Wicker, Roger F.: We meet this morning to receive testimony on the posture of the United States Space Command and the United States Strategic Command. We're joined today by General Stephen Whiting and Admiral Richard Correll. Thank our witnesses for again appearing and for their long service to our nation. Over two years ago, the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission reached the unanimous bipartisan conclusion that the United States must fundamentally update our strategic capabilities to have any hope of countering growing threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The progress we've made since then has been limited, but Russia and China have advanced by leaps and bounds in their nuclear and space programs. Even North Korea has outpaced our efforts as Kim Jong-un steadily expands his nuclear and missile arsenals. As we enter the fifth year of war criminal Vladimir Putin's war against Ukraine, Russia remains a major strategic threat to the United States. Moscow owns the world's largest and most modern nuclear arsenal, giving it a 10-to-1 advantage over the United States in tactical nuclear weapons. Russia has also developed new weapons, unlike anything in the U.S. inventory. It stocks nuclear-powered trans-oceanic autonomous torpedoes and international cruise missiles. For its part, Xi's China is rapidly becoming an even greater threat. Beijing is expanding its nuclear arsenal at breakneck speed, likely outpacing the U.S. by the early 2030s. Already, it has successfully deployed an operational strategic triad of nuclear missiles, bombers, and submarines. Over the past few years, China quadrupled the size of its nuclear arsenal and built an ICBM network larger than our own here in the United States. The Chinese have flown a missile that can drop nuclear warheads from orbit anywhere on Earth with virtually no warning. Both Russia and China understand that space is a battlefield. They are openly developing and testing capabilities to degrade or destroy our satellite constellations. Each country has obliterated operational satellites, scattering thousands of fragments of debris and endangering hundreds of other orbital objects. Unfortunately, these aggressive actions only scratch the surface of Moscow and Beijing's militarization of space. North Korea is a less immediate threat than China or Russia, but it is a threat nonetheless. Kim Jong-un is increasingly able to attack the United States and our allies. North Korea is conducting frequent missile tests and is working to fuel ballistic missile submarines. Both actions make one thing clear. Kim Jong-un believes he can achieve his goals through nuclear threats. The Golden Dome Initiative is long overdue and is a reassessment of the capabilities we need to defend our homeland from strategic attacks. The President allowed the outdated New START Treaty to expire, and he exposed Moscow's and Beijing's illicit nuclear testing. I believe both actions helped reset the strategic balance that has tipped against us for decades. Operations Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury eliminated the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, permanently, I hope. Still, there's much more we need to do. We must restore the National Nuclear Security Administration's basic industrial capabilities. We must make progress on the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, the Columbia submarine, and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile programs. We must explore what additional nuclear and space capabilities we need to deter Putin's, Xi's, and Kim's ambitions. These efforts require sustained investment and innovation we can afford no less. During this hearing, I'd like to hear how we are managing the risk of maintaining critical military capabilities that are both too old and too few in number to meet the threats of today, much less the threats of tomorrow. I'd also like to leave this hearing understanding better how our witnesses see the roles of their commands evolving under the latest national defense strategy. It's no secret that I believe this NDS falls short in several areas. I'm particularly concerned that the current strategy does not address space and nuclear threats with anywhere near the urgency they deserve. So undoubtedly, we'll talk about that today. And I now turn to my friend and colleague, Ranking Member Reed.