Thomas Wright discusses his experiences serving in the Biden administration and the challenges facing the United States.
NATIONAL
SECURITYSTRATEGY
OCTOBER 2022
October 12, 2022
From the earliest days of my Presidency, I have argued that our world is at an inflection point.
How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the
American people for generations to come. The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my
Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests, position the
United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical co mpetitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our
world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow. Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the fut ure of the international order. Meanwhile, shared
challenges that impact people everywhere de mand increased global cooperation and nations
stepping up to their responsibilities at a moment when this has become more difficult. In response, the United States will lead with our values, and we will work in lockstep with our allies and partners and with all those who shar e our interests. We will not leave our future
vulnerable to the whims of those who do not share our vision for a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. As the world continues to navigate the lingering impacts of the pandemic and global economic uncertainty, there is no nation better positioned to lead with
strength and purpose than the United States of America.
From the moment I took the oath of office, my Administration has focused on investing in America ’s core strategic advantages. Our economy has added 10 million jobs and
unemployment rates have reached near record lo ws. Manufacturing jobs have come racing back
to the United States. We’re rebuilding our economy from the bottom up and the middle out.
We’ve made a generational investment to upgrade our Nation’s infrastructure and historic
investments in innovation to sharpen our competitive edge for the future. Around the world, nations are seeing once again why it’s never a good bet to bet against th e United States of
America. We have also reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to
uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability,
prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years. We have deepened our core alliances in Europe and
the Indo-Pacific. NATO is stronger and more united than it has ever been, as we look to
welcome two capable new allies in Finland and Sweden. We are doing more to connect our partners and strategies across regions through init iatives like our security partnership with
Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). And we are forging creative new ways to work in
common cause with partners around issues of shared interest, as we are with the European Union, the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Indo-P acific Economic Framework, and the Americas
Partnership for Economic Prosperity.
These partnerships amplify our capacity to respond to shared challenges and take on the issues
that directly impact billions of people’s lives. If parents cannot feed their children, nothing else
matters. When countries are repeatedly ravaged by climate disasters, entire futures are wiped
out. And as we have all experienced, when pa ndemic diseases proliferate and spread, they can
worsen inequities and bring the entire world to a standstill. The United States will continue to prioritize leading the international response to thes e transnational challenges, together with our
partners, even as we face down concerted effort s to remake the ways in which nations relate to
one another.
In the contest for the future of our world, my Ad ministration is clear-eyed about the scope and
seriousness of this challenge. The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and ,
increasingly, the capacity to reshape the interna tional order in favor of one that tilts the global
playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the
competition between our countries responsibly. Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war on its
neighbor Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and impacted stability everywhere, and its
reckless nuclear threats endanger the global non-p roliferation regime. Autocrats are working
overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at
home and coercion abroad. These competitors mistakenly believe democracy is we aker than autocracy because they fail to
understand that a nation’s power springs from its people. The United States is strong abroad
because we are strong at home. Our economy is dynamic. Our people are resilient and creative. Our military remains unmatched —and we will keep it that way. And it is our democracy that
enables us to continually reimagine ourselves and renew our strength.
So, the United States will continue to defend de mocracy around the world, even as we continue
to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. We will continue to invest in boosting American competitiveness globally, drawing
dreamers and strivers from around the world. We will partner with any nation that shares our
basic belief that the rules-based order mu st remain the foundation for global peace and
prosperity. And we will continue to demonstrate how America’s enduring le adership to address
the challenges of today and tomorrow, with vision and clarity, is the best way to deliver for the
American people. This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the worl d as it is today, laying out the future we seek,
and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without
setbacks. But I am more confident than ever th at the United States has everything we need to
win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is
nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this —for our future and for the world.
J
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
4Table of Contents
PART I: THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT COMES NEXT...................................................... 6
Our Enduring Vision ............................................................................................................ ... 6
Our Enduring Role.............................................................................................................. ..... 7
The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies ................................ 8Cooperating to Address Shared Challe nges in an Era of Competition.................................... 9
Overview of Our St rategic Approach.................................................................................... 10
PART II: INVESTING IN OUR STRENGTH............................................................................. 14
Investing in Our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge ......................................... 14
Implementing a Modern Industr ial and Innovation Strategy................................................. 14
Investing In Our People........................................................................................................ .1 5
Strengthening Our Democracy .............................................................................................. 16
Using Diplomacy to Build the Strongest Possible Coalitions................................................... 16
Transformative Cooperation.................................................................................................. 16An Inclusive World ............................................................................................................. .. 18
A Prosperous World ............................................................................................................. .1 9
Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military........................................................................... 20
PART III: OUR GLOBAL PRIORITIES..................................................................................... 23
Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia ....................................................................... 23
China.......................................................................................................................... ............ 23
Russia......................................................................................................................... ............ 25
Cooperating on Shared Challenges ........................................................................................... 27
Climate and Energy Security................................................................................................. 27
Pandemics and Biodefense .................................................................................................... 28
Food Insecurity................................................................................................................ ...... 29
Arms Control and Non- Proliferation..................................................................................... 29
Terrorism ...................................................................................................................... ......... 30
Shaping the Rules of the Road .................................................................................................. 32
Technology ..................................................................................................................... ....... 32
Securing Cyberspace ............................................................................................................ .3 4
Trade and Economics .....................................................................
...
NATIONAL
SECURITYSTRATEGY
OCTOBER 2022
October 12, 2022
From the earliest days of my Presidency, I have argued that our world is at an inflection point.
How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the
American people for generations to come. The 2022 National Security Strategy outlines how my
Administration will seize this decisive decade to advance America’s vital interests, position the
United States to outmaneuver our geopolitical co mpetitors, tackle shared challenges, and set our
world firmly on a path toward a brighter and more hopeful tomorrow. Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the fut ure of the international order. Meanwhile, shared
challenges that impact people everywhere de mand increased global cooperation and nations
stepping up to their responsibilities at a moment when this has become more difficult. In response, the United States will lead with our values, and we will work in lockstep with our allies and partners and with all those who shar e our interests. We will not leave our future
vulnerable to the whims of those who do not share our vision for a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. As the world continues to navigate the lingering impacts of the pandemic and global economic uncertainty, there is no nation better positioned to lead with
strength and purpose than the United States of America.
From the moment I took the oath of office, my Administration has focused on investing in America ’s core strategic advantages. Our economy has added 10 million jobs and
unemployment rates have reached near record lo ws. Manufacturing jobs have come racing back
to the United States. We’re rebuilding our economy from the bottom up and the middle out.
We’ve made a generational investment to upgrade our Nation’s infrastructure and historic
investments in innovation to sharpen our competitive edge for the future. Around the world, nations are seeing once again why it’s never a good bet to bet against th e United States of
America. We have also reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to
uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability,
prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years. We have deepened our core alliances in Europe and
the Indo-Pacific. NATO is stronger and more united than it has ever been, as we look to
welcome two capable new allies in Finland and Sweden. We are doing more to connect our partners and strategies across regions through init iatives like our security partnership with
Australia and the United Kingdom (AUKUS). And we are forging creative new ways to work in
common cause with partners around issues of shared interest, as we are with the European Union, the Indo-Pacific Quad, the Indo-P acific Economic Framework, and the Americas
Partnership for Economic Prosperity.
These partnerships amplify our capacity to respond to shared challenges and take on the issues
that directly impact billions of people’s lives. If parents cannot feed their children, nothing else
matters. When countries are repeatedly ravaged by climate disasters, entire futures are wiped
out. And as we have all experienced, when pa ndemic diseases proliferate and spread, they can
worsen inequities and bring the entire world to a standstill. The United States will continue to prioritize leading the international response to thes e transnational challenges, together with our
partners, even as we face down concerted effort s to remake the ways in which nations relate to
one another.
In the contest for the future of our world, my Ad ministration is clear-eyed about the scope and
seriousness of this challenge. The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and ,
increasingly, the capacity to reshape the interna tional order in favor of one that tilts the global
playing field to its benefit, even as the United States remains committed to managing the
competition between our countries responsibly. Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war on its
neighbor Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and impacted stability everywhere, and its
reckless nuclear threats endanger the global non-p roliferation regime. Autocrats are working
overtime to undermine democracy and export a model of governance marked by repression at
home and coercion abroad. These competitors mistakenly believe democracy is we aker than autocracy because they fail to
understand that a nation’s power springs from its people. The United States is strong abroad
because we are strong at home. Our economy is dynamic. Our people are resilient and creative. Our military remains unmatched —and we will keep it that way. And it is our democracy that
enables us to continually reimagine ourselves and renew our strength.
So, the United States will continue to defend de mocracy around the world, even as we continue
to do the work at home to better live up to the idea of America enshrined in our founding documents. We will continue to invest in boosting American competitiveness globally, drawing
dreamers and strivers from around the world. We will partner with any nation that shares our
basic belief that the rules-based order mu st remain the foundation for global peace and
prosperity. And we will continue to demonstrate how America’s enduring le adership to address
the challenges of today and tomorrow, with vision and clarity, is the best way to deliver for the
American people. This is a 360-degree strategy grounded in the worl d as it is today, laying out the future we seek,
and providing a roadmap for how we will achieve it. None of this will be easy or without
setbacks. But I am more confident than ever th at the United States has everything we need to
win the competition for the 21st century. We emerge stronger from every crisis. There is
nothing beyond our capacity. We can do this —for our future and for the world.
J
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
4Table of Contents
PART I: THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT COMES NEXT...................................................... 6
Our Enduring Vision ............................................................................................................ ... 6
Our Enduring Role.............................................................................................................. ..... 7
The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies ................................ 8Cooperating to Address Shared Challe nges in an Era of Competition.................................... 9
Overview of Our St rategic Approach.................................................................................... 10
PART II: INVESTING IN OUR STRENGTH............................................................................. 14
Investing in Our National Power to Maintain a Competitive Edge ......................................... 14
Implementing a Modern Industr ial and Innovation Strategy................................................. 14
Investing In Our People........................................................................................................ .1 5
Strengthening Our Democracy .............................................................................................. 16
Using Diplomacy to Build the Strongest Possible Coalitions................................................... 16
Transformative Cooperation.................................................................................................. 16An Inclusive World ............................................................................................................. .. 18
A Prosperous World ............................................................................................................. .1 9
Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military........................................................................... 20
PART III: OUR GLOBAL PRIORITIES..................................................................................... 23
Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia ....................................................................... 23
China.......................................................................................................................... ............ 23
Russia......................................................................................................................... ............ 25
Cooperating on Shared Challenges ........................................................................................... 27
Climate and Energy Security................................................................................................. 27
Pandemics and Biodefense .................................................................................................... 28
Food Insecurity................................................................................................................ ...... 29
Arms Control and Non- Proliferation..................................................................................... 29
Terrorism ...................................................................................................................... ......... 30
Shaping the Rules of the Road .................................................................................................. 32
Technology ..................................................................................................................... ....... 32
Securing Cyberspace ............................................................................................................ .3 4
Trade and Economics ............................................................................................................ 34
PART IV: OUR STRATEGY BY REGION................................................................................ 37
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 5 Promote a Free and Op en Indo-Pacific ..................................................................................... 37
Deepen Our Alliance with Europe ............................................................................................ 38
Foster Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Western Hemisphere .................................... 40
Support De-Escalation and Integr ation in the Middle East ....................................................... 42
Build 21st Century U.S.-Africa Partnerships ............................................................................ 43
Maintain a Peaceful Arctic .................................................................................................... .... 44
Protect Sea, Air, and Space ................................................................................................... .... 45
PART V: CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 48
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
6PART I: THE COMPETITION FOR WHAT
COMES NEXT
“The world is changing. We’re at a significant infl ection point in world history. And our country
and the world—the United States of America has alwa ys been able to chart the future in times of
great change. We’ve been able to constantly renew ourselves. And time and again, we’ve proven
there’s not a single thing we cannot do as a na tion when we do it together—and I mean that—not
a single solitary thing.”
PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. B IDEN ,JR
United States Coast Guard Academy's 140th Commencement Exercises
Our Enduring Vision
We are now in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world. The terms of
geopolitical competition between the major powers will be set. The window of opportunity to
deal with shared threats, like climate change, will narrow drastically. The actions we take now will shape whether this period is known as an age of conflict and discord or the beginning of a
more stable and prosperous future.
We face two strategic challenges. The first is th at the post-Cold War era is definitively over and
a competition is underway between the major power s to shape what comes next. No nation is
better positioned to succeed in this competition than the United States, as long as we work in common cause with those who share our vision of a world that is free, open, secure, and
prosperous. This means that the foundational pr inciples of self-det ermination, territorial
integrity, and political independence must be respected, international institutions must be strengthened, countries must be free to deter mine their own foreign policy choices, information
must be allowed to flow freely, universal hum an rights must be upheld, and the global economy
must operate on a level playing fiel d and provide opportunity for all.
The second is that while this competition is unde rway, people all over the world are struggling to
cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food
insecurity, communicable diseas es, terrorism, energy shortages, or inflation. These shared
challenges are not marginal issues that are secondary to geopolitics. They are at the very core of national and international security and must be treated as such. By their very nature, these
challenges require governments to cooperate if they are to solve th em. But we must be clear-eyed
that we will have to tackle these challenges within a competitive international environment where heightening geopolitical competition, na tionalism and populism re nder this cooperation
even more difficult and will require us to think and act in new ways.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 7 This National Security Strategy lays out our pl an to achieve a better future of a free, open,
secure, and prosperous world. Our strategy is r ooted in our national interests: to protect the
security of the American peopl e; to expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and to realize
and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. We can do none of
this alone and we do not have t o. Most nations around the world define their interests in ways
that are compatible with ours. We will build the strongest and broade st possible coalition of
nations that seek to cooperate with each other, while competing with those powers that offer a
darker vision and thwarting their effo rts to threaten our interests.
Our Enduring Role
The need for a strong and purposeful American ro le in the world has never been greater. The
world is becoming more divided and unstable. Gl obal increases in inflation since the COVID-19
pandemic began have made life more difficult for many. The basic laws and principles governing
relations among nations, including the United Na tions Charter and the protection it affords all
states from being invaded by their neighbors or having their borders redrawn by force, are under
attack. The risk of conflict between major powers is increasing. Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and
the world. Competition to develop and deploy fo undational technologies th at will transform our
security and economy is intensifying. Global coop eration on shared interests has frayed, even as
the need for that cooperation takes on existentia l importance. The scale of these changes grows
with each passing year, as do the risks of inaction.
Although the international envir onment has become more contes ted, the United States remains
the world’s leading power. Our economy, our population, our innovation, and our military power
continue to grow, often outpacing those of other large countries. Our inherent national
strengths—the ingenuity, creativity, resilience, and determination of the American people; our values, diversity, and democr atic institutions; our technolog ical leadership and economic
dynamism; and our diplomatic corps, development professionals, intelligence community, and our military—remain unparalleled. We are experienced in using and applying our power in combination with our allies and partners who add significantly to our own strengths. We have learned lessons from our failures as well as our successes. The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape th e international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at
home and deepening abroad.
The United States is a large and diverse democracy, encompassing people from every corner of
the world, every walk of life, every system of belief. This means that our politics are not always smooth—in fact, they’re often the opposite. We live at a moment of passionate political
intensities and ferment that some times tears at the fabric of th e nation. But we don’t shy away
from that fact or use it as an excuse to retrea t from the wider world. We will continue to reckon
openly and humbly with our divisions and we will work through our politics transparently and democratically. We know that for all of the effort that it takes, our democracy is worth it. It is the only way to ensure that people are truly able to live lives of dignity and freedom. This American
project will never be complete—democracy is always a work in progress—but that will not stop us from defending our values and continuing to pursue our national security interests in the
world. The quality of our democracy at home affects the strength and credibility of our leadership abroad—just as the character of the world we inhabit affects our ability to enjoy security, prosperity, and freedom at home.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 8 Our rivals’ challenges are profound and mounting. Their problems, at bot h home and abroad, are
associated with the pathologies inherent in highly personalized autocracies and are less easily remedied than ours. Conversely, the United Stat es has a tradition of transforming both domestic
and foreign challenges into opport unities to spur reform and rej uvenation at home. This is one
reason that prophecies of American decline have repeatedly been disproven in the past—and
why it has never been a good bet to bet against America. We have always succeeded when we embrace an affirmative vision for the world that addresses shared challenges and combine it with the dynamism of our democracy and the de termination to out-c ompete our rivals.
The Nature of the Competition Between Democracies and Autocracies
The range of nations that supports our vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world is
broad and powerful. It includes our democratic allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific as well as
key democratic partners around the world that share much of our vision for regional and
international order even if they do not agree w ith us on all issues, and countries that do not
embrace democratic institutions but neve rtheless depend upon and support a rules-based
international system.
Americans will support universal human rights an d stand in solidarity with those beyond our
shores who seek freedom and dignity, just as we continue the critical work of ensuring equity
and equal treatment under law at home. We will work to strengthen democracy around the world
because democratic governance consistently outperforms authoritarianism in protecting human dignity, leads to more prosperous and resilient societies, creates stronger and more reliable economic and security partners for the United Stat es, and encourages a peaceful world order. In
particular, we will take steps to show that democracies deliver—not only by ensuring the
United States and its democratic partners lead on the hardest challenges of our time, but by working with other democratic g overnments and the private sector to help emerging democracies
show tangible benefits to th eir own populations. We do not, however, believe that governments
and societies everywhere must be remade in America’s image for us to be secure.
The most pressing strategic challenge facing ou r vision is from powers that layer authoritarian
governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to
international peace and stability—especially wagi ng or preparing for wars of aggression, actively
undermining the democratic politi cal processes of other countri es, leveraging technology and
supply chains for coercion and repression, and expor ting an illiberal model of international order.
Many non-democracies join the world’s demo cracies in forswearing these behaviors.
Unfortunately, Russia and the People’ s Republic of China (PRC) do not.
Russia and the PRC pose different challenges. Russia poses an immediate threat to the free and
open international system, recklessly flouting the ba sic laws of the international order today, as
its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine ha s shown. The PRC, by contrast, is the only
competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.
Just as the United States and countries around th e world benefited greatly from the post-Cold
War international order, so too did the PRC and Russia. The PRC’s economy and geopolitical influence grew rapidly. Russia joined the G8 and G20 and recovered economically in the 2000s.
And yet, they concluded that the success of a fr ee and open rules-based in ternational order posed
a threat to their regimes and stifled their ambiti ons. In their own ways, they now seek to remake
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 9 the international order to create a world conducive to their highly personalized and repressive
type of autocracy.
Their pursuit of this vision is complicated by se veral factors. The PRC’s assertive behavior has
caused other countries to push back and defend their sovereignty, for their own, legitimate
reasons. The PRC also retains common intere sts with other countries, including the
United States, because of various interdepende ncies on climate, economic s, and public health.
Russia’s strategic limitations have been exposed following its war of aggression against Ukraine. Moscow also has some interest in cooperation with countries that do not share its vision,
especially in the global south. As a result, the United States and our allies and partners have an opportunity to shape the PRC and Russia’s external environment in a way that influences their
behavior even as we compete with them.
Some parts of the world are uneasy with the competition between the United States and the
world’s largest autocracies. We understand these concerns. We also want to avoid a world in
which competition escalates into a world of rigid blocs. We do not seek conflict or a new Cold War. Rather, we are trying to support every country , regardless of size or strength, in exercising
the freedom to make choices that serve their interests. This is a critical difference between our vision, which aims to preserve the autonomy and ri ghts of less powerful states, and that of our
rivals, which does not.
Cooperating to Address Shared Challe nges in an Era of Competition
Heightened competition between democracies and autocracies is just one of two critical trends
we face. The other is shared challenges—or what some call transnational challenges—that do not
respect borders and affect all nations. Thes e two trends affect each other—geopolitical
competition changes, and often complicates, the context in which shared challenges can be addressed while those problems often exacerbate geopolitical comp etition, as we saw with the
early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic when the PRC was unwilling to cooperate with the
international community. We cannot succeed in our competition with the major powers who
offer a different vision for the worl d if we do not have a plan to wo rk with other nations to deal
with shared challenges and we will not be ab le to do that unless we understand how a more
competitive world affects cooperation and how th e need for cooperation affects competition. We
need a strategy that not only deals with both but recognizes the relationship between them and
adjusts accordingly.
Of all of the shared problems we face, climate change is the greatest and potentially existential
for all nations. Without immediate global action du ring this crucial deca de, global temperatures
will cross the critical warming threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius after wh ich scientists have
warned some of the most catastrophic climate imp acts will be irreversib le. Climate effects and
humanitarian emergencies will only worsen in the years ahead—from more powerful wildfires
and hurricanes in the United States to flooding in Europe, rising sea levels in Oceania, water
scarcity in the Middle East, melting ice in the Ar ctic, and drought and deadly temperatures in
sub-Saharan Africa. Tensions w ill further intensify as countries compete for resources and
energy advantage—increasing humanitarian need, f ood insecurity and health threats, as well as
the potential for instability, conflict, and mass migration. The necessity to protect forests
globally, electrify the transportation sector, re direct financial flows and create an energy
revolution to head off the climate crisis is reinforced by the geopolitical imperative to reduce our
collective dependence on states like Russia th at seek to weaponize energy for coercion.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 10 It is not just climate change. COVID-19 has shown that transnational challenges can hit with the
destructive force of major wars. COVID-19 has killed millions of people and damaged the livelihoods of hundreds of millions, if not more. It exposed the insufficiency of our global health
architecture and supply chains, widened inequalit y, and wiped out many years of development
progress. It also weakened food systems, brou ght humanitarian need to record levels, and
reinforced the need to redouble our efforts to reduce poverty and hunger and expand access to education in order to get back on track to ach ieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.
Meanwhile, communicable diseases like Ebola conti nue to reemerge and can only be dealt with
if we act early and with other nations.
The pandemic has made clear the need for international
leadership and action to create stronger, more equitable, and more resilient health systems—so that we can prevent or prepare for the next pa ndemic or health emerge ncy before it starts.
The global economic challenges resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic have been extended
and deepened globally as uneven, recovering de mand has outpaced suppliers and put strains on
supply chains. Consumers and policymakers the wo rld over have also struggled with surging
energy prices and mounting food insecurity, whic h sharpen security challenges like migration
and corruption. Moreover, autocratic government s often abuse the global economic order by
weaponizing its interconnectivity and its stre ngths. They can arbitrarily raise costs by
withholding the movement of key goods. They leve rage access to their markets and control of
global digital infrastructure for coercive purposes . They launder and hide their wealth, often the
proceeds of foreign corrupt practices, in major economies through shell and front companies. Nefarious actors—some state sponsored, some no t—are exploiting the digital economy to raise
and move funds to support illicit w eapons programs, terrorist attacks, fuel conflict, and to extort
everyday citizens targeted by ransomware or cyber-attacks on national health systems, financial institutions and critical infrastructure. These va rious factors constrain our policy options, and
those of our allies and partners, to advance our security interests and meet the basic needs of our citizens.
We have also experienced a global energy crisis driven by Russia’s weaponization of the oil and
gas supplies it controls, exacerbated by OPEC’s management of its own supply. This
circumstance underscores the n eed for an accelerated, just, and responsible global energy
transition. That’s why — even as we continue to explore all opportunitie s with our allies and
partners to stabilize energy markets and get suppl ies to those who need it — we are also focused
on implementing the most significant piece of climate legislation in our nation’s history, to bring
innovative energy technologies to scale as quickly as possible.
We must work with other nations to address sh ared challenges to improve the lives of the
American people and those of people around the world. We recognize that we will undertake
such effort within a competitive environment where major powers will be actively working to advance a different vision. We will use the impulses released by an era of competition to create a race to the top and make progress on shared challenges, whether it is by making investments at home or by deepening cooperation with ot her countries that share our vision.
Overview of Our St rategic Approach
Our goal is clear—we want a free, open, prosperous , and secure international order. We seek an
order that is free in that it allows people to enjoy their basic, universal rights and freedoms. It is
open in that it provides all nations that sign up to these principles an opportunity to participate in,
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 11 and have a role in shaping, the rules. It is prosperous in that it empowers all nations to
continually raise the standard of living for their citizens. And secure, in that it is free from aggression, coercion and intimidation.
Achieving this goal requires three lines of effort . We will: 1) invest in the underlying sources and
tools of American power and influence; 2) build the strongest possible coalition of nations to
enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and 3) modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition with major powers, while maintaining the capability to disrupt the terrorist threat to the homeland. This is covered in Part II of this strategy.
We will use these capabilities to outcompete our strategic competitors, galvanize collective
action on global challenges, and shape the rules of the road for technology, cybersecurity, and
trade and economics. This is c overed in Part III. Our approach encompasses all elements of
national power—diplomacy, devel opment cooperation, industrial st rategy, economic statecraft,
intelligence, and defense—and is built on several key pillars.
First, we have broken down the dividing line between foreign policy and domestic policy. We
understand that if the United States is to succeed abroad, we must inve st in our innovation and
industrial strength, and build our resilience, at home. Likewise, to advance shared prosperity
domestically and to uphold the rights of all Americans, we must proactively shape the
international order in line with our interests and values. In a competitive world, where other powers engage in coercive or unfair practices to gain an edge over the United States and our
allies, this takes on a special importance. We must compleme nt the innovative power of the
private sector with a modern industrial strate gy that makes strategi c public investments in
America’s workforce, and in strategic sectors a nd supply chains, especially critical and emerging
technologies, such as microelectronics, advan ced computing, biotechnologies, clean energy
technologies, and advanced telecommunications.
Second, our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most impor tant strategic asset
and an indispensable element contributing to international peace and stability. A strong and unified NATO, our alliances in the Indo-Pacifi c, and our traditional security partnerships
elsewhere do not only deter aggression; they pr ovide a platform for mutually beneficial
cooperation that strengthens th e international order. We place a premium on growing the
connective tissue—on technology, trade and s ecurity—between our democratic allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe because we recognize that they are mutually reinforcing and the fates of the two regions are intertwined. The United States is a global power with global
interests. We are stronger in each region because of our affirmative engagement in the others. If one region descends into chaos or is dominated by a hostile power, it will detrimentally impact our interests in the others.
Third, this strategy recognizes that the PRC presents America’s most consequential geopolitical
challenge. Although the Indo-Pacific is where its outcomes will be most acutely shaped, there are
significant global dimensions to this challenge. Russia poses an immediate and ongoing threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally but it lacks the across the spectrum capabilities of the PRC. We also recognize that other smaller autocratic powers are also acting in aggressive and destabilizing ways. Most notably, Iran interferes in the internal affairs of neighbors, proliferates missile s and drones through proxies, is
plotting to harm Americans, including former officials, and is advancing a nuclear program
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 12 beyond any credible civilian need. The Demo cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
continues to expand its illicit nuclear weapons and missile programs.
Fourth, we will avoid the temptation to see the world solely through the prism of strategic
competition and will continue to engage countries on their own terms. We will pursue an
affirmative agenda to advance peace and security and to promote prosperity in every region. A
more integrated Middle East that empowers our allies and partners will advance regional peace and prosperity, while reducing the resource de mands the region makes on the United States over
the long term. In Africa, the dynamism, i nnovation, and demographic growth of the region
render it central to addressing complex global problems. The Western Hemisphere directly
impacts the United States more than any other region so we will continue to revive and deepen our partnerships there to advance economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security.
Fifth, we recognize that globalization has deliver ed immense benefits for the United States and
the world but an adjustment is now required to cope with dramatic global changes such as
widening inequality within and among countri es, the PRC’s emergence as both our most
consequential competitor a nd one of our largest trading partne rs, and emerging technologies that
fall outside the bounds of existing rules and regula tions. We have an affirmative agenda for the
global economy to seize the full range of economic benefits of the 21st cen tury while advancing
the interests of American workers. Recognizing we have to move beyond traditional Free Trade
Agreements, we are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagement with our partners, like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF); a global
minimum tax that ensures corporations pay their fair share of tax wherever they are based in the world; the Partnership for Global Investment and Infrastructure (PGII) to help low- and middle-
income countries secure high-sta ndard investment for critical infr astructure; updated rules of the
road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and ec onomics; and ensuring the transition to clean
energy unlocks economic opportunities and good jobs around the world.
Finally, the community of nations that shares our vision for the future of international order is
broad and includes countries on every continent. We share in common a desire for relations
among nations to be governed by the UN Charter; for the universal rights of all individuals—
political, civil, economic, social and cultural—to be upheld; for our environment, air, oceans,
space, cyberspace and arteries of international commerce to be protected and accessible for all;
and for international institutions, including the United Nations, to be modernized and strengthened to better address global challenges and deliver more tangible benefits for our citizens. The order we seek builds on what came before, but addresses serious shortcomings, new realities, and the attempts by some states to advance a much less free and open model. To preserve and increase internati onal cooperation in an age of competition, we will pursue a dual-
track approach. On one track, we will cooperate with any c ountry, including our geopolitical
rivals, that is willing to work constructively with us to address shared challenges. We will also fully engage with, and work to strengthen, international institutions. On the other track, we will deepen our cooperation with democracies and ot her like-minded states. From the Indo-Pacific
Quad (Australia, India, Japan, United States) to the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council,
from AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) to I2-U2 (India, Israel, UAE, United States), we are creating a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.
The world is now at an inflection point. This d ecade will be decisive, in setting the terms of our
competition with the PRC, managing the acute threat posed by Russia, and in our efforts to deal
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 13 with shared challenges, particularly climate change, pandemics, and economic turbulence. If we
do not act with urgency and creativity, our wi ndow of opportunity to shape the future of
international order and tackle shared challenges will close. Those actions must begin with developing the means to execute our strategy , by making renewed investments at home and
abroad.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
14PART II: INVESTING IN OUR STRENGTH
“As we look ahead, we will lead. We will lead on all the grea test challenges of our time—from
COVID to climate, peace and security, human dignity and human rights. But we will not go it
alone. We will lead together with our Allies and partners and in cooperation with all those who
believe, as we do, that this is within our power to meet these challenges, to build a future that
lifts all of our people and preserves this planet. Bu t none of this is inevitable; it’s a choice. And I
can tell you where America stands: We w ill choose to build a better future.”
PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. B IDEN ,JR
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
Investing in Our Nation al Power to Maintain a
Competitive Edge
To outcompete our rivals and tackle shared challenges, America will need to maintain and refine
its competitive edge by making critical domestic investments. In an in terconnected world, there
is no bright line between foreign and domestic pol icy. The future of America’s success in the
world depends upon our strength and resilience at home—and espe cially the strength of our
middle class, which is critical to our national security as an engi ne of economic growth and a key
source of democratic vibrance and cohesion. Th e reverse is also true. Our success at home
requires robust and strategic engagement in the wo rld in line with our interests and values to
make life better, safer, and fairer for the Am erican people. That is why we must make
far-reaching investments in the sources of our natural strength while building our resilience.
Implementing a Modern Industrial and Innovation Strategy
The private sector and open markets have been, an d continue to be, a vita l source of our national
strength and a key driver of innovation. Howe ver, markets alone cannot respond to the rapid
pace of technological change, global supply disr uptions, nonmarket abuses by the PRC and other
actors, or the deepening climate crisis. Strategic public investment is the backbone of a strong
industrial and innovati on base in the 21st century global economy.
That is why the United States is pursuing a mo dern industrial and innovation strategy. We are
identifying and investing in key areas where private industry, on its own, has not mobilized to protect our core economic and na tional security interests, in cluding bolstering our national
resilience. We are securing our critical infras tructure, advancing foundatio nal cybersecurity for
critical sectors from pipelines to water, and working with the private sector to improve security defenses in technology products. We are securi ng our supply chains, including through new
forms of public-private collabor ation, and using public procur ement in critical markets to
stimulate demand for innovati on. In 2021, we boosted our competitiveness by enacting the
largest investment in physical infrastructure in n early a century, including historic investments in
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 15 transportation, broadband, clean water, and ener gy infrastructure that will increase economic
growth for decades to come. We recognize the importance of the semiconductor supply chain to our competitiveness and our national security, and we are seeking to reinvigorate the semiconductor industry in the United States. The CHIPS and Science Act authorizes $280 billion
for civilian investment in research and development, especially in critical sectors such as semiconductors and advanced computing, next -generation communications, clean energy
technologies, and biotechnologies. Through th e National Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing
Initiative, we are investing more than $2 billion to harness the full potenti al of biotechnology and
biomanufacturing, create jobs at home, strengthen supply chains, and reduce carbon emissions.
In 2022, we enacted the Inflation Reduction Act wh ich will invest in domestic energy production
and manufacturing, and reduce carbon emissions by roughly 40 percent by 2030. Combatting the
climate crisis, bolstering our energy security, and hastening the clean energy transition is integral to our industrial strategy, econo mic growth, and security. We are incubating and deploying new
technologies and solutions, allowing us to l ead the world while creating new markets and
scalable approaches. Together, these investments will keep the United States at the leading edge, increase economic capacity, and support millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in economic
activity over the next decade. Across these effo rts, we are mobilizing the talent, grit, and
innovation of American workers, who can out-compe te anyone. We are also prioritizing equity
and investing in regional economic development to ensure the fu ture is made across all of
America, by all Americans.
As we do this work, we are also protecting our investments and bolstering their resilience
through tracking, attributing, and defending against the activities of malicious actors in cyberspace. And we are countering intellectual pr operty theft, forced technology transfer, and
other attempts to degrade our technological ad vantages by enhancing investment screening,
export controls, and counterintelligence resources. Ju st as we seek to pool technical expertise and
complementary industrial capacity with our allie s and partners, we ar e also enhancing our
collective capacity to withstand attempts to degr ade our shared technology advantages, including
through investment screening a nd export controls, and the deve lopment of new regimes where
gaps persist.
Investing In Our People
We are focused on strengthening the economy by building from the bottom up and the middle out. To that end, we know the most impactful public investments are the ones we make in our
people. We seek to increase equitable access to affordable health care and child care; career-long training and skill building; and high-quality education and training, including science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM ), especially for women and girls. These
investments will boost our economic capacity by ensuring our workforce is better educated,
healthier, and more productive. This stronger workforce will also build enduring advantages that
bolster our strength and resilience. We ar e also supporting workers by promoting union
organizing and collective bargaining, a nd improving workers’ job quality.
As we create the conditions for our people to thrive, we will also continue to make America the
destination of choice for talent around the worl d. Since the founding of our Nation, America has
been strengthened and renewed by immigrants se eking opportunity and refuge on our shores—a
unique strategic advantage. We will continue wo rking with Congress and taking executive action
to ensure our immigration and refugee systems are fair, orderly, humane, easier to navigate, and
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 16 consistent with our values a nd the law. And we will take further measures to ensure the
United States remains the world’s top destination for talent.
Strengthening Our Democracy
Our democracy is at the core of who we are, and America’s democratic experiment has long been a source of inspiration for people around th e world. Our system of government enshrines
the rule of law and strives to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals. Deliberation and
informed debate propel us to correct our mista kes, better meet public needs, and expand the
circle of opportunity. We have not always lived up to our ideals and in recent years our
democracy has been challenged fro m within. But we have never walked away from our ideals
and in each challenging moment, citizens have stepped forward to uphold them. In times of crisis
or lapses in judgment, we look to more demo cracy—not less—to forge the path forward. Our
democracy is a work in progress—and by reckoni ng with and remedying our own shortcomings,
we can inspire others around the world to do the same.
As Americans, we must all agree that the people’s verdict, as expressed in elections, must be
respected and protected. We also be lieve that critical reforms continue to be needed to strengthen
our system of governance. This is why we have taken executive acti on and urged essential
legislation to protect and promote voting rights and expand democratic pa rticipation, and why we
are building on the work of generations of activis ts to advance equity and root out systemic
disparities in our laws, po licies, and institutions. Indeed, plura lism, inclusion, and diversity are a
source of national strength in a rapidly changing world. We are reaffirming the rights to free
speech, a free press, peaceful assembly, and other core civil liberties. And at the same time, we are standing up to threats to our democracy su ch as domestic terrorism by implementing our
nation’s first-ever National Strategy for Count ering Domestic Terrorism and tackling head-on
global forces like weaponized corruption, in formation manipulation operations, political
interference, and attacks on the rule of law, including in elections. America will not tolerate foreign interference in our elections. We will act decisively to defend, and deter disruptions to
our democratic processes, and we will respond to future interfere nce using all appropriate tools
of national power.
Using Diplomacy to Build the Strongest Possible Coalitions
The United States’ unrivaled network of allies and partners protects and advances our interests around the world—and is the envy of our adve rsaries. Building on this network, we will
assemble the strongest possible coalitions to advance and defend a world that is free, open, prosperous, and secure. These coalitions will include all nations that share these objectives. At the heart of this coalition, to ensure it is as tr ansformative as possible, are democratic nations
who share our interests and values. To make our coalitions as inclusive as possible, we will also work with any country that supports a rules-based or der while we continue to press all partners to
respect and advance democracy and human rights.
Transformative Cooperation
To solve the toughest problems the world faces, we need to produce dramatically greater levels
of cooperation. The key to doing this is to recogn ize that the core of our inclusive coalition are
those partners who most closely share our interests. America’s treaty alliances with other
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 17 democratic countries are foundationa l to our strategy and central to almost everything we do to
make the world more peaceful and prosperous . Our NATO and bilatera l treaty allies should
never doubt our will and capacity to stand with them against a ggression and intimidation. As we
modernize our military and work to strengthen our democracy at home, we will call on our allies to do the same, including by investing in the type of capabilities and undertaking the planning necessary to bolster deterrence in an increasingly confrontational world.
America’s alliances and partnerships have played a critical role in our national security policy for
eight decades, and must be deepened and modernized to do so into the future. NATO has responded with unity and strength to deter furt her Russian aggression in Europe, even as NATO
also adopted a broad new agenda at the 2022 Ma drid Summit to address systemic challenges
from the PRC and other security risks from cyber to climate, as well as agreeing to Finland and Sweden’s application to join the alliance. Th e newly established U.S.-EU Trade and Technology
Council is coordinating approaches to setting the rules of the road on global technology,
economic, and trade issues based on shared democr atic values. Our AUKUS security partnership
with Australia and the United Kingdom promotes stability in the Indo-Pacific while deepening
defense and technology integration. We continue to deepen cooperation with the Five Eyes (with
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The re vitalized Quad, which brings
the United States together with Japan, India, a nd Australia, addresses regi onal challenges and has
demonstrated its ability to deliver for the Indo-Pacific, combatin g COVID-19 and climate
change, to deepening cybersecurity partnerships and promoting high standards for infrastructure
and health security. Our intelligence relationships with our allies are a strategic asset that will increasingly factor in to our competition with our rivals, especially in technological competition.
We will continue to prioritize seeking out new ways to integrate our alliances in the Indo-Pacific
and Europe and develop new and deeper means of cooperation. We have revitalized the G7 as
the steering committee of the world’s advanced industrial democracies and believe it has a critical role to play in supporting our shared vision for the international order. The G7 is at its
strongest when it also formally engages other co untries with aligned goals, such as at the 2022
summit where Argentina, India, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa, and Ukra ine also participated.
U.S. interests are best served when our European allies and partners play an active role in the Indo-Pacific, including in supporting freedom of navigation and maintain ing peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait. Similarly, we want our Indo-Pacific allies to be engaged cooperatively
with our European allies on shaping the order to which we all aspire, and by standing up to Russia and cooperating with the European Unio n and United Kingdom on our competition with
the PRC. This is not a favor to the United States. Our allies recognize that a collapse of the international order in one region will ultimately endanger it in others.
These democratic allies and part ners are also essential to supporting democracy and human
rights around the world. Actions to bolster democr acy and defend human rights are critical to the
United States not only because doing so is consis tent with our values, but also because respect
for democracy and support for human rights prom otes global peace, security, and prosperity.
Global threats to accountable and transparent go vernance also threaten our own democratic
system. We will continually update our range of tools to advance democracy and counter
authoritarianism. The Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal qualitatively increases our ability to combat defining challenges of the 2020s, like grand corruption, digital repression, and
attacks on elections and independent media. By the same token, we are responding to the ever-
evolving ways in which authoritarians seek to subvert the global order, notably by weaponizing
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 18 information to undermine democracies and polarize societies. We are doing so by working with
governments, civil society, independent media, and the private sector to prevent credible
information from being crowded out, exposing di sinformation campaigns, and strengthening the
integrity of the media environment - a bedrock of thriving democracies. Together with our allies and partners, we are also holding states accountable for violati ons and abuses of human rights,
including against ethnic and religious minorities, treating the fight against corruption as the core national security interest it is , countering transnational repres sion, and standing with people
around the world on the front lines of the fight for dignity, equality and justice. We reaffirm our
commitment to work with the international community to achieve sustainable, long-term solutions to what is the most severe refuge e crisis since World War Two—including through
resettlement. We raised our annual refugee admissions cap to 125,000 and are rebuilding and
improving the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program to enable us to achieve that goal.
An Inclusive World
The vast majority of countries want a stable and open rules-based order that respects their
sovereignty and territorial integr ity, provides a fair means of ec onomic exchange with others and
promotes shared prosperity, and enables coop eration on shared challenges. They strongly
disapprove of aggression, coercion, and external interference. They have no interest in
overturning longstanding rules a nd norms to make the world safe for aggression and repression.
We will help construct and preserve coalitions that engage all of these countries and leverage
their collective strengths. We recognize that some may harbor reservations about American power and our foreign policy. Others may not be democratic but ne vertheless depend upon a
rules-based interna tional system. Yet what we share in co mmon, and the prospect of a freer and
more open world, makes such a broad coalition necessary and worthwhile. We will listen to and consider ideas that our partners suggest about how to do this.
Building this inclusive coalition requires rein forcing the multilateral system to uphold the
founding principles of the United Nations, includi ng respect for international law. 141 countries
expressed support at the United Na tions General Assembly for a resolution condemning Russia’s
unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. We continue to demonstrate this approach by engaging
all regions across all issues, not in terms of what we are against but what we are for. This year,
we partnered with ASEAN to advance clean energy infrastructure and maritime security in the
region. We kickstarted the Prosper Africa Build Together Campaign to fuel economic growth
across the continent and bolster trade and investment in the clean energy, health, and digital
technology sectors. We are working to develop a partnership with countries on the Atlantic
Ocean to establish and carry out a shared approach to advancing our joint development,
economic, environmental, scientific, and maritime governance goals. We galvanized regional
action to address the core challenges facing the Western Hemisphere by spearheading the
Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity to drive economic recovery and by mobilizing the
region behind a bold and unprecedented approach to migration through the Los Angeles
Declaration on Migration and Protection. In th e Middle East, we have worked to enhance
deterrence toward Iran, de-escalate regional confli cts, deepen integration among a diverse set of
partners in the region, and bolster energy stability.
A prime example of an inclusive coalition is IPEF, which we launched alongside a dozen
regional partners that represent 40 percent of the world’s GDP. This framework’s four pillars—trade and the digital economy, supply chains and resilience, clean energy and decarbonization,
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19 and tax and anticorruption—will allow this partnership to determine the rules of the road for an
economically vital region, and therefore the global economy.
The United States, alongside our G7 partners, laun ched PGII to meet the enormous infrastructure
need in low- and middle-income countries. PGII is catalyzing public and private finance to
advance climate and energy security, health and health security, digital connectivity, and gender equality—all while crea ting opportunities for American busin esses. We secured over $3 billion
in commitments from the Gulf Cooperation Council fo r projects that align with PGII goals. We
have taken a similar approach in a number of other development initiatives, also built around
multi-stakeholder coalitions that can mobilize a wide array of resources to show in various ways that “democracy delivers,” including the longst anding President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR), and the Global Fund. We are rallyi ng the world to take bold action and raise
our collective ambition to reach the Global F und’s $18 billion target to fight HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malari a over the next three years, and requested $2 billion in our FY 2023
budget to anchor a $6 billion three-year pledge from the United States. This investment will
strengthen health systems, accelerate progress to achieve universal health coverage, and expand the global health workforce.
The United States will work pragmatically with any partner willing to join us in constructive
problem-solving, reinforcing and building new ties based on shared interests. This includes not
just nation states, but also civil society gr oups, private companies, philanthropies, and sub-
national governments at home and around the wo rld. Through proven initiatives like Gavi, the
Vaccine Alliance; new platform s that meet the moment, such as COVAX, and new historic
efforts to improve global health security financin g, including the Financial Intermediary Fund for
Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response, we will forge fit-for-purpose coalitions and
public-private alliances to take on the world’s toughest challenges.
A Prosperous World
We also will build new ways to work with allies and partners on development and the expansion of human dignity because we recognize they are in tegral to the security and prosperity of all
Americans. Infectious diseases, terrorism, vi olent extremism, irregu lar migration, and other
threats often emerge or accelerate due to deeper development challenges, and once they do, they
do not recognize national borders. Transnational threats, in tur n, undermine development, fuel
poverty and human suffering, and feed a vicious circle.
The COVID-19 pandemic has eroded development gains and illuminated persistent inequities.
Protracted conflicts, growing fragility, a resurgence of authoritarianism, and ever-more frequent climate shocks threaten people’s lives and livelihoods and global stability. Russia’s war against Ukraine has only aggravated these threats, cont ributing to a surge in food and energy prices,
exacerbating poverty and eroding food security worldwide.
We will work to confront these shared challenges and recommit to advancing the Sustainable
Development Goals by pursuing more inclusive development partnerships, especially by putting local partners in the driver’s seat, and by depl oying a more expansive set of tools, including
catalytic financing and integrated humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actions. We are
already applying this approach to helping vulnerable nations build resilience to the devastating impacts of the climate crisis through the President’s Emergency Plan for Adaptation and
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 20 Resilience (PREPARE) and in support of democr atic renewal through the Partnerships for
Democratic Development (PDD). We are also implementing this development approach to advance global health security and systems and to take principled humanitarian action while
addressing the root causes of fragility, conflict, and crisis, including through the Global Fragility Act. We will use our humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding tools more cohesively. And we will invest in women and girls, be responsive to the voices and focus on the needs of the most
marginalized, including the LGBTQI+ comm unity; and advance inclusive development
broadly.
Across our development work, we will continue to employ best practices that distinguish the
United States and our partners from our comp etitors: transparency and accountability; high
environmental, social, labor, and inclusion st andards; respect for human rights; and local
partnerships supported by foreign assistance a nd sound, sustainable financing. The international
financial institutions, including the World Bank an d the International Monetary Fund, are also a
force multiplier for our values and interests. Stronger, more stable growth abroad means a stronger economy here at home. As other econo mies prosper, demand for U.S. exports of goods
and services increases, creating U.S. jobs. We w ill work to enhance the responsiveness of these
institutions to U.S. priorities, including how to better support developing countries as they
weather the pandemic and now the spillove rs of the Russian war on Ukraine.
Modernizing and Strengthening Our Military
The American military is the strongest fighting fo rce the world has ever known. America will not
hesitate to use force when necessary to defend our national interests. But we will do so as the last
resort and only when the objectives and mission ar e clear and achievable, consistent with our
values and laws, alongside non-military tools, a nd the mission is undertaken with the informed
consent of the American people.
Our approach to national defens e is described in detail in th e 2022 National Defense Strategy.
Our starting premise is that a powerful U.S. military helps advance and safeguard vital U.S. national interests by backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggressi on, deterring conflict,
projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests. Amid
intensifying competition, the military’s role is to maintain and gain warfi ghting advantages while
limiting those of our competitors. The military will act urgently to sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as its pacing challenge. We will make disciplined choices regarding our national defense and focus our a ttention on the military’s primary responsibilities: to defend the
homeland, and deter attacks and aggression against the United St ates, our allies and partners,
while being prepared to fight and win the Nati on’s wars should diplomacy and deterrence fail.
To do so, we will combine our strengths to achieve maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression—an approach we refer to as integrated deterrence (see text box on page 22). We will
operate our military using a campaigning mindset—sequencing logically linked military activities to advance strategy-align ed priorities. And, we will build a resilient force and defense
ecosystem to ensure we can perform these func tions for decades to co me. We ended America’s
longest war in Afghanistan, and with it an era of major military operations to remake other societies, even as we have maintained the capacity to address terrorist threats to the American people as they emerge.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 21 A combat-credible military is the foundation of de terrence and America’s ability to prevail in
conflict. We will modernize the joint force to be lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive, prioritizing operational concep ts and updated warfighting capabilities. The war
in Ukraine highlights the criticality of a vibrant Defense Industrial Base for the United States and
its allies and partners. It must not only be capable of rapidly manufacturing proven capabilities needed to defend against adversary aggression, but also empowered to innovate and creatively
design solutions as battlefield conditions evolve . As emerging technolog ies transform warfare
and pose novel threats to the United States and our allies and partners, we are investing in a
range of advanced technologies including applic ations in the cyber and space domains, missile
defeat capabilities, trusted artificial intelligence, and quantum systems, while deploying new capabilities to the battlefield in a timely manner. Incorporating allies and partners at every stage of defense planning is crucial to meaningful co llaboration. We also seek to remove barriers to
deeper collaboration with allies and partners, to include issues related to joint capability development and production to safeguar d our shared military-technological edge.
Nuclear deterrence remains a top priority for the Nation and foundational to integrated
deterrence. A safe, secure, and effective nucle ar force undergirds our defense priorities by
deterring strategic attacks, assuring allies and partners, and allowing us to achieve our objectives if deterrence fails. Our competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. By the 2030s, the United States for the fi rst time will need to de ter two major nuclear
powers, each of whom will field modern and diverse global and regional nuclear forces. To ensure our nuclear deterrent remains responsive to the threats we face, we are modernizing the
nuclear Triad, nuclear command, control, a nd communications, and our nuclear weapons
infrastructure, as well as strengthening our extended deterrence commitments to our Allies. We remain equally committed to reducing the risks of nuclear war. This includes taking further steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our st rategy and pursuing realistic goals for mutual,
verifiable arms control, which contribute to our deterrence strategy and strengthen the global
non-proliferation regime.
The most important investments are those made in the extraordinary All-Volunteer Force of the
Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, Coast Guard—together with our Department of Defense civilian workforce. Our service members are the backbone of America’s
national defense and we are committed to their wellbeing and their families while in service and beyond. We will maintain our foundational principle of civ ilian control of the military,
recognizing that healthy civil-military relations rooted in mutual respect are essential to military effectiveness. We will strengthen the effectiveness of the force by promoting diversity and inclusion; intensifying our suicide prevention efforts; eliminating the scourges of sexual assault, harassment, and other forms of violence, abuse, and discrimination; and rooting out violent extremism. We will also uphold our Nation’s sacred obligation to care for veterans and their
families when our troops return home.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 22 Integrated Deterrence
The United States has a vital interest in dete rring aggression by the PRC, Russia, and other
states. More capable competitors and new strategi es of threatening behavior below and above the
traditional threshold of c onflict mean we cannot afford to rely solely on conventional forces and
nuclear deterrence. Our defense strategy must sustain and strengthen deterrence, with the PRC as our pacing challenge.
Our National Defense Strategy relies on integrated deterrence: the seamless combination of
capabilities to convince potential a dversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh
their benefits. It entails:
x Integration across domains , recognizing that our competitors’ strategies operate across
military (land, air, maritime , cyber, and space) and non-military (economic,
technological, and information) domains—and we must too.
x Integration across regions , understanding that our competitors combine expansive
ambitions with growing capabilities to threaten U.S. interests in key regions and in the homeland.
x Integration across the spectrum of conflict to prevent competitors from altering the
status quo in ways that harm our vital inte rests while hovering below the threshold of
armed conflict.
x Integration across the U.S. Government to leverage the full array of American
advantages, from diplomacy, intelligence, and economic tools to security assistance and force posture decisions.
x Integration with allies and partners through investments in interoperability and joint
capability development, cooperative posture pl anning, and coordina ted diplomatic and
economic approaches.
Integrated deterrence requires us to more eff ectively coordinate, networ k, and innovate so that
any competitor thinking about pressing for a dvantage in one domain understands that we can
respond in many others as well. This augmen ts the traditional backstop of combat-credible
conventional and strategic capabilities, allowing us to better shape adversary perceptions of risks
and costs of action against core U.S. interests, at any time and across any domain.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
23PART III: OUR GLOBAL PRIORITIES
“[T]he challenges we face today are great indeed , but our capacity is greater. Our commitment
must be greater still. So let’s stand together to again declare the unmis takable resolve that
nations of the world are united still, that we stand for the values of the U.N. Charter, that we still
believe by working together we can bend the arc of history toward a freer and more just world
for all our children, although none of us have fully achieved it. We’re not passive witnesses to
history; we are the authors of history. We c an do this—we have to do it—for ourselves and for
our future, for humankind.”
PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. B IDEN ,JR
77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
The steps outlined in the previous section—building our strength at home to maintain a
competitive edge; using our diplomatic power to build the strongest possible coalition to support
a world that is open, free, prosperous, and s ecure; and modernizing and strengthening our
military will position the United States to strengthen an international order that has delivered broad benefits for the American people for decades and to outcompete our rivals who offer a different vision. The breadth and complexity of our global interests mean that we need to use that
power strategically. Three interlinked lines of e ffort are of paramount importance—dealing with
the challenges to the international order posed by our strategic competitors, addressing shared global challenges, and shaping the rules of the ro ad for technology, cybersecurity, and trade and
economics.
Out-Competing China and Constraining Russia
The PRC and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other but the challenges they pose are, in important ways, distinct. We will prioritize maintaining an enduring competitive edge over thePRC while constraining a s till profoundly dangerous Russia.
China
The PRC is the only competitor with both the inte nt to reshape the international order and,
increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it. Beijing has
ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of in fluence in the Indo-Pacific and to become the
world’s leading power. It is using its technolog ical capacity and increasing influence over
international institutions to create more permissive conditions for its own authoritarian model, and to mold global technology use and norms to privilege its interests and values. Beijing frequently uses its economic power to coerce co untries. It benefits from the openness of the
international economy wh ile limiting access to its domestic mark et, and it seeks to make the
world more dependent on the PRC while reduc ing its own dependence on the world. The PRC is
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 24 also investing in a military that is rapidly modern izing, increasingly capable in the Indo-Pacific,
and growing in strength and reach globally – a ll while seeking to erode U.S. alliances in the
region and around the world.
At the same time, the PRC is also central to the global economy and has a significant impact on
shared challenges, particularly climate change and global public health. It is possible for the United States and the PRC to coexist peacefully, and share in and contribute to human progress together.
Our strategy toward the PRC is threefold: 1) to invest in the foundations of our strength at home –
our competitiveness, our innovation, our resilience, our democracy, 2) to align our efforts with our
network of allies and partners, acting with co mmon purpose and in common cause, and 3) compete
responsibly with the PRC to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. The first two
elements— invest and align— are described in the previous section and are essential to out-competing the PRC in the technological, economic, political, military, intelligence, and global governance domains.
Competition with the PRC is most pronounced in th e Indo-Pacific, but it is also increasingly
global. Around the world, the contest to write the rules of the road and shape the relationships
that govern global affairs is playing out in every region and across economics, technology,
diplomacy, development, security, and global governance.
In the competition with the PRC, as in other arenas, it is clear that the next ten years will be the
decisive decade. We stand now at the inflectio n point, where the choices we make and the
priorities we pursue today will set us on a course that determines our competitive position long into the future.
Many of our allies and partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific, stand on the frontlines of the
PRC’s coercion and are rightly determined to seek to ensure their own autonomy, security, and
prosperity. We will support their ability to make s overeign decisions in line with their interests
and values, free from external pressure, and work to provide high-standard and scaled
investment, development assistance, and markets. Our strategy will require us to partner with,
support, and meet the economic and development ne eds of partner countries, not for the sake of
competition, but for their own sake. We will act in common purpose to address a range of issues
– from untrusted digital infrastru cture and forced labor in suppl y chains and illegal, unreported,
and unregulated fishing. We will hold Beijing a ccountable for abuses – genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang, human rights violations in Tibet, and the dismantling of Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms – even as it seeks to pressure countries and communities into
silence. We will continue prioritizing investments in a combat credible military that deters aggression against our a llies and partners in the region, and can help those allies and partners
defend themselves.
We have an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is
critical to regional and global security and prospe rity and a matter of in ternational concern and
attention. We oppose any unilateral changes to th e status quo from either side, and do not support
Taiwan independence. We remain committed to our one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. And we will uphold our commitments under the Taiw an Relations Act to support Taiwan’s self-defense and
to maintain our capacity to resist any re sort to force or coercion against Taiwan.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 25 Though allies and partners may have distinct perspectives on the PRC, our diplom atic approach,
and the PRC’s own behavior, has produced significant and growing opportunities to align
approaches and deliver results. Across Europe, As ia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America,
countries are clear-eyed about the nature of the challenges that the PRC poses. Governments
want sustainable public finances. Workers want to be treated with dignity and respect. Innovators
want to be rewarded for their ingenuity, risk-taking, and persis tent efforts. And enterprising
businesses want open and free waters throug h which their products can be traded.
While we compete vigorously, we will manage the competition res ponsibly. We will seek greater
strategic stability through measures that re duce the risk of unintended military escalation,
enhance crisis communications, build mutual transparency, and ultimately engage Beijing on more formal arms control efforts. We will always be willing to work with the PRC where our interests align. We can’t let the disagreements that divide us stop us from moving forward on the priorities that demand that we work together, for the good of our people and for the good of the world. That includes on climate, pandemic threats, nonproliferation, countering illicit and illegal narcotics, the global food crisis, and macroeconomic issues. In short, we’ll engage constructively with the PRC wherever we can, not as a favor to us or anyone else, and never in exchange for walking away from our principles, but because working together to solve great challenges is what the world expects from great powers, and because it’s directly in our interest. No country should withhold progress on existential transnational issues like the climate crisis because of bilateral differences.
While we have profound differe nces with the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese
Government, those differences are between gove rnments and systems – not between our people.
Ties of family and friendship continue to connect the American and the Chinese people. We
deeply respect their achievements, their history, and their culture. Racism and hate have no place
in a nation built by generations of immigrants to fulfill the promise of opportunity for all. And we
intend to work together to solve issues that matter most to the people of both countries.
Russia
Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy
with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in an attempt to topple its government and bring it under Russian
control. But, this attack did not come out of the blue; it was preceded by Russia’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine, its military intervention in Syria, its longstanding efforts to destabilize its neighbors
using intelligence and cyber capabilities, and its blatant attempts to undermine internal
democratic processes in countries across Eur ope, Central Asia, and around the world. Russia has
also interfered brazenly in U.S. politics and worked to sow divisions among the American people. And Russia’s destabilizing actions are not limited to the international arena. Domestically, the Russian government under Presid ent Putin violates its citizens’ human rights,
suppresses its opposition, and shutte rs independent media. Russia now has a stagnant political
system that is unresponsive to the needs of its people.
The United States, under successive administrations, made considerable efforts at multiple points
to reach out to Russia to limit our rivalry and id entify pragmatic areas of cooperation. President
Putin spurned these efforts and it is now clear he will not change. Russia now poses an immediate and persistent threat to international peace and stability. This is not about a struggle
between the West and Russia. It is about the f undamental principles of the UN Charter, which
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 26 Russia is a party to, particularly respect for sove reignty, territorial integrity, and the prohibition
against acquiring territory through war.
We are leading a united, principled, and resolute response to Russia’s invasion and we have
rallied the world to support the Ukrainian people as they bravely defend their country. Working
with a broad and durable intern ational coalition, we have mars halled near-record levels of
security assistance to ensure Ukraine has the means to defend itself. We have provided humanitarian, economic and development assistance to strength en Ukraine’s sovereign, elected
government and help the millions of refugees who have been forced to flee their homes. We will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine as they fight back against Russia’s naked
aggression. And we will rally the world to hold Ru ssia accountable for the at rocities they have
unleashed across Ukraine.
Alongside our allies and partners, America is helping to make Russia’s war on Ukraine a
strategic failure. Across Europe, NATO and the Eu ropean Union are united in standing up to
Russia and defending shared values. We are cons training Russia’s strategic economic sectors,
including defense and aerospace, and we will conti nue to counter Russia’s attempts to weaken
and destabilize sovereign nations and undermine multilate ral institutions. Together with our
NATO Allies, we are strengthening our defense and deterrence, particularly on the eastern flank of the Alliance. Welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO will further improve our security and capabilities. And we are renewing our focus on bolstering our collective resilience against shared threats from Russia, including asymmetric thr eats. More broadly, Putin’s war has profoundly
diminished Russia’s status vis-a-vis China and other Asian powers such as India and Japan. Moscow’s soft power and diplomatic influen ce have waned, while its efforts to weaponize
energy have backfired. The historic global re sponse to Russia’s war against Ukraine sends a
resounding message that countries cannot enjo y the benefits of gl obal integration while
trampling on the core tenets of the UN Charter.
While some aspects of our approach will depend on the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, a
number of elements are already cl ear. First, the United States will continue to support Ukraine in
its fight for its freedom, we will help Ukraine recover economically, and we will encourage its
regional integration with the European Union. Second, the United States will defend every inch
of NATO territory and will continue to build and deepen a coalition with allies and partners to prevent Russia from causing further harm to European security, democracy, and institutions. Third, the United States will deter and, as necessa ry, respond to Russian actions that threaten
core U.S. interests, including Russian attacks on our infrastructure and our democracy. Fourth,
Russia’s conventional milita ry will have been weakened, which will likely increase Moscow’s
reliance on nuclear weapons in its military planning. The United States will not allow Russia, or any power, to achieve its objectives through us ing, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons.
America retains an interest in preserving strategic stability and developing a more expansive, transparent, and verifiable arms control infrastructure to succeed New START and in rebuilding European security arrangements which, due to Ru ssia’s actions, have fa llen in to disrepair.
Finally, the United States will sustain and develop pragmatic modes of interaction to handle issues on which dealing with Russia can be mutually beneficial.
The United States respects the Russian people an d their contributions to science, culture and
constructive bilateral relations over many decade s. Notwithstanding the Russian government’s
strategic miscalculation in attacking Ukraine, it is the Russian people who will determine Russia’s future as a major power capable of once more playing a constructive role in
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 27 international affairs. The United States will welcome such a future, and in the meantime, will
continue to push back against the aggressi on perpetrated by the Russian government.
Cooperating on Sh ared Challenges
The United States must maintain and increase in ternational cooperation on shared challenges
even in an age of greater inter-state competiti on. In an ideal world, governments would compete
responsibly where their interests diverge and c ooperate where they converge—but things have
not always worked out this way in practice. The United States, for example, has made clear that
we will not support the linkage of issues in a way that conditions cooperation on shared
challenges, but some in Beijing have been equally clear that the PRC s hould expect concessions
on unrelated issues as a prerequisite to cooperation on shared challenges, such as climate change. We have also seen how the PRC chose not to cooperate adequately w ith the World Health
Organization and the international community on the global response to COVID-19, including
on the investigation into its origins. It also continues to endanger the world with inadequate action on climate change domestically, particularly regarding massive coal power use and build up.
Our strategy to tackle the shared challenges that require global cooperation involves two
simultaneous tracks: on one track, we will fully engage all countries and institutions to cooperate
on shared threats, including by pressing for reforms where institutional responses have proven inadequate. At the same time, we will also redouble our efforts to deepen our cooperation with
like-minded partners. Across both tracks, we will also seek to harness the positive effects of competition, promoting a race to the top, to increase international efforts on these challenges.
Climate and Energy Security
The climate crisis is the existential challenge of our time. A warming planet endangers
Americans and people around the world—risking food and water supplies, public health, and
infrastructure and our national security. Without immediate global action to reduce emissions,
scientists tell us we will soon exceed 1.5 degrees of warming, locking in further extreme heat and
weather, rising sea levels, a nd catastrophic biodiversity loss.
Global action begins at home, where we are ma king unprecedented generational investments in
the clean energy transition through the IRA, simultaneously creating millions of good paying jobs and strengthening American industries. We are enhancing Federal, state, and local
preparedness against and resilience to growing extreme weather threats, and we’re integrating climate change into our national security planning and policies. This domestic work is key to our international credibility, and to getting other countries to up their own ambition and action.
The United States is galvanizing the world and incentivizing further action. Building on the
Leaders’ Summit on Climate, Major Economies Foru m, and Paris Agreement process, we are
helping countries meet and strengthen thei r nationally determined contributions, reduce
emissions, tackle methane and other super polluta nts, promote carbon dioxide removals, adapt to
the most severe impacts of climate change, and end deforestation over the next decade. We’re
also using our economic heft to drive decarboni zation. Our steel agreement with the EU, the
first-ever arrangement on steel and alumi num to address both carbon intensity and global
overcapacity, is a model for futu re climate-focused trade mechan isms. And we are ending public
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 28 finance for unabated coal power, and mobilizing financing to speed investments in adaptation
and the energy transition.
Events like Russia’s war of aggression against Uk raine have made clear the urgent need to
accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. We know that long-term energy security depends
on clean energy. Recognizing this transition will not happen overnight, we will work with partners and allies to ensure energy security a nd affordability, secure access to critical mineral
supply chains, and create a just transition for imp acted workers. Through collaborative work in
the International Energy Agency, the U.S.-EU Task Force on European Energy Security, the Clean Energy Ministerial and Mission Innovation, Power Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean Gas
Forum, the Partnership for Transatlantic Energy and Climate Cooperation, and other critical fora,
we will drive concrete action to achieve an energy secure future.
Many low-income and lower-middle income countries need assistance, especially for mitigation
and adaptation efforts. That is why we are a iming to provide over $11 b illion in annua l climate
funding, and are pressing partners to increase th eir own contributions. We are embedding climate
change into the investment strategies of our development finance institutions, including through PGII, and working with international organizations like the World Bank and regional development banks to do the same.
Pandemics and Biodefense
COVID-19 has killed nearly 6.5 million people ar ound the world, including more than 1 million
Americans, but the next pandemic could be much worse—as contagious but more lethal. We
have a narrow window of opportunity to take step s nationally and internationally to prepare for
the next pandemic and to st rengthen our biodefense.
In the United States, that requires preparing fo r catastrophic biological risks, including by
improving early warning and disease surveillance, data sharing and forecasting; speeding development, domestic manufacturin g, and delivery of medical c ountermeasures; advancing safe
biotechnology development and manufacturing; a nd overcoming inequities in care quality and
access.
Internationally, it requires action on multiple fronts. The United States has recommitted to
COVAX, to which we are the largest donor, the World Health Organization, and a cooperative
approach toward global health security. We recognize that no one is safe until everyone is safe, which is why we have donated more vaccines internationally than any other country, with no
political strings attached. We are working with allies and partners, including philanthropic organizations and the private sector, to boost su stainable vaccine manufacturing in Africa and
South Asia.
We recognize that we must engage with all c ountries on global public health, including those
with whom we disagree, because pandemics know no borders. We also acknowledge that some
of our international institutions have fallen short in the past and need to be reformed. While we believe that many of these reforms can be agreed upon and implemented over the lifetime of this
administration, we also recognize that ultimately some may fall short be cause other countries do
not share our belief in greater transparency and sharing critical data with the international community. Therefore, as we engage globally and through international institutions, we will also deepen our cooperation with like-minded states to push for reforms on pandemic preparedness
and if necessary to work more closely together to set higher standards that others can emulate.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 29 We will also tackle the increasing risk posed by deliberate and accident al biological risks,
including through our ability to rapidly detect, identify, and attribute agents, and to develop medical countermeasures. Working with partners and allies, we will stre ngthen the Biological
Weapons Convention to deter stat e biological warfare capabilities; prevent terrorist acquisition
or use of biological weapons; and reinforce in ternational norms against biological weapons’
development and use. We will also reduce biological risks associated with advancements in technologies and dual-use research and deve lopment, including by establishing and
strengthening international biosafety and biosecurity norms and practices.
Food Insecurity
Global food systems today are under threat from a variety of sources, including Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate events, and
protracted conflicts—all of which threaten to push 75-95 million more people into extreme poverty in 2022 than were expected before the pa ndemic. The food insecurity crisis has become
particularly dangerous because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which took much of
Ukraine’s grain off the market and exacerbated an already worsening global food insecurity
problem. To address the needs of the hundreds of millions of people now suffering as a result,
the United States is providing more humanitarian assistance than ever before. We remain the
largest contributor to the World Food Programme and the leading donor in nearly every country
experiencing a humanitarian food crisis.
Over the longer term, we are rallying the world to find ways to deal with the broad set of
challenges for the world’s food supply achiev ing sustained global food security demands
constant vigilance and action by all governments, in partnership with multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations. Working together with our partners, we launched the Roadmap
for Global Food Security: A Call to Action which urges the more than 100 signatory states to
take several actions including keeping food and agricultural mark ets open, increasing fertilizer
production, and investing in climate-resilient agriculture. The Un ited States is also implementing
the Global Food Security Strategy, which fo cuses on reducing global poverty, hunger, and
malnutrition by supporting inclusive and su stainable agriculture-led economic growth;
strengthening resilience among people and food systems; and supporting well-nourished healthy
populations, especially among women and child ren. This requires working across entire food
systems to consider every step from cultivation to consumption, and to integrate these efforts
within larger climate, health, c onflict mitigation, and peacebuilding work. To ensure these efforts
are durable and sustainable requires centering e quity and inclusion, and partnering both with
local partners and international bodies. Going forward, the United States must continue to
address both acute needs and work collaboratively to build sustained food security for the long
term.
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons pro liferation is a vitally important and enduring
global challenge, requiring sust ained collaboration to prevent th e spread of weapons of mass
destruction and fissile material, their means of delivery, and enabling technologies. The
United States will work with allies and partners, civil society, and international organizations to strengthen arms control and nonproliferation mechanisms, esp ecially during times of conflict
when escalation risks are greater. We will address the existential threat posed by the proliferation
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 30 of nuclear weapons through renewed arms c ontrol and nonproliferati on leadership. We will
continue to seek pragmatic engagement with competitors about strategic stability and risk reduction. Our approach will emphasize measures that head off costly arms races, reduce the
likelihood of miscalculation, and complement U.S. and allied deterrence strategies.
We will lead bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts and strengthen existing regimes,
frameworks, and institutions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, International Atom ic Energy Agency, and other United Nations
bodies, to extend the more than seven-decade record of nuclear non-use. We will support the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical We apons and the Biological Weapons Convention
and reinforce norms against the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons. We will
continue to lead the world in coordinated effort s to lock down nuclear a nd radiological materials
and prevent terrorist acquisition. And we will ensure multilateral export control regimes are
equipped to address destabilizing emerging technologies and to align export policies in likeminded states toward countries of concern.
Terrorism
Today’s terrorist threat is more ideologically di verse and geographically diffuse than that of two
decades ago. Al-Qa‘ida, ISIS, and associated forces have expanded from Afghanistan and the Middle East into Afri ca and Southeast Asia.
Syria, Yemen, and Somalia remain terrorist sanctuaries; local affiliates have become entrenched
actors in regional conflicts. Many of these groups still intend to carry out or inspire others to
attack the United States and our interests abroad, even as years of sustai ned counterterrorism and
law enforcement pressure have constrained their capabilities, and enhanced security measures and information sharing have improved our defenses. Meanwhile, we face sharply increased
threats from a range of domestic violent extremists here in the United States.
America remains steadfast in protecting our c ountry and our people and facilities overseas from
the full spectrum of terrorism threats that we face in the 21st century. As the threat evolves, so too must our counterterrorism appr oach. To that end, last year, we ended America’s longest war,
in Afghanistan, having long ago achieved our obj ective of delivering justice to Osama Bin Laden
and other key leadership of al-Qa’ida. We are confident in our ability to maintain the fight against al-Qa’ida, ISIS, and associated forces from over the horizon, as we demonstrated with
the operation to kill Ayman al-Zawahiri . We will ensure Afghanistan never again serves as a safe
haven for terrorist attacks on the United States or our allies and we will hold the Taliban accountable for its public commitments on counterterrorism.
Around the world, we will increase cooperation and support to trusted partners, shifting from a
strategy that is “U.S.-led, part ner-enabled” to one that is “p artner-led, U.S.-enabled.” That
requires building or expanding systems to prev ent, detect, and respond to threats as they
develop—including by strengthening partners’ la w enforcement and judici al systems, improving
threat information sharing, enhancing border secu rity, countering terrorist financing, targeting
terrorist prevention and extremist disengagement programming, and preventing online and offline terrorist recruitment and mobilization to violence. It also necessitates addressing the root causes of radicalization by leveraging U.S. and partner efforts to support effective governance,
promote stabilization and economic developm ent, and resolve ongoing conflicts.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 31 Where necessary, we will use force to disrupt and degrade terrorist groups that are plotting
attacks against the United States, our people, or our diplomatic and military facilities abroad. We will do so consistent with domestic and international law and in a manner that minimizes civilian casualties, while promoting greater transpar ency and accountability. We are committed to
continuing to work with the Congress to replace outdated authorizations for the use of military force with a narrow and specific framework appropri ate to ensure that we can continue to protect
Americans from terrorist threats. Here at home, we will continue to work with state, local, tribal, and territorial partners and the private sector to share information and disr upt terrorist plots that
threaten our citizens.
We face an increased and significant threat w ithin the United States from a range of domestic
violent extremists, including those motivated by racial or ethnic prejudice, as well as anti-
government or anti-authority sentiment. Conti nuing to implement our first-ever National
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism w ill enable us to better understand and share
information regarding the domestic terrorist threat, prevent recruitment and mobilization to violence, and disrupt and deter domestic terror ist activity and any transnational linkages—all
while reinforcing respect for civil rights and civil liberties. Already, we are providing more and better information on domestic violent extremist threats to state, local, territorial, and tribal partners, and using new mechanisms, such as sm artphone-based applications, to do so in real
time. We are investing millions of dollars in data-driven violence prevention efforts, including through grant programs available to Federal, stat e, territorial, tribal, a nd nonprofit partners, as
well as to houses of worship as they face incr eased threats. We are working with like-minded
governments, civil society, and the technology s ector to address terroris t and violent extremist
content online, including through innovative resear ch collaborations. And we are confronting the
long-term contributors to domestic violent extremist threats, including working with Congress to
advance commonsense gun laws and policies, and addressing the crisis of disinformation and
misinformation, often channeled through social and other media platforms, that can fuel extreme
polarization and lead some individuals to violence.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 32 Combatting Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational organized crime impacts a growing number of victims while amplifying other
consequential global challenges, from migration to cyber-attacks. Transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs) are involve d in activities such as the traf ficking of drugs and other illicit
goods, money laundering, theft, human smuggling and trafficking, cybercrime, fraud, corruption,
and illegal fishing and mining. These activities feed violence in our communities, endanger
public safety and health, and contribute to tens of thousands of drug-overdose deaths in the
United States each year. They degrade the security and stability of our neighbors and partners by
undermining the rule of law, fostering corrupti on, acting as proxies for hostile state activities,
and exploiting and endangering vulnerable populati ons. We will accelerate our efforts to curb the
threat posed by transnational organized crime, integrating the vital work of law enforcement with
diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and other tools, and in coordination with foreign partners. As
part of this effort, we will work to reduce the availability of illicit drugs in the United States,
especially the growing scourge of fentanyl and methamphetamines, by bringing all the tools of
government to bear to interd ict drugs and disrupt TCO’s s upply chains and the financial
networks that enable their corrosive activities. Recognizing that this is a problem with global
reach we will work closely with our internati onal partners to stop TCOs from getting precursor
chemicals and work closely with private industry to increase vigilance and prevent the diversion
of chemicals for illicit fentanyl production.
Shaping the Rules of the Road
Since 1945, the United States has led the creation of institutions, norms, and standards to govern
international trade and inve stment, economic policy, and technology. These mechanisms
advanced America’s economic and geopolitical aims and benef ited people around the world by
shaping how governments and economies interacte d—and did so in ways that aligned with U.S
interests and values. These mechanisms have not kept pace with economic or technological
changes, and today risk being irrelevant, or in certain cases, actively harmful to solving the challenges we now face—from insecure supply chains to widening inequality to the abuses of the
PRC’s nonmarket economic actions. We are ende avoring to strengthen and update the UN
system and multilateral institutions generally. Nowhere is this need more acute than in updating
the rules of the road for technology, cyberspace, trade, and economics.
By doing so in close coordination with our allies and partners, we will establish fair rules while
also sustaining our economic and technological edge and shape a future defined by fair
competition—because when American workers and companies compete on a level playing field,
they win.
Technology
Technology is central to today’s geopolitical co mpetition and to the fu ture of our national
security, economy and democracy. U.S. and allie d leadership in technology and innovation has
long underpinned our economic pros perity and military strength. In the next decade, critical and
emerging technologies are poised to retool economies, transform milita ries, and reshape the
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 33 world. The United States is committed to a future where these technologies increase the security,
prosperity, and values of the American pe ople and like-minded democracies. Our technology
strategy will enable the United States and like-minded democracies to work together to pioneer new medicines that can cure diseases, increa se the production of healthy foods that are
sustainably grown, diversify and strengthen our manufacturing supply chains, and secure energy
without reliance on fossil fuels, all while deliver ing new jobs and security for the American
people and our allies and partne rs. With bipartisan support, we have launched a modern
industrial strategy and already s ecured historic investments in clean energy, mi croelectronics
manufacturing, research, and deve lopment, and biotechnology, and we will work with Congress
to fully fund historic new authorizations for research and development. We also are doubling
down on our longstanding and as ymmetric strategic advantage: attracting and retaining the
world’s best talent. Attracting a higher volume of global STEM talent is a priority for our
national security and supply chain security, so we will aggressively implement recent visa actions and work with Congress to do more.
These investments will enable the United States to anchor an allied tec hno-industrial base that
will safeguard our shared security, prosperity and values. This means working with allies and partners to harness and scale new technologies, and promote the foundatio nal technologies of the
21st century, especially microelectronics, adva nced computing and quantum technologies,
artificial intelligence, biotechnol ogy and biomanufacturing, adva nced telecommunications, and
clean energy technologies. We also will part ner with like-minded nations to co-develop and
deploy technologies in a way that benefits a ll, not only the powerful, and build robust and
durable supply chains so that countries ca nnot use economic warfare to coerce others.
We are already rallying like-minded actors to advance an international technology ecosystem
that protects the integrity of international sta ndards development and promotes the free flow of
data and ideas with trust, while protecting our security, privacy, and human rights, and enhancing
our competitiveness. That includes work throug h the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council to
foster transatlantic c oordination on semiconductor a nd critical mineral supply chains, trustworthy
artificial intelligence, di sinformation, the misuse of technology threatening security and human
rights, export controls, and investment screenin g, as well as through the Indo-Pacific Quad on
critical and emerging technologies, open, next-gen eration digital infrastr ucture, and people-to-
people exchanges. Across this work, we seek to bolster U.S. and allied technology leadership,
advance inclusive and responsible technology de velopment, close regulatory and legal gaps,
strengthen supply chain security, and enhance coop eration on privacy, data sharing, and digital
trade.
We must ensure strategic competitors ca nnot exploit foundational American and allied
technologies, know-how, or data to undermine American and allied security. We are therefore
modernizing and strengthening our export contro l and investment screening mechanisms, and
also pursuing targeted new approaches, such as screening of outbound investment, to prevent
strategic competitors from exploiting investments and expertise in ways that threaten our national security, while also protecting the in tegrity of allied technological ecosystems and
markets. We will also work to counter the exploitation of American’s sensitive data and
illegitimate use of technology, including comme rcial spyware and surveillance technology, and
we will stand against digital authoritarianism.
To achieve these goals, the digital backbones of the modern economy must be open, trusted,
interoperable, reliable, and secure. That require s working with a broad range of partners to
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 34 advance network infrastructure resilience in 5G and other advanced communication
technologies, including by promoting vendor diversity and securing supply chains. These
investments cannot just be made in wealthy countries; we mu st also focus on providing high-
quality digital infrastructure in low- and middle- income countries, bridging digital divides by
emphasizing access among marginalized groups. To ensure these investments support positive
technological outcomes, we will partner with i ndustry and governments in shaping technological
standards that ensure quality, consumer safety, and global interoperability, and to advance the open and transparent standards process that has enabled innovation, growth, and
interconnectivity for decades. And in all that we do we will strive to ensure that technology
supports, and does not undermine, democracy, an d is developed, deployed, and governed in
accordance with human rights.
Securing Cyberspace
Our societies, and the critical infrastructure that supports them, from power to pipelines, is
increasingly digital and vulnerable to disruption or destruction via cyber attacks. Such attacks
have been used by countries, such as Russia, to undermine countries' ability to deliver services to
citizens and coerce populations. We are working cl osely with allies and partners, such as the
Quad, to define standards for critical infrastructure to rapidly improve our cyber resilience, and building collective capabilities to rapidly respond to attacks. In the face of disruptive cyber
attacks from criminals, we have launched innova tive partnerships, to expand law enforcement
cooperation, deny sanctuary to cyber criminals and counter illicit use of cryptocurrency to
launder the proceeds of cybercrime. As an open soci ety, the United States has a clear interest in
strengthening norms that mitigate cyber threats and enhance stability in cyberspace. We aim to deter cyber attacks from state and non state ac tors and will respond decisively with all
appropriate tools of national power to hostile acts in cyberspace, including those that disrupt or degrade vital national functions or critical infrastructure. We will continue to promote adherence to the UN General Assembly-endorsed framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace,
which recognizes that international law applies online, just as it does offline.
Trade and Economics
America’s prosperity also relies on a fair and open trade and in ternational economic system. The
United States has long benefite d from international trade’s ability to promote global economic
growth, lower consumer prices, and access to fore ign markets to promote U.S. exports and jobs.
At the same time, the longstanding rules that govern trade and other means of economic
exchange have been violated by non-market actor s, like the PRC; were designed to privilege
corporate mobility over workers and the environment, thereby exacerbating inequality and the climate crisis; and fa il to cover the frontiers of the modern economy, including digital trade. The
United States must once again rally partners arou nd rules for creating a level playing field that
will enable American workers and businesses— and those of partners and allies around the
world—to thrive.
As our recent work to create IPEF and the Amer icas Prosperity for Economic Prosperity show,
we are working to update the current trading syst em to promote equitable and resilient growth—
encouraging robust trade, count ering anticompetitive practices, br inging worker voices to the
decision-making table, and ensuring high labor and environmental standards. We will seek new export opportunities that benefit American work ers and companies, especially small- and
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 35 medium-sized enterprises, push back on abuses by non-market economies, and enforce rules
against unfair trade and labor practices, including intellectual property theft, discriminatory regulations, forced labor, the denial of the right to organize, and other fo rms of labor repression.
We will also use trade tools to advance climate priorities, as we are doing with the landmark steel and aluminum agreement with the EU. These arrangements will be accompanied by real adjustment assistance, ensuring all Americans have a dignified place in our shared future. Taken together, these efforts will create growth and i nnovation that benefits not only Americans, but
people around the world.
Beyond trade, we are working to build an inte rnational economic system fit for contemporary
realities. We will tackle the harms caused to U.S. workers, consumers, and businesses by currency manipulation; counter corruption and illic it finance; and end the race to the bottom for
corporate taxation through promotion of the OE CD’s Global Minimum Tax. We will partner
with countries on sustainable deve lopment, including by responding to global debt challenges
and financing quality infrastructu re through PGII. We will explor e the merits and responsibly
lead development of digi tal assets, including a digital dollar, with high standards and protections
for stability, privacy, and security to benefit a strong and inclusive U.S. financial system and reinforce its global primacy. And we will address growth-stymying legal, structural, and cultural barriers that undermine labor fo rce participation for women a nd marginalized groups. We will
also support efforts by the interna tional financial institutions will al so need to continue to evolve
to meet the challenges of our times. Many of th e biggest challenges in our world today—such as
pandemics and health, climate change, fragility, migration and refugee flows—cross borders and disproportionately affect the poorest, most vulnera ble populations. Bolstering these institutions is
also critical to tackling serious long-term challenges to the international order, such as those posed by the PRC.
Hostages and Wrongful Detainees
Using human beings as pawns is antithetical to American values and to the global order to which we aspire. Yet, that is what governments, regimes, and non-state actors do when they hold
Americans against their will as hostages and wrongful detainees. We are working with our
partners to deter and thwart those inhumane tactic s. That includes our issuance in July 2022 of an
executive order implementing a recent U.S. law called the Levinson Act and unlocking new tools for punishing those who wrongfully kidnap or de tain Americans abroad. And it includes working
with key international partners to promote a nd implement the Canadian-launched Declaration
Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations so as to turn the tide against this inhumane practice and forge inte rnational norms against it.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 36 Countering Corruption
Corruption poses a fundamental threat to the ru le of law. When government officials abuse
public power for private gain, it degrades the business environment, subverts economic
opportunity, and exacerbates inequality. Corruption also contributes to reduced public trust in
state institutions, which in turn can add to th e appeal of illiberal actors who exploit popular
grievances for political advantage. In today’s globalized world, international financial systems
are used to stash illicit wealth abroad and to send bribes across borders. The United States
Strategy on Countering Corruption recognizes the unique threat corruption poses to our national
security and places a special emphasis on recogn izing the ways in which corrupt actors have
used the U.S. financial system and other rule-of-law based systems to launder their ill-gotten
gains. In response to Russia’s continued invasi on of Ukraine, the United States ramped up its
kleptocracy initiatives aimed at recovering corru ption proceeds as well as both identifying and
repatriating the laundered proceeds of crime. Finally, the United States will elevate and expand
the scale of diplomatic engagement and foreig n assistance, including by enhancing partner
governments’ capacitates to fight corrupti on in cooperation with U.S. law enforcement
authorities and bolstering the prevention and oversight capacities of willing governments.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
37PART IV: OUR STRATEGY BY REGION
“There’s a fundamental truth of the 21st century within each of our own countries and as a
global community that our own success is bound up with others succeeding as well. To deliver
for our own people, we must also engage deeply w ith the rest of the world. To ensure that our
own future, we must work together with othe r partners—our partners—toward a shared future.
Our security, our prosperity, and our very freedom s are interconnected, in my view, as never
before. And so, I believe we must work together as never before.”
PRESIDENT JOSEPH R. B IDEN ,JR.
76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
The United States can meet the challenges of th is decisive decade only by partnering with
countries and people around the world. American s rely on and benefit from our broad and deep
relationships in every region; invest in and trad e with nearly every country; and study, work, and
live on every continent. Our future and the world’s are interlinked. That is why our strategy is global.
Promote a Free and Open Indo-Pacific
The Indo-Pacific fuels much of the world’s economic growth and will be the epicenter of
21st century geopolitics. As an Indo-Pacific power , the United States has a vital interest in
realizing a region that is open, interconne cted, prosperous, secure, and resilient.
The United States will work with other regi onal states to keep the Indo-Pacific open and
accessible and ensure that nations are free to make their own choices, consistent with obligations
under international law. We support open soci eties through investme nts in democratic
institutions, free press, and civil society and are cooperating with partners to counter information
manipulation and corruption. And we will affirm freedom of the seas and build shared regional
support for open access to the South China Sea—a throughway for nearly two-thirds of global
maritime trade and a quarter of all global trade.
A free and open Indo-Pacific can only be achieve d if we build collective capacity. We are
deepening our five regional treaty alliances and closest partnerships. We affirm the centrality of ASEAN, and seek deeper bonds with Southeast Asian partners. We will expand our regional
diplomatic, development, and ec onomic engagement, with a partic ular focus on Southeast Asia
and the Pacific Islands. As we work with South Asian regional partners to address climate
change, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the PRC’s coer cive behavior, we will promote prosperity
and economic connectivity across the Indian Ocean region. The Quad and AUKUS will also be
critical to addressing regional challenges, and we will further reinforce our collective strength by weaving our allies and partners closer together—including by encouraging tighter linkages between likeminded Indo-Pacifi c and European countries.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 The prosperity of everyday Americans is linke d to the Indo-Pacific and the United States has
long been a regional trade and investment leader . With our regional partne rs, we are developing
IPEF to drive inclusive, broad-based prosperity and advance our shared interests in resilient, fair, digital, and low-carbon economies. Leadership through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) will complement these efforts.
For 75 years, the United States has maintained a strong and consistent defense presence and will
continue to meaningfully contribute to the region’ s stability and peace. We reaffirm our iron-clad
commitments to our Indo-Pacific treaty allies—Au stralia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand—a nd we will continue to modernize these alliances. We reaffirm our
unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan unde r our mutual security treaty, which covers
the Senkaku Islands. As India is the world’s larg est democracy and a Major Defense Partner, the
United States and India will work together, bila terally and multilaterally, to support our shared
vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. We will seek sustained diplomacy with North Korea to make tangible progress toward the complete de nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while
strengthening extended deterrence in the face of North Korean weapons of mass destruction and
missile threats. The brutal military coup in Burm a has undermined regional stability, and we will
continue working closely with allies and partners, including ASEAN, to help restore Burma’s democratic transition.
We will also work to enhance partners’ resilience to transnational challenges, including climate
and biological threats. The Indo-P acific is the epicenter of the clima te crisis but is also essential
to climate solutions, and our shar ed responses to the climate cris is are a political imperative and
an economic opportunity. We are also partnering to help the region build resilience to pandemic
disease and to strengthen their health systems, drive investments in global health security, and
expand the region’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond to emergencies.
We have entered a consequential new period of American foreign policy that will demand more
of the United States in the Indo-Pacific than ha s been asked of us since the Second World War.
No region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific. We are ambitious because we kno w that we and our allie s and partners hold a
common vision for its future.
Deepen Our Alliance with Europe
With a relationship rooted in sh ared democratic values, common interests, and historic ties, the
transatlantic relationship is a vital platform on which many other elements of our foreign policy
are built. Europe has been, and w ill continue to be, our foundational partner in addressing the full
range of global challenges. To effectively pur sue a common global agenda, we are broadening
and deepening the transatlantic bond—strengthening NATO, raising the level of ambition in the
U.S.-EU relationship, and standing with our European allies and partners in defense of the rules-based system that underpins our security, prosperity, and values.
Today, Europe stands at the front lines of the fight to defend the principles of freedom,
sovereignty, and non-aggression, and we will continue to work in lockstep to ensure that freedom
prevails. America remains unequivocally committed to collective defense as enshrined in NATO’s Article 5 and will work alongside our NATO Allies to deter, defend against, and build resilience to aggression and coercion in all its forms. As we step up our own sizable
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 39 contributions to NATO capabilities and readiness—including by strengthening defensive forces
and capabilities, and upholding our long-standing commitment to extende d deterrence—we will
count on our Allies to continue assuming greater responsibility by increasing their spending,
capabilities, and contributions. European defense investments, through or complementary to NATO, will be critical to ensuring our shared se curity at this time of intensifying competition.
We stand behind NATO’s continued adaptation to modern security challenges, including its
emphasis on defense in cyberspace, climate security, and the growing security risks presented by the PRC’s policies and actions.
America maintains our fundamental commitment to the pursuit of a Europe that is whole, free,
and at peace. Russia’s further invasion of Ukrain e poses a grave threat to this vision, which is
why we are determined to support Ukraine in defe nding its sovereignty and territorial integrity
while imposing severe costs on Moscow for its aggression. We have supported Ukraine with
security, humanitarian, and financial assistance. We have joined with allies and partners in Europe and around the globe to im pose sanctions and export controls that will degrade Russia’s
ability to wage future wars of aggression. We have partnered with the European Commission on
an ambitious plan to reduce Europe’s dependenc e on Russian fossil fuels, strengthen European
energy security, and advance shared climate goals. Across these efforts, the EU—an integrated market of over 450 million people—is an indispensabl e partner, and we support efforts to foster
EU unity. We also encourage close cooperation on matters of mutual in terest between the EU
and the United Kingdom. In addition, we undersco re our support for the Good Friday Agreement
which is the bedrock of peace, stability, and prosperity in Northern Ireland.
As we support Ukraine, we will also work to enhance the stability and resilience of other
democracies. We will support the European as pirations of Georgia and Moldova and their
commitment to important institutional reforms. We will assist partners in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and economic development in the Western Balkans. We will back diplomatic efforts to resolve conflict in the South Caucasus. We will continue to engage with Turkey to reinforce its strategic, political, economic, and institutional ties to the
West. We will work with allies and partners to manage the refugee crisis created by Russia’s war in Ukraine. And, we will work to forestall terror ist threats to Europe. Elsewhere in Eurasia, we
will continue to support the indepe ndence, sovereignty and territori al integrity of Central Asia.
We will foster efforts to enhanc e resilience and democratic devel opment in the five countries in
this region. We will continue to work throug h the C5+1 diplomatic platform (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turk menistan, Uzbekistan and th e United States) to advance
climate adaptation, improve regiona l energy and food security, enhance integration within the
region, and build greater connec tivity to global markets.
Though rooted in transatlantic strength and stability, our agenda with European allies and
partners is global. We will work with the EU to strengthen trade, investment, and technological
cooperation grounded in shared democratic values—promoting an open and inclusive global
economy, setting high standards for trade, ensu ring fair competition, supporting labor rights,
driving decarbonization, fighting corruption, and pr otecting our innovations from uses that run
counter to our interests and values. Through the G7, we will work with France, Germany, Italy,
and the United Kingdom to galvanize internati onal cooperation on the world’s most pressing
challenges. We will jointly defend human rights, whether in Belarus or Xinjiang. To enact this ambitious agenda, we will deepen our strategic alignment—consulting regularly, sharing information and intelligence, and acting together.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 40 Foster Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Western
Hemisphere
No region impacts the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere. With
$1.9 trillion in annual trade, shared values and democratic traditions, and familial bonds, nations
of the Western Hemisphere, especially in North Am erica, are key contributors to U.S. prosperity
and resilience. But the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing recession have exacerbated longstanding structural challenges, fueled po litical and social unrest, undermining faith in
democracy’s ability to deliver, and spurred unprece dented levels of irregular migration to the
United States and throughout the region. Recogn izing the direct link between the region’s
prosperity and security and that of our own, it is vital for the United States to revitalize our
partnerships to build and preserve economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security within the hemisphere. We will advance these efforts through regular interactions, multilateral and institutional collaboration, and regional initiatives, and by implementing the commitments
made at the Ninth Summit of the Americas.
The movement of people throughout the Amer icas, including over six million Venezuelans
forced to leave their homes since 2015, affects all of Latin America and the Caribbean and
reinforces the need for regional action. The Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection complements U.S. efforts at home to modernize its border infrastructure and build a
fair, orderly, and humane immigration system wi th a bold hemisphere-wide partnership centered
on the principle of responsibility-sharing, stability and assistance for affected communities, the expansion of legal pathways, humane migrati on management, and a coordinated emergency
response. The United States is also leading the charge to expand legal pathways for migration
and to combat illicit human smuggling and trafficking that prey on vulnerable migrants. These efforts combined aim to stabilize migrant popul ations and replace ir regular migration with
orderly flows that can fuel economic growth in the United States and across the region. We will
pursue these collaborative efforts while ensuring a fundamentally fair, orderly, and humane
approach to migration management that bolst er border security and protects our nation.
Ending and mitigating the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and advancing health security are
imperative for the wellbeing of the entire he misphere. In addition to donating over 72 million
vaccines, through the Action Plan on Health and Resilience in the Americas we are partnering
with the region to prevent, prepare for, and re spond to future pandemic threats and other public
health emergencies while also expanding the equi table delivery of healthcare and public services
to remote, vulnerable, and marginalized popul ations. In addition to supporting countries,
especially in Central America and the Caribbean, in reaching a 70 percent COVID-19 vaccination rate, associated part nerships are boosting increased vaccine manufacturing capability
and helping train 500,000 public hea lth and medical professionals by 2027 through the Americas
Health Corps.
Together with regional partners we are deepen ing economic cooperation to ensure durable and
inclusive economic growth that delivers for our working people. Our priority is to work with Canada and Mexico to advance a North American vision for the future that draws on our shared
strengths and bolsters U.S. global competitiveness. Similarly, the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity will guide our regional economic engagement by focusing on the largest drivers of bottom-up and middle-out growth, upda ting tools for the new and complex challenges
facing us today and in the decades to come with a focus on reinvigorating regional economic
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 41 institutions, securing supply chains, creating clean energy jobs and promoting decarbonization,
ensuring sustainable and inclusive trade, and making game-changing investments that increase the effectiveness of public administration.
Tackling the climate crisis and harnessing the dynamism of the region will be central to our
approach, and we will use mitiga tion and adaptation efforts to fuel a sustainable economic
recovery and protect forest ecosystems, including by promoting trade and investment in clean
energy to achieve a collective target of 70 percent installed capacity for renewable energy generation in the region’s electricity sector by 2030 and mobilizing financing and other forms of
support to promote conservation of the Am azon. The United States and the Caribbean
Community also launched the Partnership to Address the Climate Cris is 2030 to expand access
to project financing, attract private investment in clean energy infrastructure and climate adaptation projects, and enhance local capacity to assess, plan for, predict, mitigate, and respond
to extreme weather events and related risks in a changing climate.
The United States derives security and economic benefits from the region’s democratic stability
and institutions, as our shared values provide a basis for collaboration and peaceful dispute resolution. To help preserve and enhance these traditions, we will support partners striving to
build transparent, inclusive, and accountable institutions. Together, we will support effective
democratic governance responsive to citizen needs, defend human rights and combat
gender-based violence, tackle corruption, and prot ect against external interference or coercion,
including from the PRC, Russia, or Iran. Through reinvigorated and representative
Inter-American institutions, and in partnership with civil society and other governments, we will
support democratic self-determination for the pe ople of Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and any
country where the popular will is suppressed. In Haiti, which suffers from an extended
humanitarian, political, and economic crisis, we will mobilize th e international community to
help restore security, rebuild governing institu tions, and support a foundati on of prosperity by
which the Haitian people can determine their own future.
We will also assist partners in facing security threats. These challenges may be internal—
including from local gangs, or transnational, including from criminal organizations that traffic drugs and humans and undertake other illegal operations—or external, as malign actors seek to gain military or intelligence footholds in the region. These threats impact security throughout the Americas, including here at home, and we will therefore promote collaboration to help assist
civilian police and, strengthen justice systems in the Americas, and expand information sharing
with our partners.
These priorities—expanding economic opportunitie s, strengthening democracy, and building
security—are mutually reinforcing and contribute to national, regional, and global stability. We have an overriding strategic interest in pursuing and strengthening collaboration through
intensified diplomatic engagement with hemispheric partners and institutions based on the premise that advance a vision of a region that is secure, middle class, and democratic is
fundamentally in the national secu rity interest of the United Stat es. The challenge and the stakes
of this undertaking are accentuated by the bac kdrop of increased geopo litical and geoeconomics
volatility, the interrelated challenges posed by phenomena like climate change, global pandemics, and mass migra tion, and the recognition that the s ecurity and prosperity of the
United States hinges on that of our neighbors.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 42 Support De-Escalation and In tegration in the Middle East
Over the past two decades, U.S. foreign policy has focused predominantly on threats emanating
from the Middle East and North Africa. We have too often defaulted to military-centric policies underpinned by an unrealistic faith in force and regime change to deliver sustainable outcomes,
while failing to adequately a ccount for opportunity costs to competing global priorities or
unintended consequences. It is time to eschew grand designs in favor of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional pa rtners lay the foundation for greater stability,
prosperity, and opportunity for the people of th e Middle East and for the American people.
The United States has set forth a new framewo rk for U.S. policy in the region based on
America’s unparalleled comparative advantage in building partnerships, co alitions, and alliances
to strengthen deterrence, while using diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, reduce risks of new
conflicts, and set a long-ter m foundation for stability.
This framework has five principles. Fi rst, the United States will support and
strengthen partnerships with countries that subs cribe to the rules-based international order, and
we will make sure those countries can defend themselves against foreign threats. Second,
the United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardize freedom of navigation through the Middle East’s waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab,
nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another—or the region—through military
buildups, incursions, or threats. Third, even as the United States works to deter threats to
regional stability, we will work to reduce tensions, de-escalate, and end conflicts wherever possible through diplomacy. Fourth, the United States will promote regional integration by building political, economic, and security connections between and among U.S. partners, including through integrated air and maritime defe nse structures, while re specting each country’s
sovereignty and independent choices. Fifth, the United States will always promote human rights and the values enshrined in the UN Charter.
This new framework builds on the recent progress regional states have made to bridge their
enduring divides. We will continue to work with allies and partne rs to enhance their capabilities
to deter and counter Iran’s dest abilizing activities. We will pursue diplomacy to ensure that Iran
can never acquire a nuclear weapon, while remain ing postured and prepared to use other means
should diplomacy fail. Iran’s threats against U.S. personnel as well as current and former U.S.
officials will not be tolerated, and as we have demonstrated, we will respond when our people and interests are attacked. As we do so, we will always stand with the Iranian people striving for the basic rights and dignity long denied them by the regime in Tehran.
More broadly we will combine diplomacy, economic aid, and security assistance to local
partners to alleviate suffering, reduce instability, and prevent the export of terrorism or mass migration from Yemen, Syria, and Libya, while working with regional governments to manage the broader impact of these challenges. We will seek to extend and deepen Israel’s growing ties
to its neighbors and other Arab states, incl uding through the Abraham Accords, while
maintaining our ironclad commitment to its security. We will also continue to promote a viable two state solution that preserves Israel’s future as a Jewish and democratic state while meeting Palestinian aspirations for a secure and viable state of their own. As President Biden stated
during his visit to the West Bank in July 2022, “Two States along the 1967 lines, with mutually agreed swaps, remain the best way to achieve equal measure of securi ty, prosperity, freedom,
and democracy for Palestinians as well as Israelis.”
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 43 This new framework relies on a sustainable and effective military posture focused on deterrence,
strengthening partner capacity, enabling regional s ecurity integration, countering terrorist threats,
and ensuring the free flow of global commerce. In conjunction with the use of other instruments
of national power, these military activities also help counter external actors’ military expansion in the region. We will not use our military to chan ge regimes or remake societies, but instead
limit the use of force to circumstances where it is necessary to protect our national security
interests and consistent with international law, while enabling our partners to defend their territory from external and terrorist threats.
We will encourage economic and political reforms that help unlock the region’s potential,
including by fostering greater economic integration to drive growth and create jobs. We will encourage energy producers to use their resources to stabilize global energy markets, while also preparing for a clean energy future and protecting American consumers. We will also continue to support our democratic partners and demand accountability for violations of human rights,
recognizing that while true reform can only come from within, the United States still has an important role to play. The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance
and a longstanding champion for principled, ne eds-based humanitarian action. We will sustain
our leadership on humanitarian assistance and manage long-term refugee and displacement crises, which help realize human dignity and bol ster stability. And we will accelerate our support
to regional partners to help them build greater resilience, as the future of the Middle East will be defined as much by climate, t echnological, and demographic chan ges as by traditional security
matters.
Build 21st Century U.S.-Africa Partnerships
Africa’s governments, institutions, and people are a major geopolitical force, one that will play a
crucial role in solving global challenges in the coming decade. Africa is more youthful, mobile, educated, and connected than ever before. African countries comprise one of the largest regional
voting groups at the UN and their citizens lead major international institutions. The continent’s
booming population, vital natural re sources, and vibrant entrepreneurship, coupled with the
African Continental Free Trade Area, have the potential to drive transformative economic growth. Our partnerships with African states over the past three decades helped lay the groundwork for this growth. To accelerate it, U.S. -Africa partnerships must adapt to reflect the
important geopolitical role that African nations play globally.
Advancing America’s national interests will hinge in part on working more closely, not only
with African nations, but also with regional bodies, such as the African Union, subnational
governments, civil society, and private sector and diaspora communities. We will continue to invest in the region’s largest states, such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa, while also
deepening our ties to medium and small states . We will engage African countries as equal
partners to achieve our shared priorities from health and pandemic preparedness to climate change. We will also press partners about human rights, corruption, or authoritarian behavior,
and deepen partnerships with countries that ma ke progress toward more open and democratic
governance. In coordination with international partners and re gional bodies, we will counter
democratic backsliding by imposing costs for coups and pressing for progress on civilian transitions. And we will listen to African leaders and people as they articulate their vision for
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 44 their foreign partnerships, incl uding expectations for transparency, accountability, fairness,
inclusion, and equity.
Enhancing Africa’s peace and prosperity will bolster Africa’s ability to solve regional and global
problems. The region’s commitment and capacity to renew democracy, as well as anticipate,
prevent, and address emerging and long running conflicts can lead to favorable outcomes for
Africans and Americans. We will support African-led efforts to work toward political solutions
to costly conflicts, increasing terrorist activity, and humanitarian crises, such as those in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, and
the Sahel, and invest in local and international peacebuilding and peacekeeping to prevent new
conflicts from emerging. Consistent with our br oader counterterrorism a pproach, we will disrupt
and degrade terrorist threats against the Unite d States while supporting partners to prevent
terrorist expansion. We will work with our African and international partners to tackle the root
causes of terrorism, including by countering corru ption, strengthening accountability and justice,
investing in inclusive economic development, and advancing human rights, including women’s
rights, and also push back on the destabilizin g impact of the Russia-backed Wagner Group.
We will support accelerating growth through privat e sector investment, help Africa unlock its
digital economy, double down on tackling food insecurity, and expand clean energy infrastructure through the Prosper Africa, Feed the Future, and Power Africa initiatives. We will
support climate adaptation, conser vation, and a just energy tran sition, as sub-Saharan African
countries are already ex periencing severe climate impacts, compounding land use, migration
challenges, and rising food and commodity prices , made worse by Russia’s further invasion of
Ukraine. Quality healthcare systems are essential to economic growth, and we will build on our decades-long partnerships to invest in health security and health systems infrastructure, and the ongoing COVID-19 response. We will also work with African governments to create the business environments and make the investments in human capital and capacity development to
attract investors, grow businesses, and creat e good jobs across sectors—and to bolster
U.S.-Africa trade and create new opportunities fo r U.S. businesses. We will seek to offer
opportunities that reflect America’s competitiv e advantages, promoting inclusive growth,
respecting workers’ rights, and protecting the region’s resources for future generations.
Maintain a Peaceful Arctic
The United States seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative.
Climate change is making the Arctic more accessible than ever, threatening Arctic communities and vital ecosystems, creating new potentia l economic opportunities. and intensifying
competition to shape the region’s future. Russia has invested significantly in its presence in the Arctic over the last decade, modernizing its military infrastructure and increasing the pace of exercises and training operations. Its aggressive behavior has raised geopolitical tensions in the
Arctic, creating new risks of unintended conflict a nd hindering cooperation. The PRC has also
sought to increase its influence in the Arctic by rapidly increased its Arc tic investments, pursuing
new scientific activ ities, and using these scientific enga gements to conduct dual-use research
with intelligence or military applications.
We will uphold U.S. security in the region by improving our maritime domain awareness,
communications, disaster response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity to prepare for increased
international activity in the region. We will exerci se U.S. Government presence in the region as
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 45 required, while reducing risk a nd preventing unnecessary escalati on. Arctic nations have the
primary responsibility for addre ssing regional challenges, and we will deepen our cooperation
with our Arctic allies an d partners and work with them to sustain the Arctic Council and other
Arctic institutions despite the ch allenges to Arctic c ooperation posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine.
We will continue to protect freedom of navigation and determine the U.S. extended continental shelf in accordance with international rules. We must build resilience to and mitigate climate
change in the region, including through agreemen ts to reduce emissions and more cross-Arctic
research collaboration. As econo mic activity in the Arctic in creases, we will invest in
infrastructure, improve livelihoods, and encourage responsible private sector investment by the
United States, our allies, and our partners, including in critical minerals, and improve investment screening for national security purposes. Acro ss these efforts, we will uphold our commitment to
honor Tribal sovereignty and self-governance through regular, meaningful, and robust
consultation and collaboration with Alaska Native communities.
Protect Sea, Air, and Space
People around the world depend on the sea, air, and space for their security and prosperity.
The world’s interconnected oceans, lands, waterw ays, and other ecosystems generate economic
opportunity and enable critical co mmercial and military activity. Th ey contain biodiversity vital
to food security, clean air and water, a stable c limate, and health and wellbeing. Threats to these
systems—including excessive maritime and airspace claims , pollution and unregulated
deforestation, and wildlife tra fficking and illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing—impact
governments’ abilities to meet basic human ne eds and contribute to political, economic, and
social instability. We will stand up for freedom of navigation and overflight, support
environmental protection, and oppos e destructive distant water fi shing practices by upholding
international laws and norms, including the customary international law rules in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. And we will promote Antarctica’s status as a continent
reserved for peace and science in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.
Space exploration and use benefits humanit y, from creating economic opportunities to
developing new technologies a nd enabling climate surveillance. America will maintain our
position as the world’s leader in space and work alongside the international community to ensure
the domain’s sustainability, safety, stability, and security. We must lead in updating outer space
governance, establishing a space traffic coordination system and charting a path for future space norms and arms control. Working with allies and partners, we will develop policies and regulations that enable the burgeoning U.S. commercial space sector to compete internationally. We will enhance the resilience of U.S. space systems that we rely on for critical national and homeland security functions. These efforts aim to protect U.S. interests in space, avoid destabilizing arms races, and responsibly steward the space environment.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 46 Sharpen Our Tools of Statecraft
Our national security institutions and workforce underpin America’s global leadership and the
security, prosperity, and freedoms of the Americ an people. To achieve our ambitious aims, we
must modernize and adapt our tools of statecraft for today’s challenges. For example, we are:
x Strengthening American diplomacy by modern izing the Department of State, including
through the recent creation of a new bureau for cyberspace and digital policy and special
envoy for critical and emerging technologies.
x Adapting the Intelligence Community (IC), including by aligning our organizations to
better address competition, embraci ng new data tools, and e nhancing integration of open
source material.
x Enhancing U.S. and global early warning a nd forecasting for infectious disease threats
and pandemics by increasing support for the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) Center for Outbreak, Forecasting, and Analytics and foreign
assistance for global health security.
x Reorganizing the Office of the Under Secretar y of Defense for Policy to sharpen its focus
on emerging technologies and elevate senior leader attention to critical regions.
Bolstering the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Cybersecurity Service by reimagining how DHS hires, develops, and retains top-tier and di verse cyber talent.
x Making development assistance more accessibl e and equitable by increasing engagement
with and shifting 25 percent of U.S. Agen cy for International Development (USAID)
funding to local partners, and double USAID’ s work on empowering women and girls.
x Expanding our engagement with stakeholders and build our capacity to partner with the
private sector, philanthropy, diaspora communities, and civil society.
x Prioritizing technology’s role in national security by elevating the White House Office of
Science and Technology Policy to a cabinet-le vel agency and full me mber of the National
Security Council.
The success of these efforts and our foreign policy will require strengthening the national
security workforce by recruiting and retainin g diverse, high-caliber talent. We are:
x Prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, a nd accessibility to ensure national security
institutions reflect the Ameri can public they represent.
x Creating more effective and efficient hi ring, recruitment, re tention, and talent
development practices, particularly in STEM fields, economics, critical languages, and
regional affairs.
x Supporting professional development opportunities—for bot h leadership and technical
skills—at all levels of the workforce.
x Opening opportunities for the national security workforce to move among institutions,
both within and outside government, and carry the skills they develop back to their home
agencies.
x Equipping the workforce with cutting-edge technology and better integrate data and
analytic tools to support decision-making.
x Prioritizing human resources ca pabilities and personnel, who w ill drive and steward all of
these initiatives.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 47 The health of our national security institutions and workforce relies on faith in the apolitical nature
of Federal law enforcement agencies, the IC, our diplomats, civil servants, Federally funded
research and development institutions, and military as we work together in national service.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
48PART V: CONCLUSION
We are confident that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, is positioned to
succeed in our pursuit of a free, open, prosperous, and secure global order. With the key elements outlined in this strategy, we will tackle the twin challenges of our time: out-competing our rivals to shape the international order while tackling shared challenges, including climate change, pandemic preparedness, and food security , that will define the next stage of human
history. We will strengthen democracy across th e world, and multilateral institutions, as we look
to the future to chart new and fair rules of th e road for emerging technology, cybersecurity, and
trade and economics. And we will do all this and more by leveraging our considerable advantages and our unparalleled coalition of allies and partners.
As we implement this strategy, we will continually assess and reassess our approach to ensure
we are best serving the American people. We will be guided by the indisputable fact that the strength and quality of the American project at home is inextricably linked with our leadership in
the world and our ability to shape the terms of the world order. This National Security Strategy will be evaluated by an overriding metric: whether it makes life better, safer, and fairer for the people of the United States, and whether it lif ts up the countries and people around the world
who share our vision for the future.
We are motivated by a clear visi on of what success looks like at th e end of this decisive decade.
By enhancing our industrial capacity, investing in our people, and strengthening our democracy,
we will have strengthened th e foundation of our economy, bolst ered our national resilience,
enhanced our credibility on the world stage, and ensured our competitive advantages.
By deepening and expanding our diplomatic relationships not only with our democratic allies but
with all states who share our vision for a better future, we will have developed terms of competition with our strategic rivals that are favorable to our interests and values and laid the foundation to increase cooperation on shared challenges.
By modernizing our military, pursuing advanced technologies, and investing in our defense
workforce, we will have strengthened deterrence in an era of increasing geopolitical confrontation, and positioned Americ a to defend our homeland, our a llies, partners, and interests
overseas, and our values across the globe.
By leveraging our national strengths and rallying a broad coalition of allies and partners, we will
advance our vision of a free, open, prosper ous, and secure world, outmaneuvering our
competitors, and making meaningful progress on issues like climate change, global health, and food security to improve the lives not just of Americans but of people around the world.
This is what we must achieve in this decisive decade. As we have done throughout our history,
America will seize this moment and rise to the challenge. There is no time to waste.
Document ID: talking-us-national-security-with-returning-senior-fellow-thomas-wright