with
the ability to restrict quantities and affect global prices. Beijing has shown a willingness to restrict global access
to its mineral resources —sometime s in response to geopolitical disputes —as with its banning of exports to
the United States of metals used in semiconductor manufacturing, such as gallium, germanium, and
antimony in December 2024 in response to U.S. export controls on advanced semiconducto rs and chip -
making equipment . Other examples include when the PRC temporarily stopped rare earth element exports
to Japan in 2010, and Beijing’s creation of new laws codifying its authority to restrict mineral exports. A
prolonged cessation in supplies con trolled by China could disrupt critical inputs needed for U.S. industry
and technological advancements.
China has similar aims in global shipping and resource access, including in the Arctic, where melting sea ice is
creating opportunities for expanded ma ritime transport and energy exploitation, especially along the Northern Sea
Route (NSR) off Russia’s coast. China seeks access to the Arctic’s potentially vast natural resources, including
oil, gas, and minerals, even though China is not among the eight Ar ctic countries that control territory in the
region. Beijing seeks to normalize more direct and efficient maritime shipping routes to Russia and other
Northern Hemisphere areas, as a way to fuel its economic growth and energy security and reduc e its depend ence
on Middle East energy. China ha s gradually increased engagement with Greenland mainly through mining
projects, infrastructure development, and scientific research projects. Despite less active engagement right now,
China’s long -term goal is to expand access to Greenland’s natural resources, as well as to use the same
access as a key strategic foothold for advancing China’s broader and economic aims in the Arctic.
[ 13 ] Technology
China is using an aggressive, whole -of-government approach, combined with state direction of the private sector, to
become a global S&T superpower, surpass the United States, promote self -reliance, and achieve further economic,
political, and military gain. Beijing has prioritized technology sectors such as advanced power and energy,
AI, biotechnology, quantum information science, and semiconductors, further challenging U.S. efforts to
protect critical technologies by tailoring restrictions narrowly to address national s ecurity concerns. China is
accelerating its S&T progress through a range of licit and illicit means, to include investments, intellectual
property acquisition and theft, cyber operations, talent recruitment, international collaborations, and
sanctions evas ion.
• Some forecasts indicate China’s technology sectors will account for as much as 23 percent of its gross
domestic product by 2026, more than doubling since 2018. In addition to private funding, the PRC
government is investing hundreds of billions of do llars in priority technologies, such as AI,
microelectronics, and biotechnologies , in pursuit of its self -reliance goals.
China almost certainly has a multifaceted, national -level strategy designed to displace the United States as the
world’s most influen tial AI power by 2030. China is experiencing a boom in generative AI with the rapid
emergence of a large number of PRC -developed models, and is broadly pursuing AI for smart cities, mass
surveillance, healthcare, S&T innovation, and intelligent weapons. Ch inese AI firms are already world
leaders in voice and image recognition, video analytics, and mass surveillance technologies. The PLA
probably plans to use large language models (LLMs) to generate information deception attacks, create fake
news, imitate pe rsonas, and enable attack networks. China has also announced initiatives to bolster
international support for its vision of AI governance.
• China has stolen hundreds of gigabytes of intellectual property from companies in Asia, Europe, and
North America in an effort to leapfrog over technological hurdles, with as much as 80 percent of U.S.
economic espionage cases as of 2021 involving PRC entities.
China also sees biotechnology as critical to becoming a dominant economic power and intends to grow its
domesti c bioeconomy to $3.3 trillion this year . Beijing is investing heavily in collecting health and genetic
data both at home and abroad in pursuit of these goals, and has shown it can be globally competitive in
certain low -cost, high -volume commodities, such as biomanufacturing and genetic sequenci ng. Beijing
has identified genetic data as a national strategic resource and is expanding state control over the
country’s gene banks and other genetic repositories, positioning it to potentially lead in precision medicine
and agricultural biotechnology ap plications.
China has made progress in producing advanced 7 -nanometer (nm) semiconductor chips for cryptocurrency mining
and cellular devices using previously acquired deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography equipment, but will face
challenges achieving high -quality, high -volume production of these chips without access to extreme ultraviolet
lithography tools . PRC researchers also continue to explore applying advanced patterning techniques to DUV
machines to produce semiconductor chips as small as 3nm. China le ads the world in legacy logic
semiconductor (28nm and up) production, accounting for 39.3 percent of global capacity, and is expected to
add more capacity than the rest of the world combined through 2028. These legacy chips are vital to
producing automobil es, consumer electronics, home appliances, factory automation, broadband, and many
military and medical systems.
[ 14 ] WMD
China remains intent on modernizing, diversifying, and expanding its nuclear posture. China’s nuclear weapons
and advanced delivery system s pose a direct threat to the Homeland and are capable of delivering catastrophic
damage to the United States and threatening U.S. military forces here and abroad.
China most likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare (CBW) that pose a threat to
U.S., allied, and partner forces as well as civilian populations.
Biosecurity
China’s approach to and role in global biological, medical, and other health -related global priorities present unique
challenges to the United States and the world The COVID -19 pandemic that ultimately led to the death of
more than one million Americans —and multiples more worldwide —began in China, which Beijing still
refuses to acknowledge. China’s strict censorship and repression of free speech prevented doctors treating
the earliest of patients in Wuhan from warning the world of a far more serious contagion than Beijing
wanted told, slowing the world’s preparedness and response. To this day, Beijing refuses to fully cooperate
with the rest of the international community trying to definitively pinpoint the precise cause of the disease so
it can head off and prepare for any new disease .
Regarding COVID -19 origins, IC agencies have continued to evaluate new information from classifie d and
open sources, revisit previous reporting, and consult with diverse technical experts to increase our
understanding of the cause of the pandemic. These efforts have led CIA to assess that a research -related
hypothesis is more likely than a natural ori gin hypothesis.
The other hypothesis for COVID -19—natural origin —includes many scenarios in which humans could have
been infected with SARS -CoV -2—the virus that causes COVID -19—or a close progenitor through exposure
to wild or domestic animals. China is h ome to a diverse body of naturally occurring coronaviruses found in
a wide geographic area, and there is precedence for these viruses to emerge within human populations far
from reservoir locations. For example, the coronavirus that is the closest known re lative to SARS -CoV —the
virus that causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) —probably originated in Yunnan Province,
according to scientific studies, even though the first SARS outbreak detected in humans in 2003 occurred in
Guangdong Province, hundre ds of miles away.
• The research -related incident hypothesis also considers a broad range of potential initial human -
infection scenarios from events in research facilities, such as government or university laboratories, to
research -related activities in the field, such as collecting samples from wild animals.
The PRC’s dominance in pharmaceutical and medical supply production combined with lower quality safety and
environmental standards than those of the U nited States positions Beijing to potentially restri ct such exports for
leverage over Washington and others in trade or security disputes . The PRC plays an increasingly important role
in supplying pharmaceuticals and related medical supplies to the United States, as well as the rest of the
world.
• U.S. impo rts of Chinese pharmaceuticals —defined as medicines, vaccines, blood, organic cultures,
bandages, and organs —grew almost five -fold between 2020 and 2022 alone, from $2.1 billion to
$10.3 billion.
[ 15 ] • The PRC also might look to uniquely provide such supplies and medical aid to countries, more
cheaply and at scales competitors cannot match, as a way to boost its global influence at the expense
of the United States. The PRC’s “vaccine diplomacy” during th e COVID -19 pandemic —it provided
vaccines to 83 countries —was driven at least in part by geopolitical considerations, such as currying
favor for a new port in Burma.
Space
China has eclipsed Russia as a space leader and is poised to compete with the United States as the world’s leader in
space by deploying increasingly capable interconnected multi -sensor systems and working toward ambitious
scientific and strategic goals. China has achieved global coverage in some of its intelligence, surveillance, and
recon naissance (ISR) constellations and world -class status in all but a few space technologies.
• China’s Beidou constellation is a world -class position, navigation, and timing capability that competes
with U.S. GPS and Europe’s Galileo service. The PLA ISR archi tecture and satellite communications
are areas the PLA continues to improve upon to close the perceived gap between itself and the U.S.
military.
• China’s successful lunar sample return mission in June 2024 contributes to Beijing’s technological
prowess and national prestige while supporting its effort to land astronauts on the Moon by 2030 and
establish the first lunar base by 2035 .
• China’s commercial space sector is growing quickly with aspiration to be a major global competitor to
U.S. and European space companies. For example, China launched the first set of satellites in its low
Earth orbit (LEO) proliferated constellation last year for its own satellite Internet service to compete
with Western commercial satellite Internet servi ces.
Counterspace operations will be integral to PLA military campaigns, and China has counterspace -weapons
capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites. China already has fielded ground -based counterspace
capabilities, including EW systems, directed energy weapons (DEWs), and antisatellite (ASAT) missiles intended
to disrupt, damage, and destroy target satellites.
• China also has conducted orbital technology demonstrations, which, while not counterspace weapons
tests, prove its ability to operate future space -based counterspace weapons. China has also conducted
on-orbit satellite inspections of other satellites, which probably would be representative of the tactics
required for some counterspace attacks.
Malign Influence Activities
Beijing will continue to expand its coercive and subversive malign influence activities to weaken the United States
internally and globally, as well as counter what Beijing sees as a U.S. -led campaign to tarnish China’s global
relations and overthrow the CC P. Through these efforts, t he PRC seeks to suppress critical views and critics of
China within the United States and worldwide, and sow doubts in U.S. leadership and strength . Beijing is likely to
feel emboldened to use malign influence more regularly in c oming years, particularly as it fields AI to improve its
capabilities and avoid detection .
[ 16 ] • PRC actors have increased their capabilities to conduct covert influence operations and disseminate
disinformation. For example, pro -China online actors in 2024 used AI -generated news anchors and
fake social media accounts with AI -generated profile pictures to sow divisions on issues such as drug
use, immigration, and abortion.
RUSSIA
Strateg ic Overview
Russia views its ongoing war in Ukraine as a proxy conflict with the West, and its objective to restore Russian
strength and security in its near abroad against perceived U.S. and Western encroachment has increased the risks of
unintended escalation betwee n Russia and NATO . The resulting heightened and prolonged political -military
tensions between Moscow and Washington, coupled with Russia’s growing confidence in its battlefield
superiority and defense industrial base and increased risk of nuclear war , create both urgency and
complications for U .S. efforts to bring the war to an acceptable close.
Regardless of how and when the war in Ukraine ends, Russia’s current geopolitical, economic, military, and
domestic political trends underscore its resilience and enduring potential threat to U.S. power, presence, and global
interests. Despite having paid enormous military and economic costs in its war with Ukraine, Russia has
proven adaptable and resilient, in part because of the expanded backing of China, Ira n, and North Korea.
President Vladimir Putin appears resolved and prepared to pay a very high price to prevail in what he sees as
a defining time in Russia’s strategic competition with the United States, world history, and his personal
legacy. Most Russian people continue to passively accept the war, and the emergence of an alternative to
Putin probably is less likely now than at any point in his quarter -century rule. China’s Challenges
China faces daunting challenges that will impair CCP leaders’ strate gic and political achievements. China’s
leaders probably are most concerned about corruption, demographic imbalances, and fiscal and economic
struggles because they threaten the country’s economic performance and quality of life, two key factors
underpinn ing CCP legitimacy. Despite an acute economic slowdown, China’s leaders probably will resist
making needed structural reforms and instead maintain statist economic policies to steer capital toward
priority sectors, reduce dependence on foreign technologies , and enable military modernization.
• China’s growth probably will continue to slow because of low consumer and investor confidence.
China’s birth and marriage rates continue to decline, reinforcing negative population trends and a
shrinking labor force.
Xi’s focus on security and stability for the CCP and securing other leaders’ personal loyalty to him is
undermining China’s ability to solve complex domestic problems and will impede Beijing’s global
leverage. Xi’s blending of domestic and foreign security threats is undermining China’s position and
standing abroad, reducing Beijing’s ability to shape global perceptions and compete with U.S. leadership.
[ 17 ] • Western efforts to isolate and sanction Russia have accelerated its invest ments in alterna tive
partnerships and use of various tools of statecraft to offset U .S. power , with China’s backing and
reinforcement . Russia’s relationship with China has helped Moscow circumvent sanctions and export
controls to continue the war effort, maintain a strong market for energy products, and promote a
global counterweight to the United States, even if at the cost of greater vulnerability to Chinese
influence . Russia is also increasing military cooperation with Iran and North Korea, which will
continue to help i ts war effort and enhance U.S. adversary cooperation and collective capacity .
Finally, Moscow is increasingly willing to play spoiler in Western -centric forums such as the UN as
well as use non -Western organizations like the Brazil, Russia, India, China, a nd South Africa ( BRICS )
group to press policies such as de -dollarization .
• Russia has shown it can navigate substantial economic challenges resulting from the ongoing drains of
the war, Western cost imposition, and high inflation and interest rates, for at least the near term by
using financial and import substitution workarounds, maintaining low debt, and continuing
investments in the defense -industrial base . Russia’s economy remains the fourth largest in the world
(based on GDP at purchasing power parit y).
• Russia’s sizable ground force losses in the war have done little to undermine the strategic pillars of its
military power, to include its diverse and robust nuclear deterrent and asymmetric capabilities,
particularly in counterspace and undersea warfar e. Russia’s air and naval forces remain intact, with
the former being more modern and capable than at the start of the invasion. Russia is developing a
growing arsenal of conventional capabilities, such as theater strike weapons, to target the Homeland
and deployed forces and assets abroad —and to hold U.S. a llies at risk —during crisis and wartime.
Russia’s advanced WMD and space programs threaten the Homeland, U.S. forces, and key
warfighting advantages.
• Russia will continue to be able to deploy anti -U.S. diplomacy, coercive energy tactics, disinformation,
espionage, influence operations, military intimidation, cyberattacks, and gray zone tools to try t o
compete below the level of armed conflict and fashion opportunities to advance Russian interests.
• The wa r in Ukraine has afforded Moscow a wealth of lessons regarding combat against Western weapons
and intelligence in a large -scale war. This experience probably will challenge future U.S. defense
planning, including against other adversaries with whom Moscow is sharing those lessons learned.
Russia and the Arctic
Russia controls about half of all Arctic coastline and views the region as essential to its economic well -
being and national security. Moscow wants to further develop its Arctic oil and gas reserves and position
itself to reap benefits from expected increases in maritime trade. Russia has concerns about increasing
economic and military competition with Western countries in the region, which com pounded last year
when NATO enlarged to include the last two previously nonaligned Arctic states, Finland and Sweden.
• The war in Ukraine has sapped Russia’s finances and available military resources to fulfill its
Arctic ambitions, prompting Russia to see k a closer partnership with China in the Arctic, and
[ 18 ] Military
Moscow’s massive investments in its defense sector will render the Russian military a continue d threat to U.S.
national security, despite Russia’s significant personnel and equipment losses —primarily in the ground forces —
during the war with Ukraine. Russia’s air and naval forces, despite suffering some losses and expending
substantial quantities of precision -guided munitions, remain capable of providing Moscow with regional and
global power projection forces, while Russia’s nuclear and counterspace forces continue to provide it with
strategic deterrence capability.
• The Ukraine conflict has led to im provements in some Russian military capabilities. For example,
Russia’s initial use of EW and unmanned systems was lacking but it adapted and innovated using EW to
more effectively interfere with Ukrainian use of radar and GPS and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
• Russia possesses long -range precision strike capability, most notably submarines and bombers
equipped with LACMs and antiship cruise missiles, that can hold the Homeland at risk.
• Moscow has increased its defense budget to its heaviest burden level during Putin’s more than
two decades in power and taken measures to reduce the impact of sanctions on its military and
defense industry.
• Russia has imported munitions such as UAVs from Iran and artillery shells from North Korea to
mitigate to the impact of international sanctions, thereby sustaining its ability to wage war in Ukraine
and enhancing the threat its military poses.
Moscow will contend with long -term challenges such as troop quality and corruption, and a fertility rate
below what is needed for replacements, but its investments in personnel recruitment and procurement
should allow it to steadily reconstitute reserves and expand ground forces in particular during the next
decade . Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine will be a drag on those efforts as long as it persists. Moscow will
have to continually balance resource allocation between large -scale production of equipment to sustain the
war with modernization and recapitalization ef forts. welcoming other non -Western countries’ increasing involvement, to offset NATO countries’
perceived advantages.
• Russia’s interest in Greenland is focused mainly on its proximity to strategically important naval
routes between the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans —including for nuclear -armed submarines —and the
fact that Greenland hosts a key U.S. military base.
[ 19 ] Cyber
Russia’s advanced cyber capabilities, its repeated success compromising sensitive targets for intelligence collecti on,
and its past attempts to pre -position access on U.S. critical infrastructure make it a persistent counterintelligence
and cyber attack threat . Moscow’s unique strength is the practical experience it has gained integrating cyber attacks
and operations w ith wartime military action, almost certainly amplifying its potential to focus combined impact on
U.S. targets in time of conflict. Russia and Ukraine
Russia in the past year has seized the upper hand in its full -scale invasion of Ukraine and is on a path to accrue
greater leverage to press Kyiv and its Western backers to negotiate an end to the war that grants Moscow
concessions it seeks. Continuing the Russia -Ukraine war perpetuates strategic risks to the United States of
unintended escalation to large -scale war, the potential use of nuclear weapons, heightened insecurity among
NATO Allies, particularly in Central, Ea stern, and Northern Europe, and a more emboldened China and
North Korea.
Even though Russian President Putin will be unable to achieve the total victory he envisioned when
initiating the large -scale invasion in February 2022, Russia retains momentum as a g rinding war of
attrition plays to Russia’s military advantages. This grinding war of attrition will lead to a gradual but
steady erosion of Kyiv’s position on the battlefield, regardless of any U.S. or allied attempts to impose
new and greater costs on Mos cow.
• Despite recruitment challenges, Russia has regularly generated sufficient personnel to replenish
losses and create new units to sustain attacks on multiple frontline axes. While Ukraine has
increased its overall personnel intake since new legislation on mobilization was passed in spring
2024, Kyiv has stretched its resources trying to launch new offensives —such as in Kursk, Russia —
and build more brigades while defending on all fronts.
• Moscow’s rising defense spending and investments in defense -industri al capacity will continue to
enable a high level of production of critical capabilities —such as artillery, long -range missiles, one -
way attack UAVs, and glide bombs —and ensure Russia retains a firepower advantage over Ukraine.
• Both Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy are interested in continuing discussions
with the United States on how to end the war and have shown a willingness to test partial
ceasefires. Nonetheless, Putin probably is attuned to the potential f or protracted conflict to drag
down the Russian economy and prompt undesired escalation with the West, and Zelenskyy
probably understands that his position is weakening, the future of Western assistance is uncertain,
and a ceasefire may ultimately become a necessary recourse. However, both leaders for now
probably still see the risks of a longer war as less than those of an unsatisfying settlement. For
Russia, positive battlefield trends allow for some strategic patience, and for Ukraine, conceding
territor y or neutrality to Russia without substantial security guarantees from the West could
prompt domestic backlash and future insecurity.
[ 20 ] • Russia has demonstrated real -world disruptive capabilities during the past decade, including gaining
experience in attack execution by relentlessly targeting Ukraine ’s networks with disruptive and
destructive malware.
Malign Influence Activities
Moscow uses influence activities to counter threats, including by stoking political discord in the West, sowing doubt
in democratic processes and U.S. global leadership, degrading Western support for Ukraine, and amplifying
preferred Russian narratives. Mo scow’s malign influence activities will continue for the foreseeable future and will
almost certainly increase in sophistication and volume.
• Moscow probably believes information operations efforts to influence U.S. elections are advantageous,
regardless of whether they affect election outcomes, because reinforcing doubt in the integrity of the
U.S. electoral system achieves one of its core objectives.
• Russia uses a variety of entities such as the U.S. -sanctioned influence organizations Social Design
Agency (SDA) and ANO Dialog and the state media outlet RT in its efforts to covertly shape public
opinion in the United States, amplify and stoke domestic divisions, and discreetly engage Americans,
while hiding Russia’s hand .
WMD
Russia has the largest and mos t diverse nuclear weapons stockpile that, along with its deployed ground -, air-, and
sea-based delivery systems , could inflict catastrophic damage to the Homeland. Russia has developed a more
modernized, mobile, and survivable strategic nuclear force that is intended to circumvent or neutralize
future augmented U.S. missile defense and ensure deterrence through reliable retaliatory strike potential. In
addition, Russia’s vast arsenal of non -strategic nuclear weapons helps it to offset Western conventional
superiority and provide formidable escalation management options in theater war scenarios.
Russia continu es efforts to modernize its nuclear weapons capabilities in the face of multiple failed tests
of new systems.
Russia’s CBW threat is expanding. Russian scientific institutes continue to research and develop CBW
capabilities, including technologies to deliver CBW ag ents. Russia retains an undeclared chemical weapons
program and has used chemical weapons at least twice during recent years in assassination attempts with
Novichok nerve agents, also known as fourth -generation agents, against Russian opposition leader Ale ksey
Navalny in 2020, and against U.K. citizen Sergey Skripal and his daughter Yuliya Skripal on U.K. soil in
2018. Russian forces almost certainly continue using chemicals against Ukrainian forces, with hundreds of
reported attacks occurring since late 20 22.
Space
Russia continues to train its military space elements and field new antisatellite weapons to disrupt and degrade
U.S. and allied space capabilities. It is expanding its arsenal of jamming systems, DEWs, on -orbit counterspace
capabilities, and ASA T missiles designed to target U.S. and allied satellites.
[ 21 ] • Russia is using EW to counter Western on -orbit assets and continues to develop ASAT missiles
capable of destroying space targets in LEO.
Despite its Soviet legacy, the war in Ukraine has revealed g laring deficiencies in Russia’s space -based architecture,
which will continue to face difficulties from the effects of sanctions and export controls, domestic space -sector
problems, and increasingly strained competition for program resources within Russia. However, Russia will
remain a space competitor, probably by prioritizing assets critical to its national security and integrating
military space services over civil space projects.
• Moscow uses its and others’ civil and commercial remote -sensing satellites to supplement military -
dedicated capabilities and has warned that other countries’ commercial infrastructure in outer space
used for military purposes can become a legitimate target.
Technology
While Russia’s S&T ecosystem has been constrained in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow continues to deploy
nascent AI applications on and off the battlefield and has deepened technical cooperation with partners such as China
in support of long -term R&D goals. Moscow’s use of AI to augment military operations probably will further
hone Russian tactics and capabilities in the event of future conflicts with the United States or NATO allies.
• Russia is using AI to create highly -capable deepfakes to spread misinformation, conduct malign
influence operations, and stoke further fear. Russia has also demonstrated the use of AI -enabled
antidrone equipment duri ng its ongoing conflict with Ukraine.
• Russia’s few domestic microelectronics manufacturers have only mastered production of chips down to
the 65nm level and has goals of mass producing 28nm chips by 2030, significantly behind global leaders.
• While largely cut-off from Western supply chains, Russia has significantly expanded and deepened
cooperation in several technical sectors with international partners. Russia seeks to further align its
S&T efforts with China and BRICS allies in areas such as AI developme nt and governance and
semiconductor production to advance its own capabilities as well as broadly decrease Western influence. Russian Antisatellite Capability
Russia is developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an antisatellite capability . A nuclear
detonation in outer space could cause devastating consequences for the United States, the global
economy, and the world in general. It would harm all countries’ national se curity and commercial
satellites and infrastructure, as well as impair U.S. use of space as a driver for economic development.
• In February 2022, Russia launched a satellite, which its Ministry of Defense claimed at the time
was for testing on -board instru ments and systems under the influence of radiation and heavy
charged particles.
[ 22 ] IRAN
Strategic Overview
Tehran will try to leverage its robust missile capability and expanded nuclear program, and its diplomatic outreach
to regional states and U.S. rivals to bolster its regional influence and ensur e regime survival. However, regional and
domestic challenges, most immediately tensions with Israel, are seriously testing Iran’s ambitions and capabilities.
A degraded Hizballah, the demise of the Asad regime in Syria, and Iran’s own failure to deter Israel have
led leaders in Tehran to raise fundamental questions regarding Iran’s approach. Iran’s consi stently
underperforming economy and societal grievances will also continue to test the regime domestically.
Tehran will continue its efforts to counter Israel and press the United States to leave the region by aiding and
arming its loose consortium of like -minded terrorist and militant actors, known as the “Axis of Resistance.”
Although the demise of the Asad regime, a key ally of Tehran, is a blow to th e Axis, these actors still
represent a wide range of threats . These threats includ e some continued Israeli vulnerability to HAMAS and
Hizballah; militia attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria; and the threat of Huthi missile and UAV
attacks targetin g Israel and maritime traffic transiting near Yemen. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continues
to desire to avoid embroiling Iran in an expanded, direct conflict with the United States and its allies.
Iranian investment in its military has been a key plank of its efforts to confront diverse threats and try to deter and
defend against an attack by the United States or Israel. Iran continues to bolster the lethality and precision of its
domestically produced missile and UAV systems, and it has the largest stockpi les of these systems in the
region. It considers them as critical to its deterrence strategy and power projection capability, and Iran uses
their sales to deepen global military partnerships. Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive
cyber operations also make it a major threat to the security of U.S. and allied and partner networks and data. Russia’s Challenges
Even as Russia has proven resilient, it faces a myriad of challenges to remaining an indispensable global
player, maintaining a sphere of influence, and upholding stability at home —its highest strategic aims —
suggesting limits on its confidence dealing with the United States and the international community. Russia has
paid a heavy price in blood, treasure, and loss of international reputation and foreign policy options
because of its large -scale invasion of Ukraine. President Putin upended two decades of Russia’s
geopolitical resurgence, created new threats to its external and internal security, and strained its economic
and military potential, making it more reliant on China and other like -minded partners like North Korea .
• Russia’s military has suffered more casualties in Ukraine than in all of its other wars since World
War II (750,000 -plus dead and wounded), and its economy faces significant long -term
macroeconomic headwinds and is increasingly dependent on China .
• Russia’s aggression has strengthened European unity and prompted Finland and Sweden to join
NATO. Efforts by Armenia, Moldova, and some Central Asian states to seek alternative partners
highlight how the war has hurt Moscow’s influence, even in the post -Soviet space, and derailed
Putin’s vision of a greater Eurasian union.
[ 23 ] Iran also will continue to directly threaten U.S. persons globally and remains committed to its decade -long effort to
develop surrogate networks inside the United States. Iran seeks to target former and current U.S. officials it
believes were involved in the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -Qods Force
Commander Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 and previously has tried to conduct lethal operations in the
United States.
Tehran intends for its expanding relationships with other key U.S. adversaries and the Global South to mitigate
U.S. efforts to isolate the regime and blunt the impact of Western sanctions. Tehran’s diplomati c efforts —including
at times outreach to Europe —are likely to continue with varying degrees of success. In the past year, Iran has
focused extensively on deepening ties with Russia —including through military cooperation for its war in
Ukraine —and has relie d on China as a key political and economic partner to help it mitigate economic and
diplomatic pressure. Iran is also making progress developing closer diplomatic and defense ties to African
states and other actors in the Global South and is trying to buil d on nascent improvements in its ties with
other regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia, despite continued mutual suspicion over each other’s ultimate
visions for the region .
The economic, political, and societal seeds of popular discontent could threaten further domestic strife akin to the
widescale and prolonged protests inside Iran during late 2022 and early 2023. The economy is beset by low
growth, exchange rate volatility, and high inflation. Absent sanctions relief, these trends probably will
continue for the foreseeable future.
Syria
The fall of President Bashar al -Asad’s regime at the hands of opposition forces led by Hay'at Tahrir al -Sham
(HTS) —a group formerly associated with al -Qa‘ida —has created conditions for extended instability in Syria
and could contribute to a resurgence of ISIS and other Islamist terror groups . Even if the HTS –led interim
government can bridge divergent objectives, governing Syria will remain a daunting challenge amid the
country’s economic problems, humanitarian needs driven in part by millions of internally displaced Syrians,
rampant insecurity, as well as ethnic, sectari an, and religious cleavages.
• The HTS -led interim government forces, along with elements of Hu rras al-Din and other jihadist
groups , engaged in violence and extrajudicial killings in northwestern Syria in early March 2025
primarily targeting religious minor ities that resulted in the death of more than 1,000 people,
including Alawi and Christian civilians.
• The leader of HTS claims to be willing to work with Syria’s array of ethnosectarian groups to
develop an inclusive governance model . Many of these groups r emain skeptical of HTS’s
intentions, especially considering the leader’s past al-Qa‘ida association , suggesting protracted
negotiations could devolve into violence . Israeli government officials are skeptical of HTS claims
and intentions, expressing concern that historic al HTS objectives against Israel persist.
• Some remaining jihadi st groups refuse to merge into the HTS Ministry of Defense, and ISIS
has already signaled opposition to HTS’s call for democracy and is plotting attacks to
unde rmine its governance.
[ 24 ] Military
Iran’s conventional and unconventional capabilities will pose a threat to U.S. forces and partners in the region for
the foreseeable future , despite the degradation to its proxies and air defenses during the Gaza conflict . Iran’s large
conventional forces are capable of inflicting substantial damage to an attacker, executing regional strikes,
and disrupting shipping, particularly energy supplies, through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s unconventional
warfare operation s and militant partners and proxies , such as Hizballah, have traditionally enabled Tehran
to pursue its interests throughout the region and maintain strategic depth with a modicum of deniability.
However, Iranian officials are grappling with how to slow an d eventually reverse their and their proxies’
recent military losses from the Israeli campaign against Iran and its regional allies, including strikes on
Iranian military targets such as air defense systems in April and October 2024. The IC assesses Iran’ s
prospects for reconstituting force losses and posing a credible deterrent , particularly to Israeli actions, are
dim in the near -term.
Iran has fielded a large quantity of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as UAVs that can strike throughout
the region and continues efforts to improve their accuracy, lethality, and reliability. Iran’s defense industry
has a robust development and manufacturing capacity, especially for low -cost weapons such as small UAVs.
However, the limited damage Iran’s strikes in Apr il and October 2024 inflicted on Israel highlights the
shortcomings of Iran’s conventional military options .
Iran has also deployed small boats and submarines capable of disrupting shipping traffic through the Strait
of Hormuz. Its ground and air forces, w hile among the largest in the region, suffer from outdated equipment
and limited training.
[ 25 ] Middle East Conflict
The Israel -HAMAS conflict sparked by the HAMAS October 7 attack against Israel derailed the unprecedented
diplomacy and cooperation generated by the Abraham Accords and trajectory of growing stability in the Middle
East. We expect the situation in Gaza, as well as Israel -Hizballah and Israel –Iran dynamics, to remain volatile.
Even in degraded for m, HAMAS continues to pose a threat to Israeli security. The group retains thousands of
fighters and much of its underground infrastructure, and probably has used the ceasefire to reinforce and
resupply its military and munitions stock so that it can fight again. HAMAS is capable of resuming a
low-level guerilla resistance and to remain the dominant political action in Gaza for the foreseeable
future. Low expectations on all sides that a ceasefire will endure and the absence of a credible post -
fighting poli tical and reconstruction plan, portend years of instability.
• While HAMAS’s popularity has declined among Gazans, its popularity remains high among West
Bank Palestinians, especially relative to the Palestinian Authority (PA).
The long -term Israeli -Palestinian relationship also hinges on the trajectory of an increasingly unstable West
Bank. The PA’s weak and declining ability to provide security and other services in the West Bank,
Israel i operations in the West Bank, violence from Israeli settlers a nd Palestinian militant groups
including HAMAS, and a potential leadership transition in the PA are likely to exacerbate governance
challenges in Ramallah. Much also will depend on how Israel deals with post-conflict Gaza and its
operations in the West Ban k that may weaken or undermine the PA.
During the Gaza conflict, Iran encouraged and enabled its various proxies and partners to conduct
strikes against Israeli and at times U.S. forces and interests in the region.
• The Huthis have emerged as the most aggre ssive actor, attacking commercial shipping in the Red
Sea and Indian Ocean, U.S. and European forces, and Israel. In addition to receiving Iranian
assistance, the Huthis have expanded their reach by broadening partnerships with other actors,
such as Russia and Russian arms brokers, PRC commercial defense companies, al -Shabaab, and
Iraqi Shia militants.
• Iraqi Shia militias continue to try to compel a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq through political
pressure on the Iraqi government and attacks on U.S. forces in Ir aq and Syria.
Further fighting between Hizballah and Israel would threaten Lebanon’s fragile stability and any political
progress begun by the election of a president in January after years of trying. A resumption of protracted
Israeli operations in Lebano n could trigger a sharp rise in sectarian tension, undermine Lebanese
security forces, and dramatically worsen humanitarian conditions. Although weakened , Hizballah
maintains the capability to target U.S. persons and interests in the region, worldwide, and —to a lesser
extent —in the United States.
[ 26 ] Cyber
Iran’s growing expertise and willingness to conduct aggressive cyber operations make it a major threat to the
security of U.S. networks and data. Guidance from Iranian leaders has incentivized cyber actors to become
more aggressive in developing capabilities to conduct cyber attacks.
Malign Influence Activities
Iran often amplifies its influence operations with offensive cyber activities . During the Israel -HAMAS
conflict, U.S. private industry tracked Iranian influence campaigns and cyber attack s.
• In June 2024, an IRGC actor compromised an email account associated with an individual with
informal ties to then -former President Trump’s campaign and used that account to send a targeted
spear -phishing email to individuals inside the campaign itself. The IRGC subsequently tried to
manipulate U.S. journalists into leaking information illicitly acquired from the campaign.
WMD
We continue to assess Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and that Khamenei has not reauthorized the nuclear
weapons program he suspended in 2003, though pressure has probably built on him to do so. In the past year,
there has been an erosion of a decades -long taboo on discussing nuclear weapons i n public that has
emboldened nuclear weapons advocates within Iran’s decisionmaking apparatus. Khamenei remains the
final decisionmaker over Iran’s nuclear program, to include any decision to develop nuclear weapons.
Iran very likely aims to continue R&D of chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes . Iranian military
scientists have researched chemicals that have a wide range of sedation, dissociation, and amnestic
incapacitating effects, and can also be lethal.
NORTH KOREA
Strategic Overview
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will continue to pursue strategic and conventional military capabilities that
target the Homeland, threaten U.S. and allied armed forces and citizens, and enable Kim to undermine U.S. power
and reshape the regional security environment in his favor . Kim’s newly cemented strategic partnership with
Russia is yielding financial benefit, diplomatic support, and defense cooperation. The partnership with Iran’s Chall enges
Iranian leaders recognize the country is at one of its most fragile points since the Iran -Iraq war, which
probably weighs on their strategic calculus and confidence in their approach toward the region, the
United States, and U.S. partners. They face growing political, social, economic, and regional pressures,
leaving Iran increasingly vulnerable to regime -threatening instability and external interference.
[ 27 ] Moscow also helps reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing . North Korea’s advancing strategic weapons
capabilities and increasing access to revenue are enabling Kim’s longstanding goals of securing international
acceptance as a nuclear power, reducing U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula, expanding state
control over the North’s economy, and blocking foreign influence.
• In June 2024 , Kim and Putin signed a comprehensive strategic agreement for sweeping economic and
technology partnerships. Kim also is using the agreement’s mutual defense clause, which comm its
each country to provide military assistance if either is invaded by a foreign power, to justify deploying
combat troops to fight against Ukraine.
• Kim has no intention of negotiating away his strategic weapons programs, which he perceives as a
guarantor of regime security and national pride, because they threaten the Homeland, U.S. forces in
the region, and U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan. He is increasing North Korea’s nuclear
warhead stockpile and improving its ballistic missile technology ; for example, North Korea
conducted three launches in 2024 of what it claimed were IRBMs equipped with maneuverable,
hypersonic payloads .
• Kim seeks to intimidate the United States and its allies into abandoning opposition to North Korea’s
nuclear weapons and it s aggression toward South Korea. For example, he responds to U.S. military
planning with South Korea and trilateral cooperation with South Korea and Japan by ordering missile
launches and threatening nuclear retaliation.
• North Korea will continue to defy i nternational sanctions and engage in illicit activities, including
stealing cryptocurrency, sending labor overseas, and trading UN -proscribed goods to resource and
fund Kim’s priorities, including ballistic missiles and WMD .
Kim will act aggressively to co unter activities he views as undermining the regime and threaten to use force when
he perceives U.S. and allied actions as challenging North Korea’s sovereignty, undermining his power, or aiming
to curb his nuclear and missile ambitions. Pyongyang is expan ding its capacity for coercive operations and
using new tactics as it becomes more confident in its nuclear deterrent. Since coming to power, Kim
generally has relied on non -lethal coercive activities, including missile demonstrations and cross -border
balloon launches of refuse, to win concessions and counter U.S. and South Korean military, diplomatic,
and civilian activities.
• North Korea uses threats to try to stop South Korean efforts to disseminate information in the North,
which he views as destabilizing his control. Kim in the past has challenged South Korea’s de facto
maritime boundary claims and may do so again, raising the prospects of renewed clashes along the
Northern Limit Line .
• Kim could escalate to more lethal asymmetric activities i f he judged North Korea’s efforts at
deterrence were not working and he needed to send a stronger message. He also could resort to these
lethal activities if he believed doing so would intimidate South Korea or the United States into
changing its policies to be more favorable to the North while minimizing the risk of retaliation.
[ 28 ] WMD
Kim remains committed to increasing the number of North Korea’s nuclear warheads and improving its missile
capabilities to threaten the Homeland and U.S. forces, citizens, an d allies, and to weaken U.S. power in the Asia -
Pacific region, as evidenced by the pace of the North’s missile flight tests and the regime’s public touting of its
uranium enrichment capabilities . North Korea is probably prepared to conduct a nuclear test and continues to
flight test ICBMs so Kim can threaten the Homeland. Russia is increasingly supporti ng North Korea’s
nuclear status in exchange for Pyongyang’s support to Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
North Korea maintains its CBW ca pabilities and may use such weapons in a conflict or in an unconventional or
clandestine attack against the United States or its allies .
Military
North Korea’s military poses a lethal threat to U.S. forces and citizens in South Korea and the region by its ability
to launch massive conventional strikes across the DMZ and continued investment in niche capabilities designed to deter
outside intervention and offset enduring deficiencies in the country’s conventional forces. The North’s conventional
military capabilities also provide Kim with options to advance his political objectives through coercion.
• The North Korean military would struggle to execute combined -arms maneuver warfare because its
ground, air, and navy forces remain heavily reliant o n Soviet -era equipment and lack adequate
training , despite the investments to improve conventional capabilities .
• Kim will continue to prioritize efforts to build a more capable missile force —from cruise missiles to
ICBMs and hypersonic glide vehicles —desig ned to evade U.S. and regional missile defenses, improve
the North’s precision strike capabilities, and put U.S. and allied forces at risk.
Pyongyang is positioned to gain technical expertise for its weapons developments in exchange for its
munitions sales to Moscow , which could accelerate North Korea’s testing and deployment efforts. Combat
experience in the Russia -Ukraine war also could help Pyongyang strengthen its training and become more
tactically proficient.
Cyber
North Korea is funding its military development —allowing it to pose greater risks to the United States —and
economic initiatives by stealing hundreds of millions of dollars per year in cryptocurrency from the United States
and other victims. Looking forward, the North may also expand its ongoing cyber espionage to fill gaps in the
regime’s weapons programs, potentially targeting defense industrial base companies involved in aerospace,
submarine, or hypersonic glide technologies.
[ 29 ] ADVERSARIAL COOPERATION
Cooperation among China, Russi a, Iran, and North Korea has been growing more rapidly in recent years,
reinforcing threats from each of them individually while also posing new challenges to U.S. strength and power
globally. These primarily bilateral relationships, largely in security an d defense fields, have strengthened
their individual and collective capabilities to threaten and harm the United States, as well as improved their
resilience against U.S. and Western efforts to constrain or deter their activities. Russia’s war in Ukraine h as
accelerated these ties, but the trend is likely to continue regardless of the war’s outcome. This alignment
increases the chances of U.S. tensions or conflict with any one of these adversaries drawing in another. China is
critical to this alignment and its global significance, given the PRC’s particularly ambitious goals, and powerful
capabilitie s and influence in the world.
U.S. adversaries’ cooperation has nevertheless been uneven and driven mostly by a shared interest in circumventing
or undermining U.S. power, whether it be economic, diplomatic, or military. Concerns over escalation control
and directly confronting the United States, as well as some divergent political interests, have tempered the
pace and scope of these relationships. The leaders, though, are likely to continue to look for opportunities to
collaborate, especially in areas in w hich there are mutual advantages and they lack other ways of achieving
their aims toward or resisting the United States alone.
Russia has been a catalyst for the evolving ties, especially as it grows more reliant on other countries for its
objectives and r equirements including in but not limited to Ukraine. Moscow has strengthened its military
cooperation with other states, especially Pyongyang and Tehran . Russia also has expanded its trade and
financial ties, particularly with China and Iran, to mitigate t he impact of sanctions and export controls.
• The PRC is providing economic and security assistance to Russia’s war in Ukraine through support to
Moscow’s defense industrial base, including by providing dual -use material and components for
weapons. China’s s upport has improved Russia’s ability to overcome material losses in the war and North Korea’s Challenges
North Korea will continue to struggle overcoming the damage Kim’s need for absolute control and aggressive
policies —and the isolation these create —does to the country’s economic strength and viability. Kim has so far
been able to advance his WMD and missile programs and continue to th reaten his neighbors and the United
States, but this has come at the expense of his people and the country’s overall health . The regime’s
recentralization campaign is meant to ensure the long -term survival of Kim family rule, but its periodic
crackdowns re strict economic activity, threaten livelihoods, and promote inefficient state controls,
contributing to food shortages and eroding civil order because of the violent crime they increasingly
encourage.
Kim will struggle to reduce North Korea’s dependence on China —in particular, for access to
international banking and imports of critical raw materials, consumer goods, food, and the regime’s
crude oil supply —and withstand the influence this gives Beijing.
[ 30 ] launch strikes into Ukraine. Trade between China and Russia has been increasing since the start of the
war in Ukraine, helping Moscow to withstand U.S. sanctions.
• Iran has beco me a key military supplier to Russia, especially of UAVs, and in exchange, Moscow has
offered Tehran military and technical support to advance Iranian weapons, intelligence, and cyber
capabilities.
• North Korea has sent munitions, missiles, and thousands of combat troops to Russia to support the
latter’s war against Ukraine, justified as fulfilling commitments made in the Treaty on Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership that Pyongyang and Moscow announced in June 2024.
Cooperation between China and Russia has t he greatest potential to pose enduring risks to U.S. interests. Their
leaders probably believe they are more capable of countering perceived U.S. aggression together than alone, given a
shared belief that the United States is seeking to constrain each adve rsary .
• For at least a decade, Beijing and Moscow have used high -profile, combined military activities
primarily to signal the strength of the China –Russia defense ties. This relationship has deepened
during the Russia -Ukraine war, with China providing Russ ia dual -use equipment and weapons
components to sustain combat operations.
• Russia has increased its oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to China in an effort to maintain
revenues in the face of sanctions by Western states.
• China is using its increa sed cooperation with Russia to attain a stronger presence in the Arctic and
legitimize its influence there. One area of cooperation is China’s production of icebreaker ships that
enable safe passage through Arctic waters.
• The two countries probably will ex pand combined bomber patrols and naval operations in the Arctic
theater to signal their cooperation and make it more concrete. In November, they also agreed to
expand their cooperation on developing the N SR for its economic potential and as an alternative to
Western dominated routes.
[ 31 ]
Document ID: is-america-ready-for-an-era-of-space-warfare